Sustainable coalitions in the commons

Mathematical Social Sciences

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 57-64

  Doyen, Luc ^a   Péreau, Jean Christophe ^b  

^a SORBONNE UNIVERSITÉ   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE BORDEAUX   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84155172839     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.006     Document Type: Article

References (36)

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