The plots that failed: Intelligence lessons learned from unsuccessful terrorist attacks against the United States

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 34, Issue 8, 2011, Pages 621-648

  Dahl, Erik J ^a  

^a NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 79960966069     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2011.582628     Document Type: Article

References (125)

1. The best known of these may be a list released by the White House in 2005 of ten plots that had been disrupted since the 9/11 attacks, which is discussed later in this article.
2. Brian Jenkins provides a list of some 46 failed plots, but provides fewdetails and no citations; see Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006), pp. 185-191.
3. As lightly shorter list is included as an appendix to Dallas Boyd et al., Why Have We Not Been Attacked Again? Competing and Complementary Hypotheses for Homeland Attack Frequency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency ASCO Report Number 2008 007, June 2008, pp. 165-166.
4. Useful recent listings are: Jena Baker McNeill, James Jay Carafano, and Jessica Zuckerman, "30 Terrorist Plots Foiled: How the System Worked, " Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 29 April 2010.
5. and Alejandro J. Beutel, "Data on Post-9/11 Terrorism in the United States, " Muslim Public Affairs Council Policy Memo Backgrounder, 13 May 2010.
6. Marc Sageman has recently studied all Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda-inspired plots, successful and unsuccessful, in the West since the formation of Al Qaeda in 1988: Marc Sageman, "Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan, " Perspectives on Terrorism 3(4) (December 2009), pp. 4-25.
7. Underlying Reasons for Success and Failure of Terrorist Attacks: Selected Case Studies, Homeland Security Institute Final Report, 4 June 2007.
8. Brian A. Jackson and David R. Frelinger, Understanding Why Terrorist Operations Succeed or Fail (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009).
9. Michael Jacobson, "Terrorist Dropouts: Learning from Those Who Have Left, " The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policy Focus 101, January 2010.
10. Exceptions include a recent study that examines 32 attacks thwarted since 9/11: Germain Difo, "Ordinary Measures, Extraordinary Results: An Assessment of Foiled Plots Since 9/11, " American Security Project Report, May 2010.
11. and Kevin Strom et al., Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009 (Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, October 2010), which examines 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets.
12. Another useful study that includes failed plots, but that is limited to post-9/11 radical Islamist attacks, is Jerome P. Bjelopera and Mark A. Randol, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, Congressional Research Service, 20 September 2010.
13. "Summary of the White House Review of the December 25, 2009 Attempted Terrorist Attack, " released by the White House on 7 January 2010.
14. Brian Jenkins, "Lessons for Intelligence, " Vanguard (Canada), 1 March 2006. Available at http://www.rand.org/commentary/030106VC.html
15. Paul R. Pillar, "Intelligence, " in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), p. 123.
16. Richard L. Russell, on the other hand, argues that intelligence successes are becoming known more often today, because the CIA public affairs staff often leaks its successes to the press anonymously: Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets it Wrong, and What Needs to be Done to Get it Right (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 22.
17. Statement for the Record by Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, Before the Joint Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 17 October 2002. Emphasis in the original. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002 hr/101702hayden.html.
18. CIA Director Leon Panetta has more recently written that "The CIA cannot speak publicly about its major victories-the plots foiled, the terrorists neutralized. " "The CIA is Proud to Be on the Front Lines against al-Qaeda, " The Washington Post, 10 January 2010.
19. Rohan Gunaratna, "Combating Al-Qaida and Associated Groups, " in Doron Zimmerman and Andreas Wenger, eds., How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007), p. 190.
20. Brian M. Jenkins, "Intelligence and Homeland Security, " in Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen and Daniel S. Hamilton, eds., Transatlantic Homeland Security: Protecting Society in the Age of Catastrophic Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 127.
21. Adam Liptak, "Suspected Leader of 9/11 Attacks Is Said to Confess, " The New York Times, 15 March 2007.
22. A CIA study of the results of detainee interrogation found that detainees "often try [to] pass incomplete or intentionally misleading information, perhaps hoping that the volume of the reporting will make it difficult to sort out the truth. " Central Intelligence Agency, Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida, 3 June 2005, p. 6.
23. In a separate report-completed before KSM's Guantanamo testimony-the CIA argued that information obtained from his debriefing led to disruption of several plots against the United States: "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida, " Central Intelligence Agency, 13 July 2004.
24. "Waiting for al-Qaeda's next bomb, " Economist, 5 May 2007, p. 30.
25. State of the Union Address, 23 January 2007, transcript as provided by The New York Times, 24 January 2007. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/23/washington/23bushtranscript. html
26. Statement by David C. Gompert, Acting Director of National Intelligence, 19 July 2010. Available at http://www.dni.gov/. Of note, the principal reporter for the Washington Post series, Dana Priest, said in an interview that she had asked intelligence officials for examples of intelligence successes, but she was not provided any: "We asked them to share with us anything they could, plots that were foiled that we could put in the paper because we didn't havemany examples.
27. We said give us things, just in generalities... and we didn't receive anything back. " NPR "Talk of the Nation, " 19 July 2010, with transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128624199
28. The White House, "Fact Sheet: Plots, Casings, and Infiltrations Referenced in President Bush's Remarks on the War on Terror, " 6 October 2005. Available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse. archives.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-7.html.
29. Other examples of the U.S. government touting its success in foiling terrorist plots and prosecuting terrorism related offenses include: The White House, 9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges, September 2006.
30. and the U.S. Department of Justice Counterterrorism White Paper, 22 June 2006.
31. For an examination of what is known about the incidents on the White House list, see "Thwarted Terrorist Attacks, " New York University Review of Law and Security 7, April 2006, pp. 16-21.
32. also Sara Kehaulani Goo, "List of Foiled Plots Puzzling to Some, " The Washington Post, 23 October 2005.
33. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse University, "Criminal Terrorism Enforcement in the United States During the Five Years Since the 9/11/01 Attacks. " Available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/.
34. An updated report that examined data through 2009 found that an increasing number of cases have resulted in convictions, suggesting what it calls "a more effective use of the criminal justice system. " Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001-September 11, 2009, January 2010, p. i.
35. Dan Eggen and Julie Tate, "U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism Charges, " The Washington Post, 12 June 2005.
36. New York University School of Law, Center on Law and Security, Terrorist Trial Report Card: U.S. Edition, 11 September 2006, p. 3. The Center on Law and Security has continued to track the results of terrorist trials, and its most recent reports are available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/pub newsletter.cfm?id=3.
37. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi disagree with the Center on Law and Security's conclusion that this data suggests policymakers have overestimated the terrorist threat. They argue that because authorities are successfully disrupting plots at an early stage by using criminal and other non-terrorism charges, it is not surprising that few trials result in terrorism convictions. The Convergence of Crime and Terror: Law Enforcement Opportunities and Perils, Manhattan Institute Center for Policing Terrorism, Policing Terrorism Report No. 1, June 2007, p. 16.
38. A prominent database that does include failed attacks is the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) database maintained by Edward F. Mickolus. The ITERATE database, however, only tracks international terrorism, so does not capture purely domestic plots and attacks. On ITERATE, see Peter A. Flemming, Edward Mickolus, and Todd Sandler, "Research Note: Using the ITERATE and DOTS Databases, " Journal of Strategic Security 1(1) (November 2008).
39. Published listings of terrorist activities that do cover failed attacks include Christopher Hewitt, Political Violence and Terrorism in Modern America: A Chronology (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005).
40. and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Joshua D. Goodman, and Laura Grossman, Terrorism in the West 2008: A Guide to Terrorism Events and Landmark Cases (Washington, DC: FDD Press, 2009).
41. National Counterterrorism Center Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, "Methodology. " Available at http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/wits subpage criteria.html
42. Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/faq/.
43. A recent study sponsored by the Department of Defense found that it was difficult to find good quality, openly available data on terrorism events in general, whether successful or unsuccessful. Rare Events, JASON study JSR-09-108, The MITRE Corporation, October 2009, pp. 44-45.
44. See http://www.isvg.org/faq.html
45. Joshua Sinai, "New Trends in Terrorism Studies: Strengths and Weaknesses, " in Magnus Ranstorp, ed., Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 43.
46. Berto Jongman, "Research Desiderata in the Field of Terrorism, " in Ranstorp, Mapping Terrorism Research, p. 283.
47. Stephen Marrin, "Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past, " International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17(4) (December 2004), p. 661.
48. The full data set, including criteria for the coding of intelligence and other factors, is available by e-mail from the author.
49. Eight plots are attributed to "other, " neither radical Islamism nor domestic extremism. The causes in these cases vary and are not always clear, for example in the case of a man who wanted to bomb the Alaskan oil pipeline during the Millennium celebrations in order to manipulate the oil futures market and cause financial panic. "Canadian Man Pleads Guilty to Plot to Blow Up Tans-Alaska Oil Pipeline, " Associated Press, 13 March 2008. Also coded as "other" are three attacks or plots against U.S. government facilities overseas in January 1991 that were apparently conducted by Iraqi Intelligence Service agents on orders from Saddam Hussein in retaliation for the U.S.-led Desert Storm.
50. See U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991.
51. National Counterterrorism Center, 2009 Report on Terrorism, 30 April 2010, p. 5, available at www.nctc.gov.
52. The author has not attempted to define "significant" damage or destruction, but further research would be useful in helping to determine a threshold; at what point does a certain level of destruction in an attack suggest that it was "successful"?
53. A fuller discussion of the various factors involved in determining whether to define attacks as successful or unsuccessful is in Brian A. Jackson and David R. Frelinger, Understanding Why Terrorist Operations Succeed or Fail (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009), pp. 2-3.
54. A prominent example of this sort of case not counted as a failed plot is that of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, a Texas-based Muslim charity accused by the U.S. government of providing support to Hamas. Five of its leaders were convicted on a variety of counts, including support of terrorism, in 2008, but the group was not accused of directly financing terrorist bombings or attacks. Gretel C. Kovach, "Five Convicted in Terrorism Financing Trial, " The New York Times, 25 November 2008.
55. For example, in 2005 authorities in California received a tip that six individuals had been smuggled into the United States from Mexico in order to obtain nuclear material, and they were on their way to Boston to launch some sort of attack. It turned out to be a hoax. Shelley Murphy, "FBI Finds Terror Threat Was Fabricated, " Boston Globe, 26 January 2005.
56. Another case not counted here is that of the "Detroit sleeper cell": on 17 September 2001, authorities in Detroit charged four men with conspiracy after evidence found in their apartment suggested they might have been terrorists. The charges were later dropped after allegations were made of prosecutorial misconduct. Philip Shenon, "Ex-Prosecutor Acquitted of Misconduct in 9/11 Case, " The New York Times, 1 November 2007.
57. In several cases plotters have thought they were carrying out attacks, only to find that law enforcement officials had supplied them with non-functioning weapons or explosives. These are not counted as actual attempted attacks, but as cases stopped at an earlier stage for some other reason (such as that an informant was involved and provided the fake weapons).
58. Michael Jacobsen, "They Trained. They Plotted. Then They Bailed, " The Washington Post, 23 March 2008.
59. KSM's Brooklyn Bridge Plot, The NEFA Foundation, August 2007. Available at www. nefafoundation.org.
60. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: Norton, 2004), pp. 176-179.
61. Robert Hanley, "Suspected Terrorist Convicted in Bomb Case, " The New York Times, 30 November 1988.
62. For an extensive discussion of this case, see University of Arkansas, Indicators of Terrorist Incidents, pp. 277-284.
63. See, for example, the Homeland Security Institute, Underlying Reasons for Success and Failure of Terrorist Attacks, pp. 61-65.
64. Greg Krikorian, "Plot Posed a Real, Immediate Threat, Experts Say, " Los Angeles Times, 15 December 2007.
65. Southern Poverty Law Center, The Second Wave: Return of the Militias, August 2009, p. 18.
66. Craig S. Smith, "North Africa Feared as Staging Ground for Terror, " The New York Times, 20 February 2007.
67. U.S.A. v. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, Criminal Complaint, 24 September 2009.
68. Al Baker and William K. Rashbaum, "3 Held Overseas in Plan to Bomb New York Target, " The New York Times, 8 July 2006.
69. Craig Whitlock, "Trial Opens In Alleged Plot Against U.S. Targets, " The Washington Post, 23 April 2009.
70. Central Intelligence Agency, Detainee Reporting Pivotal. Large sections of this report remain blacked out in the redacted version that has been publicly released, suggesting that additional plots and attacks may have been prevented, but are too sensitive to make public. Iyman Faris was reportedly arrested in part on the basis of information revealed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed; he had apparently already decided not to carry out the attempt to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge.
71. Brian M. Jenkins, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Washington, 31 March 2003. Available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/ hearings/hearing1/witness jenkins.htm
72. Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, "Success Against Al-Qaeda Cited, " The Washington Post, 30 September 2009.
73. This is not a new finding. A RAND study on terrorism in the 1970s found that informants and undercover sources were more often useful than wiretaps or other sources. Sorrel Wildhorn, Brian Michael Jenkins, and Marvin M. Lavin, Intelligence Constraints of the 1970s and Domestic Terrorism: Vol. I, Effects on the Incidence, Investigation, and Prosecution of Terrorist Activity (Santa Monica: RAND, December 1982), p. xi.
74. The importance of human intelligence in preventing terrorist attacks has also been seen in France: A French antiterrorism official recently claimed that 15 plots thwarted in recent years were all stopped as a result of information received from human sources. See Edward Cody, "Europe's Antiterrorism Agencies Favor Human Intelligence Over Technology, " The Washington Post, 12 May 2010.
75. William K. Rashbaum and Kareem Fahim, "Informer's Role in Bombing Plot, " The New York Times, 23 May 2009.
76. Cara Buckley and William K. Rashbaum, "4 Accused of Plot to Blow Up Facilities at Kennedy Airport, " The New York Times, 3 June 2007.
77. On the British case, see for example Don Van Natta Jr., Elaine Sciolino, and Stephen Grey, "Details Emerge in British Terror Case, " The New York Times, 28 August 2006.
78. On the Miami case, see "The Miami Plot to Bomb Federal Buildings and the Sears Tower, " The NEFA Foundation, updated January 2008. Available at www.nefafoundation.org
79. Stella Rimington, "'Humint' Begins at Home, " Wall Street Journal, 3 January 2005.
80. The study cited above by Kevin Strom and others, Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009, reached similar findings, noting that routine law enforcement activities and public vigilance are key factors in preventing terrorist attacks.
81. For background on the Lackawanna Six case, see Dina Temple-Raston, "Enemy Within? Not Quite, " The Washington Post, 9 September 2007.
82. and Bjelopera and Randol, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, pp. 109-112.
83. Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York Police Department, 2007), p. 62.
84. Matthew Purdy and Lowell Bergman, "Where the Trail Led, " The New York Times, 12 October 2003.
85. Purdy and Bergman, "Where the Trail Led. "
86. "Text of President Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address, " Washington Post, 28 January 2003. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/ bushtext 012803.html
87. For example, see Arthur S. Hulnick, Keeping Us Safe: Secret Intelligence and Homeland Security (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), pp. 126-127.
88. Ravi Satkalmi, "Material Support: The United States v. the Lackawanna Six, " Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28(3) (May 2005), pp. 193-199.
89. and Temple-Raston, "Enemy Within?"
90. Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, p. 59.
91. Temple-Raston, "Enemy Within?"
92. Ahmed Al-Haj, "Yemeni-American on FBI 'Most Wanted" List Jailed in San'a, " Associated Press, 19 May 2008.
93. Mark Mazzetti and David Johnston, "Bush Weighed Using Military in Arrests, " New York Times, 25 July 2009.
94. NEFA Foundation, "The Fort Dix Plot, " January 2008, p. 4. Available at http://www1. nefafoundation.org/reports.html.
95. See also Amanda Ripley, "The Fort Dix Conspiracy, " Time, 6 December 2007.
96. and George Anastasia and Troy Graham, "Dix Case a Test of New Laws, " Philadelphia Inquirer, 24 December 2008.
97. U.S. v. Shnewer, et al, superseding indictment, U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey Case 07-459 (RBK), 15 January 2008.
98. Geoff Mulvihill, "Fort Dix Tipster Steps into Limelight, " Associated Press, 30 May 2007. The store clerk, named Brian Morgenstern, was not initially identified by police, but he later came forward to give a series of media interviews.
99. Ripley, "The Fort Dix Conspiracy. "
100. Ripley, "The Fort Dix Conspiracy. "
101. Josh Meyer, "'Ft. Dix Six' Informants in Hot Seat Too, " Los Angeles Times, 19 October 2008.
102. and David Kocieniewski, "The Role of an F.B.I. Informer Draws Praise as Well as Questions About Legitimacy, " New York Times, 10 May 2007.
103. On this dilemma, see John Farmer Jr., "Playing Chicken With Suicide Bombers, " The New York Times, 27 September 2009.
104. Robert Block, "FBI Alters Tactics in Fight Against Terrorists, " Wall Street Journal, 23 May 2007.
105. "Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the Press Conference Announcing Guilty Plea by Najibullah Zazi, " U.S. Department of Justice press release, 22 February 2010. Available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100222.html
106. Robert S. Mueller III, prepared statement before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, 22 September 2010.
107. A. G. Sulzberger and William K. Rashbaum, "N.Y. Terror Suspect Admits Guilt and Cooperates, " The New York Times, 23 February 2010.
108. and John Marzulli, "Zazi, Al Qaeda Pals Planned Rush-Hour Attack on Grand Central, Times Square Subway Stations, " New York Daily News, 12 April 2010.
109. Judith Miller, "A Bullet Dodged, " New York Post, 26 September 2009.
110. On the CIA in Pakistan, see Brian Ross, Richard Esposito, and Clayton Sandell, "FBI Arrests Three Men in Terror Plot that Targeted New York, " ABC News, 20 September 2009. Available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/men-arrested-fbi-nyc-terror-plot/story?id = 8618732.
111. and Lolita Baldor, "NY Suspect Had Senior Al-Qaida Contact, " Associated Press, 6 October 2009.
112. "British Spies Help Prevent al Qaeda-Inspired Attack on New York Subway, " The Telegraph (London), 9 November 2009.
113. and Dina Temple-Raston, "Feds: N.Y. Subway Bomb Plot Included U.K. Targets, " NPR, 8 July 2010. Available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyId=128368594
114. U.S. Department of Justice press release, "Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al-Qaeda Plot to Attack the United States and United Kingdom, " 7 July 2010. Available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-nsd-781.html.
115. Julia Love, "Alleged Al Qaeda Operatives Indicted in New York Plot, " Los Angeles Times, 8 July 2010.
116. Raffaello Pantucci, "Manchester, New York and Oslo: Three Centrally Directed Al-Qa'ida Plots, " West Point Combating Terrorism Center CTC Sentinel August 2010, pp. 10-13. Available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/
117. Dina Temple-Raston, "Terrorism Case Shows Range of Investigators' Tools, " NPR, 3 October 2009. Available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId = 113453193
118. Temple-Raston, "Terrorism Case Shows Range of Investigators' Tools. "
119. U.S. v. Najibullah Zazi criminal complaint, 19 September 2009, p. 6.
120. Temple-Raston, "Terrorism Case Shows Range of Investigators' Tools. "
121. Baldor, "NY Suspect Had Senior Al-Qaida Contact. "
122. William K. Rashbaum and Al Baker, "How Using Imam in Terror Inquiry Backfired on Police, " The New York Times, 13 September 2009.
123. Spencer S. Hsu, "Al-Qaeda Operative Led N.Y. Subway Plot, U.S. Says, " The Washington Post, 8 July 2010.
124. William K. Rashbaum, "Qaeda Leader Indicted in New York Subway Plot, " New York Times, 7 July 2010.
125. On this new domestic-overseas hybrid threat, see Michael Leiter, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Statement for the Record before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, 22 September 2010. Available at http://www.nctc.gov/press room/speeches.html