Credibility of voluntary disclosure

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 359-374

  Stocken, Phillip C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034377306     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2601045     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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