CEO ability and management earnings forecasts

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 28, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 1645-1668

  Baik, Bok ^a   Farber, David B ^b   Lee, Sam Sunghan ^c  

^a Seoul National University   (South Korea)

^b MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80054695714     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: 19113846     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.2011.01091.x     Document Type: Article

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