Beyond the courtroom: The impact of judicial activism on socioeconomic rights in Latin America

Texas Law Review

Volumn 89, Issue 7, 2011, Pages 1669-1698

  Rodríguez Garavito, César ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES   (Colombia)

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EID: 79960986395     PISSN: 00404411     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (156)

1. Nilson Elías Pinilla Pinilla, CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF COLOMBIA], http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/lacorte/pinilla.php.
2. CONSULTORÍA PARA LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y EL DESPLAZAMIENTO (CODHES) [CONSULTANCY FIRM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISPLACEMENT], ¿CONSOLIDACIÓN DE QUÉ? INFORME SOBRE DESPLAZAMIENTO, CONFLICTO ARMADO Y DERECHOS HUMANOS EN COLOMBIA EN 2010 [CONSOLIDATION OF WHAT? REPORT ON DISPLACEMENT, CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN COLOMBIA IN 2010] 8 (2011) (stating that over five million Colombians were internally displaced over the past twenty-five years)
3. Gobierno cumple meta de 40 mil hectáreas de coca erradicadas [Government Meets Target of 40,000 Hectares of Eradicated Coca], ACCIÓN SOCIAL: AGENCIA PRESIDENCIAL PARA LA ACCIÓN SOCIAL Y LA COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL [ACCIÓN SOCIAL: PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY FOR SOCIAL ACTION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION], http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID127&conID1081 (describing Luis Alfonso Hoyos as the director of the Acción Social agency in Colombia).
4. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025/04 (slip op. at 1), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/t-025-04.htm.
5. Id. at 80-81.
6. Id. at 67-68.
7. Id. at 67-73.
8. Id. at 75-80.
9. For an analysis of the CCC's doctrine of "unconstitutional states of affairs," see generally César Rodríguez Garavito, Más Allá del Desplazamiento, o Cómo Superar un Estado de Cosas Inconstitucional [Beyond Displacement, or How to Overcome an Unconstitutional State of Affairs], in MÁS ALLÁ DEL DESPLAZAMIENTO: POLÍTICAS, DERECHOS Y SUPERACIÓN DEL DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO EN COLOMBIA [BEYOND DISPLACEMENT: POLICIES, RIGHTS AND OVERCOMING DISPLACEMENT IN COLOMBIA] 434 (César Rodríguez Garavito ed., 2009). This work discusses the court's criteria for declaring the existence of an unconstitutional state of affairs and suggests judicial guidelines for assessing governmental responses to such situations and eventually declaring that they have been overcome.
10. C.C., febrero 2, 2000, Sentencia SU-090/00 (slip op. at 1), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2000/SU090-00.htm;
11. C.C., julio 27, 1999, Sentencia T-535/99 (slip op. at 5), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/ relatoria/1999/T-535-99.htm;
12. C.C., marzo 5, 1998, Sentencia T-068/98 (slip op. at 1-2), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1998/T-068-98.htm;
13. C.C., noviembre 6, 1997, Sentencia SU-559/97, (slip op. at 1-2), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1997/SU559-97.htm.
14. C.C., abril 28, 1998, Sentencia T-153/98 (slip op. at 1), available at http:// www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1998/ T-153-98.htm.
15. C.C., octubre 20, 1998, Sentencia T-590/98 (slip op. at 4), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1998/T-590-98.htm.
16. C.C., mayo 26, 1998, Sentencia SU-250/98 (slip op. at 3), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1998/SU250-98.htm.
17. C.C., julio 31, 2008, Sentencia T-760/08 (slip op.), available at http:// www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2008/T-760-08.htm.
18. Id. at 9-10.
19. Although the CCC has not explicitly drawn on comparative constitutional law to develop its jurisprudence on unconstitutional states of affairs, there are similarities between the jurisprudence of the CCC and the doctrines of structural injunctive remedies in common-law jurisdictions such as India, South Africa, and the United States.
20. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1976) ("[P]ublic law litigation will often, at least as a practical matter, affect the interests of many people. Much significant public law litigation is therefore carried out through the class action mechanism")
21. Danielle Elyce Hirsch, A Defense of Structural Injunctive Remedies in South African Law, 9 OR. REV. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (2007) (discussing the use of structural injunctions as remedies in South Africa);
22. S. Muralidhar, India: The Expectations and Challenges of Judicial Enforcement of Social Rights, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 102, 109 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008) (discussing the "continuing mandamus" approach of the Indian supreme court "where the Court keeps the case on board over a length of time for ensuring the implementation of its directions");
23. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1019 (2004) (discussing public law relief in the United States, which has moved toward "experimentalist intervention" that "combines more flexible and provisional norms with procedures for ongoing stakeholder participation and measured accountability").
24. César Rodríguez-Garavito, Toward a Sociology of the Global Rule of Law Field: Neoliberalism, Neoconstitutionalism, and the Contest over Judicial Reform in Latin America, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 156, 164-65 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2011) (noting the rise of progressive neoconstitutionalism and its impact on judicial activism and institutional reform in Latin America).
25. Muralidhar, supra note 16, at 109-10 (asserting that the Supreme Court of India's remedies are creative in the public interest litigation context because the court is concerned with the importance of causes to the public at large);
26. Shylashri Shankar & Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Courts and Socioeconomic Rights in India, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE 146, 146 (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008) ("In the last two decades, the higher judiciary in India transformed nonjusticiable economic and social rights such as basic education, health, food, shelter, speedy trial, privacy, anti-child labor, and equal wages for equal work into legally enforceable rights.").
27. SANDRA LIEBENBERG, SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: ADJUDICATION UNDER A TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION 45, 80-81 (2010) (describing the role of the South African courts in enforcing socioeconomic rights in the 1996 South African constitution);
28. Jonathan Berger, Litigating for Social Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Focus on Health and Education, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 38, 39 (focusing on instances where "poor people" in South Africa have brought litigation under their rights of access to health care services and education);
29. Sandra Liebenberg, South Africa: Adjudicating Social Rights Under a Transformative Constitution, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 16, at 75, 81-96 (discussing significant South African socioeconomic-rights cases addressing "rights to land and housing, health care services, and social security").
30. SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES 169-70 (2008) (discussing the court's Grootboom decision as it relates to the synergistic approach to activism);
31. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS 219 (2004) (discussing an opinion by the South African Constitutional Court holding that social and economic rights are "'at least to some extent"' justiciable)
32. Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 391, 391-393 (2007) (analyzing the Grootboom decision).
33. Strategic Litigation as a Tool for the Enforceability of the Right to Education: Possibilities and Obstacles, ASOCIACIÓN POR LOS DERECHOS CIVILES [ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS], 1 (May 20, 2008), http://www.redligare.org/IMG/pdf/litigio_estrategico_educacioningles.pdf (noting that the Association for Civil Rights has been using strategic litigation as a tool for social change for over a decade).
34. generally GUSTAVO MAURINO ET AL., LAS ACCIONES COLECTIVAS: ANÁLISIS CONCEPTUAL, CONSTITUCIONAL, PROCESAL, JURISPRUDENCIAL Y COMPARADO [CLASS ACTIONS: ANALYSIS CONCEPTUALLY, CONSTITUTIONALLY, PROCEDURALLY, JURISPRUDENTIALLY AND COMPARATIVELY] (2005) (offering a strategic overview of legal mechanisms for collective legal suits, with an emphasis on Brazil, Colombia, and the United States).
35. Felipe González Morales, El trabajo clínico en materia de derechos humanos e interés público en América Latina [The Clinical Work Concerning Human Rights and Public Interest in Latin America], in ENSEÑANZA CLÍNICA DEL DERECHO: UNA ALTERNATIVA A LOS MÉTODOS TRADICIONALES DE FORMACIÓN DE ABOGADOS [THE CLINICAL EDUCATION OF RIGHTS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRADITIONAL METHODS OF LEGAL TRAINING] 175, 176 (Marta Villarreal & Christian Courtis eds., 2007) (discussing the achievements of legal clinics focusing on human rights and public interest law);
36. Stephen Meili, Staying Alive: Public Interest Law in Contemporary Latin America 5 (Univ. Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No. 09-48, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1518002 ("One of the most striking aspects of... public interest lawyering in Latin America is the way in which it has grown in both size and scope in the past 15 years.").
37. Bruce M. Wilson, Changing Dynamics: The Political Impact of Costa Rica's Constitutional Court, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 47, 59 (Rachel Sieder et al. eds., 2005) (noting that state coverage for AIDS drugs became readily available after Costa Rica's Constitutional Court recognized a constitutional right to state-funded medical care in the 1990s)
38. Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities?, 11 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J., no. 2, 2009 at 33, 35 (discussing the "epidemics of litigation" on the right to health in Brazil).
39. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 3/5/2005, "Verbitsky, Horacio/hábeas corpus," Colección Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [Fallos] (2005-328-1146), slip op., available at http://www.csjn.gov.ar/cfal/fallos/cfal3/ver_fallos.jsp?id222651&foriRHV00856-381.
40. CSJN, 8/7/2008, "Mendoza, Beatriz Silvia y otros c. Estado Nacional y otros/daños y perjuicios (daños derivados de la contaminación ambiental del Río Matanza - Riachuelo)," Fallos (2008-331-1622) (Arg.), slip op., available at http://www.csjn.gov.ar/cfal/fallos/cfal3/ver_fallos.jsp?id289823&foriORM01569-40B.
41. CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES, LITIGIO ESTRATÉGICO Y DERECHOS HUMANOS: LA LUCHA POR EL DERECHO [STRATEGIC LITIGATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE FIGHT FOR RIGHTS] 191, 193-94, 194 n.225 (2008) (referencing the enactment of legal reforms in response to Verbitsky);
42. Carolina Farstein, Gabriela Kletzel & Paola García Rey, En Busca de un Remedio Judicial Efectivo: Nuevos Desafíos para la Justiciabilidad de los Derechos Sociales [Searching for Effective Judicial Remedies: New Challenges to the Justiciability of Socioeconomic Rights], in DERECHOS SOCIALES: JUSTICIA, POLÍTICA Y ECONOMÍA EN AMÉRICA LATINA [SOCIAL RIGHTS: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS IN LATIN AMERICA] 27, 55 (Pilar Arcidiácono, Nicolás Espejo Yaksic & César Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2010) (discussing (1) the court's order in Mendoza directing federal, provincial, and local officials to design and implement a plan to cleanup the Riachuelo River, and (2) the creation of a basin authority to implement the plan).
43. For a global survey of the practice and literature on SER litigation, see generally SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 16, which compiles essays providing critical analysis of some two thousand judgments and decisions from twenty-nine national and international jurisdictions.
44. Rodolfo Arango, La justiciabilidad de los derechos sociales fundamentales [The Justiciability of Fundamental Social Rights], 12 REVISTA DE DERECHO PÚBLICO [J. PUB. L.] 185, 186 (2001) (Colom.) (reconstructing the conceptual foundations of SER on the basis of a theory of subjective rights that takes into account the material conditions that are necessary for the effective enjoyment of rights);
45. DAVID BILCHITZ, POVERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE JUSTIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 115-17 (2007) (describing a "thin" rights-based theory of judicial review, under which the principle of the "equal importance" of individuals would sometimes require courts to provide welfare support to indigent individuals, even where the democratic majority would have preferred not to do so).
46. VÍCTOR ABRAMOVICH & CHRISTIAN COURTIS, LOS DERECHOS SOCIALES COMO DERECHOS EXIGIBLES [SOCIAL RIGHTS AS ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS] 37-47 (2002) (offering a systematic overview of legal sources and doctrines supporting the justiciability of socioeconomic rights);
47. Malcolm Langford, The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 16, at 3, 6-9 (narrating the historical development of economic and social rights in conjunction with the human rights movement).
48. There are at least two notable exceptions regarding the implementation of activist rulings. See Daniel M. Brinks & Varun Gauri, A New Policy Landscape: Legalizing Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 303, 320-34 (studying a host of factors in the implementation of rulings on social and economic rights, including what factors cause the targets of litigation to comply and the direct and indirect beneficiaries of activist rulings);
49. Rodrigo Uprimny & Mauricio García-Villegas, Corte Constitucional y emancipación social en Colombia [Constitutional Court and Social Emancipation in Colombia], in EMANCIPACIÓN SOCIAL Y VIOLENCIA EN COLOMBIA [SOCIAL EMANCIPATION AND VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA] 463, 491-509 (Boaventura Santos & Mauricio García eds., 2004) (detailing a study of the practical effectiveness of Colombian Constitutional Court decisions vindicating social rights and their impact on social movements).
50. CÉSAR RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO & DIANA RODRÍGUEZ FRANCO, CORTES Y CAMBIO SOCIAL: CÓMO LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL TRANSFORMÓ EL DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO EN COLOMBIA [COURTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: HOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT TRANSFORMED FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN COLOMBIA] (2010).
51. C.C. abril 28, 1998, Sentencia T-153/98 (slip op.), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1998/T-153-98.htm.
52. Id. at 74-75.
53. C.C., julio 31, 2008, Sentencia T-760/08 (slip op. at 200-03), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2008/T-760-08.htm.
54. Id. at 195-200.
55. Dixon K, supra note 20, at 393 (describing the dialogic model of enforcing socioeconomic rights).
56. MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 1-2 (1994) (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in County of Washington, Oregon v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), which allowed women who alleged sexual discrimination through disparities in wages between different positions to sue under Title VII, but asserting that the decision had little direct impact on gender-based pay equity).
57. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39 (1991) (discussing several different authors' views on how Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), affected the Civil Rights Movement and race relations in the U.S.).
58. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 4 (1998) (using the prison reform cases as an illustration to construct a theory of judicial policy making).
59. CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1-2 (1998). Epp defines the time period of the "rights revolution" as lasting from 1961, when the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)-which allowed civil lawsuits against state officers-to the late 1960s, when the Court became "the guardian of individual rights." Id.
60. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2004). Hirschl defines "juristocracy" as the expansive judicial power that resulted from constitutional reforms shifting power from representative institutions to the judiciaries. Id.
61. MCCANN, supra note 38, at 290 (explaining that in neorealist social science, "[c]ausality is presumed to initiate with discrete judicial agents and is assessed by the degree to which it imposes coercive or moral force on the general citizenry").
62. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63. ROSENBERG, supra note 39, at 39.
64. id. at 156 ("While it must be the case that Court action influenced some people, I have found no evidence that this influence was widespread or of much importance to the battle for civil rights.").
65. id. at 52 (comparing the extent of school desegregation following Brown to that following the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and concluding that "[t]he actions of the Supreme Court appear irrelevant to desegregation.Only after [Congress passed civil rights legislation] was there any desegregation of public schools in the South.").
66. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 815-16 (1987) (formulating a constructivist theory of the legal field that views laws as a set of mutually constitutive set of institutions and symbols).
67. id. at 837-39, 848 (characterizing the law as an "'active' discourse" capable of receiving universal recognition and thus is the "quintessential form of the symbolic power of naming that creates the things named, and creates social groups in particular").
68. MC CANN, supra note 38, at 48 (describing the feminist movement's legal mobilization, which consisted of general legal action that led to effective political organization).
69. id. at 90-91 ("While lawyers, litigation, and legal discourse were hardly the sole or even the primary 'causes' of pay equity movement development, they did provide a very fundamental catalyzing force in the evolution of active struggle.").
70. Id. at 285.
71. SERGIO CLAVIJO, FALLOS Y FALLAS DE LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL: EL CASO DE COLOMBIA 1991-2001 [FAULTS AND FAILURES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: THE CASE OF COLOMBIA 1991-2001], at 19-44 (2001) (lambasting the CCC for its intervention in financial markets and the economy in general);
72. SALOMÓN KALMANOVITZ, LAS INSTITUCIONES Y EL DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO EN COLOMBIA [INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN COLOMBIA] 153-69 (2001) (criticizing the CCC for favoring public-service users, debtors, and trade unions during times of economic crisis).
73. I have previously analyzed the confrontation between economists and constitutional lawyers over judicial activism in Colombia.
74. See generally César Rodríguez-Garavito, Toward a Sociology of the Global Rule of Law Field: Neoliberalism, Neoconstitutionalism, and the Contest over Judicial Reform in Latin America, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 156 (Yzes Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2011).
75. Interestingly, the government's decree declaring the emergency (and the resulting decrees that reformed key components of the health care system) were subsequently struck down by the CCC on grounds that the administration could not resort to state-of-emergency legislation to fix policy failures caused by its own negligence, including its inaction vis-à-vis the structural injunctions of Judgment T-760. C.C., abril 21, 2010, Sentencia C-252/10 (slip op. at 164-65, 189), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2010/C-252-10.htm.
76. Interview with Patricia Ramo, Ombudsman's Office Delegate for Criminal and Prison Policy, in Bogotá, Colom. (Oct. 22, 2010).
77. For an example of such a coalition, consider Así Vamos en Salud. Seguimiento al cumplimiento de lasórdenes impartidas en la Sentencia T-760 de 2008 [Monitoring the Compliance with the Orders Issued in Judgment T-760 of 2008], ASÍ VAMOS EN SALUD, http://www.asivamosensalud.org/index.php?optioncom_content&viewarticle&id224%3ASentencia+T-+760+de+2008&catid36%3ALecturas+sugeridas&Itemid1 (last updated Sept. 11, 2009) (recognizing the organization's interest in monitoring compliance with Sentencia T-760/08).
78. MAURICIO GARCÍA VILLEGAS, LA EFICACIA SIMBÓLICA DEL DERECHO [THE SYMBOLIC EFFECTIVENESS OF LAW] 237-61 (1993) (expounding upon various degrees of symbolism in the law, spanning from expressive acts (mostly symbolic) to substantive acts (mostly material)).
79. See Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 273, 273 (1986) (offering "an image of culture as a 'tool kit' of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems").
80. See Thomas C. Tsai, Second Chance for Health Reform in Colombia, 375 LANCET 109, 109 (2010) ("[T]he spirit of T-760 advocates for a re-examination of how health resources in Colombia have been traditionally allocated to provide for an equitable and effective health insurance system").
81. The two media outlets included in the study were the daily El Tiempo and the weekly Semana.
82. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
84. See Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 79 (finding that the housing rights of people living in informal settlements in Cape Town had been violated).
85. Pearlie Joubert, Grootboom Dies Homeless and Penniless, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-08-08-grootboom-dies-homeless-and-penniless.
86. See Elisabeth Wickeri, Grootboom's Legacy: Securing the Right to Access to Adequate Housing in South Africa? iii (N.Y. Univ. Sch. Law Ctr. for Human Rights & Global Justice, Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights Series, Working Paper No. 5, 2004), available at http://www.chrgj.org/publications/docs/wp/Wickeri%20Grootboom%27s%20Legacy.pdf ("[D]espite the absence of sweeping change for South Africans. Grootboom provided a powerful tool for communities").
87. C.C., enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025/04 (slip op. at 96), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/T-025-04.htm.
88. Id. at 99-108.
89. Id. at 50-52.
90. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 530-35 (1987) (outlining the theory of "destabilization rights").
91. Interview with Hernando Toro, Coordinator, Ombudsman's Office of Attention to Displacement, in Bogotá, Colom. (Jan. 22, 2009).
92. See RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO & RODRÍGUEZ FRANCO, supra note 32, at 84-90 (detailing the court's mechanisms for holding the government accountable for the requirements of T-025).
93. Editorial, El año de los desplazados [The Year of the Displaced], EL TIEMPO, May 21, 2008, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-4200986.
94. See generally RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO & RODRÍGUEZ FRANCO, supra note 32, at 142-68 (describing the lack of coordination at the national level, within local authorities, and between central and local authorities).
95. Interview with Janeth Guevara Triana, Coordinator of Well-Being and Soc. Sec. of Teachers and Dirs., Ministry of Educ., in Bogotá, Colom. (Feb. 5, 2009).
96. Interview with Luis Domingo Gómez, Coordinating Committee Member, Ministry of the Environment, in Bogotá, Colom. (Jan. 11, 2009).
97. L. 250, febrero 7, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 45816 (Colom.).
98. See id. at 2 (listing enfoque de derechos as one of the guiding principles of the National Plan).
99. ACCIÓN SOCIAL, DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO EN COLOMBIA [FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN COLOMBIA] 7 (2011), available at http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/documentos/Retornos/CIDH%20Desplazamiento%20Forzado%20en%20Colombia%20Marzo%202010%20para%20Canciller%C3%ADa1.pdf.
100. See id. (identifying the budget allocations for IDPs in Colombia from 1999 through 2010).
101. C.C., enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025/04 (slip op. at 108-33), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/T-025-04.htm (directing a variety of agencies to take steps to comply with the goals of the order).
102. RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO & RODRÍGUEZ FRANCO, supra note 32, at 119-20.
103. Although the court has not issued an official declaration making the commission a party, it has effectively acknowledged it as a party. See, e.g., C.C., mayo 4, 2007, Auto 109/07 (slip op. at 64-69), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/Autos/2007/A109-07.htm (adopting indicators proposed by the commission to measure governmental progress in the fulfillment of IDP rights);
104. C.C., enero 26, 2009, Auto 008/09 (slip op. at 67-74), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/RELATORIA/Autos/2009/A008-09.htm (notifying the commission of the court's decision to maintain the declaration of an unconstitutional state of affairs in light of insufficient progress in governmental compliance with T-025).
105. See Muralidhar, K. supra note 16, at 110 (stating that the Indian supreme court has enlisted the help of such institutions as the National Environment Engineering Research Institute to submit reports and recommendations).
106. See C.C., enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025/04 (slip op. at 58), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/T-025-04.htm (noting that the lack of adequate information about zones that are fit for housing construction has frustrated the objectives of the program and generated resentment in some neighborhoods, and ordering the government agencies to provide the necessary information about existing measures so that the government could weigh the correct balance between security and economic assistance in order to provide adequate living conditions for IDPs).
107. COMISIÓN DE SEGUIMIENTO A LA POLÍTICA PÚBLICA SOBRE EL DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO [MONITORING COMMISSION ON PUBLIC POLICY ON FORCED DISPLACEMENT], SEPTIMO INFORME DE VERIFICACÍON SOBRE EL CUMPLIMIENTO DE DERECHOS DE LA POBLACIÓN EN SITUACIÓN DE DESPLAZAMIENTO [SEVENTH VERIFICATION REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE RIGHTS OF DISPLACED POPULATIONS] 87 (2008).
108. Id. at 55, 133-150.
109. CODHES, supra note 2, at 8.
110. Interview with Anonymous, ADACHO [Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians of the Chocó Province], in Quibdó, Colom. (July 24, 2008);
111. Interview with Eusebio Mosquera, Founder, AFRODES [National Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians], in Geneva, Switz. (Aug. 9, 2009).
112. Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Transitional Justice in Times of Conflict: Colombia's Ley de Justicia y Paz, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 49, 56 (2006) (observing the "human rights violations," including "forced displacements," resulting from armed conflict in Colombia).
113. See, e.g., Dixon supra note 20, at 393 (arguing for "a commitment to constitutional 'dialogue' as the most desirable model of cooperation between courts and legislatures in the enforcement of socioeconomic rights").
114. See id. at 407 (positing that where courts uphold rights-based claims with sweeping effects without employing the dialogic approach "the relationship between judicial review and democracy will tend to become far less certain").
115. Víctor Abramovich, Courses of Action in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Instruments and Allies, 2 SUR - INT'L J. ON HUM. RTS. 181, 196-205 (2005) (characterizing typical ways in which the judiciary oversees compliance with legal standards and thus participates in a dialogue of sorts with other branches of government);
116. Roberto Gargarella, Should Deliberative Democrats Defend the Judicial Enforcement of Social Rights?, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 233, 244-48 (Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí eds., 2006) (discussing examples of ways in which courts can intervene to implement social rights that are "fully respectful of the authority of the legislature" and "honor their commitment to democracy");
117. Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, Should Courts Enforce Social Rights? The Experience of the Colombian Constitutional Court, in JUSTICIABILITY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS: EXPERIENCES FROM DOMESTIC SYSTEMS 355-386 (Fons Coomans ed., 2006) (observing that the implementation of judicial decisions on SERs depends, among other factors, on "judicial mechanisms to guarantee their effective compliance, put forth in consensual contexts, which social movementscan politically appropriate and include in a legal strategy that forms part of their wider political struggle").
118. Gargarella supra note 95, at 237-39 (collecting authorities by authors and judges who argue for reduced participation of the judiciary in enforcing social rights);
119. Rodríguez-Garavito supra note 17, at 175-78 (describing the clash and ultimate stalemate between the supporters of progressive neoconstitutionalism, notably the Colombian Constitutional Court, and supporters of neoliberal economics);
120. Sabel & Simon supra note 16, at 1017 (noting the criticism that in SER cases in which the remedy entails institutional restructuring, courts may lack the information necessary to supervise such restructuring).
121. Dixon supra note 20, at 394 (celebrating "the potential for a constitutional judiciary to enhance the overall inclusiveness and responsiveness of a constitutional democracy").
122. ROSENBERG supra note 39, at 21 ("Courts lack the tools to readily develop appropriate policies and implement decisions ordering significant social reform.").
123. MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21 (2008) ("Courts exercise strongform judicial review when their interpretive judgments are final and unrevisable."). 100.
124. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 4-7 (1977) (criticizing decisions of United States federal courts that imposed complex or highly specific remedies in a deviation from the courts' traditional judicial role).
125. See FEELEY & RUBIN supra note 40, at 13-14 (detailing the rise of prison-reform cases and the extent of court intervention).
126. C.C., septiembre 16, 1999, Sentencia C-700/99 (slip op. at 67), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1999/C-700-99.htm.
127. See, e.g., ROSENBERG supra note 39, at 52 (noting the lack of progress in desegregating southern schools in the years following Brown).
128. C.C., septiembre 16, 1999, Sentencia C-700/99 (slip op.), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1999/C-700-99.htm.
129. Id. at 67.
130. Interview with William Jiménez, Attorney, in Bogotá, Colom. (Oct. 14, 2010). Mr. Jiménez represents banks in mortgage-collection suits.
131. Given my focus on structural rulings that mandate positive actions by the executive or the legislature, I do not dwell on negative remedies here, i.e., those that order elected authorities to abstain from a given course of action found to violate an SER, such as disproportionately taxing the poor. A deeper discussion of the topic is provided by Rodrigo Uprimny. See Uprimny, supra, note 95, at 381 (discussing types of judicial decisions, and clarifying that "negative remedies are judicial enforcements of prohibitions").
132. The T-025 decision itself provides a prime example of this process. See supra subpart I(B).
133. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
134. See id. at 750, 763 (declaring a violation of the right to health of HIV and AIDS patients because of access barriers to antiretroviral medication but declining to set forth a blanket approach for enforcement or a deadline for compliance);
135. Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 86-87 (requiring the government to implement and supervise measures to provide shelter but declining to set a timetable for such implementation).
136. See Muralidhar supra note 16, at 109 (summarizing jurisprudence that recognizes explicit rights, including a right of education flowing from the right to life; that requires compliance on a timetable; and that allows the court to exercise a "continuing mandamus" whereby it keeps the case active to ensure implementation of its directives).
137. See Abhinav Chandrachud, Dialogic Judicial Activism in India, THE HINDU (July 18, 2009), http://hindu.com/2009/07/18/stories/2009071852820800.htm (observing that the court's rights jurisprudence has extended from the rights of the impoverished to public administration and that its opinions have become foundations for dialogue and transparency, although this development may undermine enforceability).
138. See Farstein, Kletzel & García Rey, supra note 27, at 59-60 (recognizing the success of the amparo process in compelling the cleanup of the Riachuelo basin and the delegation of authority to implement the cleanup plan to an authority created by congress).
139. See C.C., abril 28, 1998, Sentencia T-153/98 (slip op. at 77), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1998/T-153-98.htm (describing the Colombian prisons as contributing to a "systematic [violation] of the most fundamental human rights").
140. See C.C., julio 31, 2008, Sentencia T-760/08 (slip op. at 172-76), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2008/T-760-08.htm (discussing issues with access to service when patients cannot afford to pay and recognizing a fundamental right to health);
141. C.C., enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025/04 (slip op. at 59-62), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/T-025-04.htm (recounting, among other things, the lack of human rights protections and the 80% poverty rate among IDPs, and finding that the situation violated constitutional rights).
142. C.C., Sentencia T-153/98 (slip op. at 83).
143. See C.C., enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025/04 (slip op. at 100), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/T-025-04.htm (affirming the competency of a domestic institution for designing and implementing a plan to improve the condition of IDPs).
144. Id. at 102.
145. C.C., Sentencia T-760/08 (slip op. at 60-61).
146. Id. at 195, 200-03 (citing L. 100/93, diciembre 23, 1993, D.O. (Colom.)).
147. See David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 319, 360 (2010) (recounting the "legislative-style hearings" conducted with NGOs and the court's "numerous" orders as to funding and other issues concerning implementation of T-025).
148. C.C., abril 28, 1998, Sentencia T-153/98 (slip op. at 78), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1998/T-153-98.htm.
149. See Alicia Ely Yamin & Oscar Parra-Vera, Judicial Protection of the Right to Health in Colombia: From Social Demands to Individual Claims to Public Debates, 33 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 431, 459 (2010) (recognizing that the success of implementation will depend on the court's ability-to date unexercised-to conduct public hearings and to engage the citizenry).
150. One exception to the court's passivity is a follow-up decision that ordered the government to immediately comply with the court's previous order to unify coverage for underage patients in the public and the private health care systems. C.C., diciembre 15, 2009, Auto 342A/09 (slip op. at 18- 19), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/Autos/2009/A342A-09.htm.
151. I use here a synthetic assessment of the rulings' impact, which aggregates the four types of effects-direct, indirect, material, and symbolic-discussed above.
152. See Yamin & Parra-Vera supra note 124, at 442 ("[C]ritics pointed to a perverse alliance between pharmaceutical companies, doctors, and judges in judicially-stimulated corruption that led to expensive pharmaceuticals being conceded to patients" (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)).
153. See RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO & RODRIGUEZ FRANCO, supra note 32, at 81 & nn.12-13 (naming some of the institutions and officials responsible for the deficiencies, and listing various common excuses they had given to IDPs who sought help and were denied).
154. C.C., abril 28, 1998, Sentencia T-153/98 (slip op. at 74-75), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1998/T-153-98.htm (noting that when the negligence of prison administration officials violates fundamental rights, or where there are serious and continuous violations of the law by authorities, those affected have a right to protection).
155. See Sabel & Simon supra note 16, at 1025 (recounting the involvement of a broad group of community stakeholders in a dialogic approach to improving public school financing after lawsuits were filed in Kentucky and Texas).
156. See Rodríguez Garavito, supra note 9, at 460-73 chart 3.