On the very idea of genetic justice: Why Farrelly's pluralistic prioritarianism cannot tackle genetic complexity

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 64-77

  Loi, Michele ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CHRONIC DISEASE; CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY; ETHICAL THEORY; ETHICS; GENE; GENETIC PREDISPOSITION; GENETIC PRIVACY; GENETICS; HUMAN; LIFESTYLE; RISK FACTOR; SOCIAL JUSTICE; SOCIOECONOMICS;

CHRONIC DISEASE; CULTURAL DIVERSITY; ETHICAL ANALYSIS; ETHICAL THEORY; GENES; GENETIC PREDISPOSITION TO DISEASE; GENETIC PRIVACY; GENETIC RESEARCH; HUMANS; LIFE STYLE; RISK FACTORS; SOCIAL JUSTICE; SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS;

EID: 84055217692     PISSN: 09631801     EISSN: 14692147     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0963180111000508     Document Type: Article

References (63)

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5. See note 3, Buchanan 2008, at 7-10.
6. Rawls J. A Theory of Justice. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1999:54-5.
7. The moral importance of general-purpose means, in contrast to narrow-range instrumental goods, is explained by the fact that it would be rational to desire more of them whatever one's ends in life, for a large range of human ends. Thus their goodness is alleged to be explained by a "thin theory of the good" valid for every rational person (see Rawls 1999:347-50).
8. In Political Liberalism, for example, primary goods are regarded as things citizens need, if they see themselves as free and equal persons. See Rawls J. Political Liberalism. exp. ed. New York: Columbia University Press; 1996:187-90. The inclusion of leisure time and freedom from physical pain as additional primary goods (in Rawls 1996:181-2) is only contemplated as a possibility but never definitively endorsed.
9. See note 6, Rawls 1999:54.
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12. These problems were central to the debate concerning the "currency of egalitarian justice." See note 10, Sen 1982.
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18. See note 16, Farrelly 2002, at 81
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20. Notice that the analogies and relationships between certain genetic characteristics or natural abilities and general-purpose means (primary goods) are used by different philosophers to make different points. See for instance, note 1, Buchanan et al. 2000:167-8.
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23. This is the view of John Rawls, who claims that "even if an equal distribution of natural assets seemed more in keeping with the equality of free persons, the question of redistributing these assets (were this conceivable) does not arise, since it is incompatible with the integrity of the person." See note 7, Rawls 1996:283.
24. See note 16, Farrelly 2002, at 80.
25. See note 16, Farrelly 2002, at 81.
26. Farrelly C. Genetic justice must track genetic complexity. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2008;17(01):45-53, at 48.
27. See note 17, Farrelly 2004, at 47.
28. See note 24, Farrelly 2008, at 50.
29. See note 17, Farrelly 2004, at W26.
30. See note 17, Farrelly 2004, at W26.
31. See note 17, Farrelly 2004, at W24.
32. See note 24, Farrelly 2008, at 48-50.
33. See note 17, Farrelly 2004, at W26, emphasis in the original.
34. See note 17, Farrelly 2004, at W26.
35. See note 24, Farrelly 2008, at 47, emphasis in the original.
36. See note 24, Farrelly 2008, at 48.
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38. See note 35, Arneson 2000, at 343.
39. See note 35, Arneson 2000, at 343.
40. Another feature of Arneson's approach is that it attaches a different moral weight to "altering a state of affairs in a way that makes someone better off or worse off" according to a person's "degree of responsibility⋯ for her present condition" (344), hence the qualification of "responsibility sensitive" in its label. See note 35, Arneson 2000.
41. See note 17, Farrelly 2004, at W26.
42. Farrelly has stated very clearly that his ambition is not to provide a set of serially ordered principles of justice, like those of Rawls's theory. Serial ordering is only one possible way in which trade-offs between principles could be defined (one could do it, in theory, by providing a set of logical and mathematical functions). Yet, Farrelly does not seem to aim to provide any comprehensive theory of justice, one in which the problem of evaluating trade-offs is explicitly dealt with. He claims that the lax genetic difference principle "is designed so that it can be balanced against the demands of other principles of justice"
43. (see note 17, Farrelly 2004, at W26), via a reasonable genetic intervention model. This is offered as a procedural solution (a fair deliberative procedure) through which different stakeholders contribute to determine the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of restricting reproductive freedom for the sake of other values.
44. See Farrelly C. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis, reproductive freedom, and deliberative democracy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2009;34(2):135-54. By analogy, Farrelly could propose a procedural solution for the problem of assessing interactions between different goods. So far, however, this goal seems to lie outside the horizon of his preoccupations.
45. See note 24, Farrelly 2008, at 46, emphasis in the original.
46. See note 24, Farrelly 2008, at 46, emphasis in the original.
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54. See note 24, Farrelly 2008, at 49.
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56. See note 51, Tabery 2009, at 32, emphasis in the original.
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58. See note 51, Tabery 2009, at 28, emphasis in the original.
59. See note 51, Tabery 2009, at 32, emphasis in the original.
60. Here I speak loosely about P and R, regarding them as different genes. It would be more appropriate to regard them as two different alleles, that is to say, versions of the same gene.
61. It could be objected that, in the scenario in question, improving educational conditions for half of the population qualifies as a goal of justice independently from duties of genetic justice and that, for that reason, the scenario in question could never occur in a fully just society. This might be true in ideal theory, but not in the context of nonideal theory, for which Farrelly's principles are intended. E.g., when international monetary institutions require a balanced budget, educational justice might have to be compromised with other legitimate goals of justice.
62. See note 51, Tabery 2009, at 41-3.
63. See note 24, Farrelly 2008, at 49.