Information sales and strategic trading

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 9, 2011, Pages 3069-3104

  García, Diego ^a   Sangiorgi, Francesco ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80051989229     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhr041     Document Type: Article

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