Observational learning under imperfect information

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 72-86

  Çelen, Boǧaçhan ^a   Kariv, Shachar ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Herd behavior; Imperfect information; Informational cascades

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842502050     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00179-9     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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