Preventing intelligence failures by learning from the past

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 655-672

  Marrin, Stephen ^a  

^a Office s Defense Capabilities and Management team   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746490318     PISSN: 08850607     EISSN: 15210561     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/08850600490496452     Document Type: Article

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