Constrained automated mechanism design for infinite games of incomplete information

Proceedings of the 23rd Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2007

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 400-407

  Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy ^a   Reeves, Daniel M ^b   Wellman, Michael P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPLICATION DOMAINS; BLACK-BOX OPTIMIZATION; CANDIDATE MECHANISMS; GAME MODELS; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; INFINITE GAME; MECHANISM DESIGN; OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS; OPTIMAL MECHANISM; PARAMETRIC DESIGN; SELECTION PROCESS; STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS; TWO STAGE;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; MACHINE DESIGN;

OPTIMIZATION;

EID: 80053166244     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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