Comments on Gendler's, "the epistemic costs of implicit bias"

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 156, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 65-79

  Egan, Andy ^a,b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052921865     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9803-5     Document Type: Article

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