Friendship and belief

Philosophical Papers

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 329-351

  Keller, Simon ^a  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 20444473703     PISSN: 05568641     EISSN: 19968523     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/05568640409485146     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Williams James, ‘The Will to Believe’, in James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York:Longmans, Green and Co., 1927) 1–31.
2. There can also, of course, be dangers in having a coach with an inflated view of your capabilities. Good coaches and motivators are people who, among other things, are optimistic about the prospects of those whom they are coaching, without this leading to their setting expectations or training regimes whose eventual effect will be to harm performance.
3. Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett, ‘Friendship and the Self’, Ethics, 108 (1998) 502–527. See also Amelie O. Rorty, ‘The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes:Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986) 399–412; Neil Delaney, ‘Romantic Love and Loving Commitment:Articulating a Modern Ideal’, American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996) 338–340; and my ‘How Do I Love Thee? Let Me Count the Properties’, American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2000) 163–173.
4. ‘Friendship and the Self’, p. 504.
5. See Bernard Williams, ‘Deciding to Believe’, in Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge University Press, 1973) 136–151.
6. Susan Wolf, ‘Moral Saints’, The Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982) 419–439. See the last section, especially.
7. For some relevant discussion, see Lawrence A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), especially chapters III-IV; Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett, ‘Friendship and Moral Danger’, The Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000) 257–277; Laurence Thomas, Living Morally:A Psychology of Moral Character (Temple University Press, 1989), especially chapters 4–5; and J. David Velleman, ‘Love as a Moral Emotion’ Ethics 109 (1999) 338–374.
8. I am very grateful for the comments and criticisms of the members of the Philosophy Department at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, especially Ben Caplan, Joyce Jenkins, Carl Matheson, Tim Schroeder and Rob Shaver. Thanks also to Aaron Garrett, Amelie Rorty and the editors of Philosophical Papers.