Taking the road less traveled by: Does conversation eradicate pernicious cascades?

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 146, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 1418-1436

  Cao, H Henry ^a   Han, Bing ^b   Hirshleifer, David ^c  

^a Center for AI and Institutions at CKGSB   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Information cascades; Long run efficiency; Network communications

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960236100     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.010     Document Type: Article

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