Adaptive evolution of cooperation through darwinian dynamics in public goods games

PLoS ONE

Volumn 6, Issue 10, 2011, Pages

  Deng, Kuiying ^a,b   Chu, Tianguang ^a  

^a PEKING UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; COOPERATION; DARWINIAN DYNAMICS; EVOLUTIONARY ADAPTATION; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; GAME; NATURAL SELECTION; NONLINEAR SYSTEM; POPULATION MODEL; POPULATION STRUCTURE; PUBLIC GOOD GAME; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL EVOLUTION; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; EVOLUTION; HUMAN; HUMAN RELATION; POPULATION DYNAMICS; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MODELS, GENETIC; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 80055037375     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0025496     Document Type: Article

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