Strategic noise in competitive markets for the sale of information

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 179-209

  Germain, Laurent ^a,b,c  

^a TOULOUSE BUSINESS SCHOOL   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^c Europlace Institute of Finance   (France)

Author keywords

Banks; Contracts; Fund management; Market efficiency; Noise

Indexed keywords

EID: 17144368466     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2005.03.001     Document Type: Article

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