Distributive justice and the durability of peace agreements

Review of International Studies

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 1137-1168

  Druckman, Daniel ^a,b   Albin, Cecilia ^c  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

^c UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960227551     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: 14699044     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210510000549     Document Type: Article

References (93)

1. Fred C. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).
2. Morton Deutsch, 'Equity, Equality and Need: What Determines Which Value Will Be Used as the Basis of Distributive Justice?', Journal of Social Issues, 31:3 (1975), pp. 137-50.
3. Mary A. Konovsky, 'Understanding Procedural Justice and Its Impact on Business Organizations', Journal of Management, 26:3 (2000), pp. 489-511.
4. Cecilia Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001);
5. Cecilia Albin, 'The Role of Fairness in Negotiation', Negotiation Journal, 9:3 (1993), pp. 223-44;
6. I. William Zartman and Victor A. Kremenyuk (eds), Peace versus Justice: Negotiating Forward-and Backward-Looking Outcomes (Lanham,Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
7. Zartman and Kremenyuk, Peace versus Justice.
8. Konovsky, 'Understanding Procedural Justice and Its Impact on Business Organizations';
9. R. Buchanan, 'Perpetual Peace or Perpetual Process: Global Civil Society and Cosmopolitan Legality at the World Trade Organization', Leiden Journal of International Law, 16 (2003), pp. 673-99.
10. Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation.
11. Our decision to take this approach is not meant to preclude the importance of perceptions in justice decisions. Indeed, useful research on justice has been reported from a psychological perspective. (See G. Mikula and M. Wenzel, 'Justice and Social Conflicts', International Journal of Psychology, 35:2 (2000), pp. 126-35;
12. Morton Deutsch, Distributive Justice: A Social-Psychological Perspective (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1985). However, the focus of this study on past peace agreements does limit the extent to which perceptions and opinions can be assessed. Simply put, the actors are not available for interviews and few provide first-person documentation of their experiences. Thus, our analyses reveal general patterns that would be further amplified by data on perceptions.
13. V. Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004);
14. D. Nilsson, 'In the Shadow of Settlement: Multiple Rebel Groups and Precarious Peace', Doctoral dissertation, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden (2006).
15. http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/definitions-all.htm.
16. Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
17. Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
18. Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation, p. 38.
19. Ibid., pp. 81-96.
20. Donald Rothchild, 'Settlement terms and postagreement stability', in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
21. C. Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
22. Zartman and Kremenyuk, Peace versus Justice.
23. See, for example, Mary A. Konovsky and S. D. Pugh, 'Citizenship Behavior and Social Exchange', Academy of Management Journal, 37 (1994), pp. 656-69.
24. C. Hartzell and M. Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars (University Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007);
25. C. Hartzell and M. Hoddie, 'Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post Civil War Conflict Management', American Journal of Political Science, 47 (2003), pp. 318-32. (Pubitemid 36618995)
26. A. Jarstad and R. Sundberg, 'Peace by pact: Data on the implementation of peace agreements', in A. Swain, A. Ramses and J. Ojendal (eds), Globalization and Challenges to Building Peace (London: Anthem Press, 2007).
27. Jack Snyder and L. Vinjamuri, 'Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice', International Security, 28 (2003/4), pp. 5-44; (Pubitemid 38421796)
28. T. Putnam, 'Human rights and sustainable peace', in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002);
29. Max Bazerman and Margaret Neale, 'The role of fairness considerations and relationships in a judgment perspective of negotiations', in Kenneth Arrow, Robert Mnookin, Lee Ross, Amos Tversky and R. Wilson (eds), Barriers to Conflict Resolution (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995);
30. Zartman and Kremenyuk, Peace versus Justice.
31. Snyder and Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors, p. 2.
32. For example, see Daniel Druckman, Benjamin Broome and Susan Korper, 'Value Differences and Conflict Resolution: Facilitation or Delinking?', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32 (1988), pp. 489-510.
33. Daniel Druckman and Justin Green, 'Playing two games: Internal negotiations in the Philippines', in I. William Zartman (ed.), Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington DC.: Brookings, 1995).
34. Druckman and Green, 'Playing two games'.
35. Bazerman and Neale, 'The role of fairness considerations', p. 89.
36. Zartman and Kremenyuk, Peace versus Justice.
37. Gerald S. Leventhal, J. Karuza and W. R. Fry, 'Beyond fairness: A theory of allocation preferences', in G. Mikula (ed.), Justice and Social Interaction (New York: Springer Verlag. 1980).
38. Roy J. Lewicki, J. A. Litterer, J. W. Minton and D. M. Sanders, Negotiation (2nd Edition) (Burr Ridge IL.: Irwin, 1994).
39. George Downs and Stephen J. Stedman, 'Evaluation issues in peace implementation', in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
40. Daniel Druckman and Terrence Lyons, 'Negotiation processes and post-settlement relations: Comparing Nagorno-Karabakh with Mozambique', in I. William Zartman and Victor A. Kremenyuk (eds), Peace vs. Justice: Forward and Backward Looking Outcomes in Negotiation (Lanham MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
41. Moorad Mooradian and Daniel Druckman, 'Hurting Stalemate or Mediation? The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990-1995', Journal of Peace Research, 36 (1999), pp. 709-27.
42. Trust is regarded as a variable or construct that intervenes between the conflict environment and the durability of agreements. As noted in fn. 8 above, measurements of perceptions are beyond the scope of this study. Thus, it is not included in the above hypotheses.
43. See Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation.
44. Thomas C. Schelling, 'Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (1957), pp. 19-36.
45. Morton Deutsch, 'Equity, Equality and Need: What Determines which Value will Be Used as the Basis of Distributive Justice?', Journal of Social Issues, 31 (1975), pp. 137-50.
46. See also John Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness', Philosophical Review, 67 (1958), pp. 164-94.
47. Eric Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
48. Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation.
49. Donald Rothchild, 'Settlement terms and postagreement stability', in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
50. Zartman and Kremenyuk, Peace versus Justice.
51. Jay Rothman, Resolving Identity-based Conflict in Nations, Organizations, and Communities (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997);
52. Jay Rothman, 'Negotiation as Consolidation: Prenegotiation in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict', The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 13 (1991), pp. 22-44.
53. I. William Zartman, 'Negotiating forward and backward-looking outcomes', in I. William Zartman and Victor A. Kremenyuk (eds), Peace versus Justice. Negotiating Forward-and Backward-Looking Outcomes (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
54. Druckman and Lyons, 'Negotiation processes and post-settlement relations'.
55. Zartman, 'Negotiating forward and backward-looking outcomes'.
56. Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation.
57. Equivalent distances between the steps from marginal to highly significant are based on the assumption that increments in significance are matters of degree; in this scale the increments are .25. The larger distance between the codes for marginally significant and no principles (1 scale step) is based on the assumption that inclusion of any principles is qualitatively distinct from no inclusion.
58. In addition, ratings done by experts were compared to those provided by students in a graduate programme on diplomacy. The cases were Cambodia and Bosnia. The same justice score of 5 was assigned to Cambodia; the experts assigned a justice score of 5 while the students gave a score of 4 to Bosnia.
59. Downs and Stedman, Evaluation issues in peace implementation.
60. These codes were used in order to maintain consistency with the other variables coded by Downs and Stedman and used in our correlational analyses. An independent check on the Downs-Stedman implementation codes by the authors revealed disagreements in only two of the 16 cases. These anomalies are discussed below.
61. Other types of agreements may require different time spans. For example, multilateral environmental agreements often specify complex conditions for implementation - some provisions may take more time to kick in than others. However, there is a trade off between the length of the implementation period examined and the amount of information needed to track adherence by each of the parties.
62. The experts were Ramses Amer (Cambodia) and James Goodby (Bosnia). See Downs and Stedman, 'Evaluation issues in peace implementation'.
63. Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict.
64. Somalia is another case where many justice principles are included in an agreement that did not endure. This may however be accounted for by a very difficult conflict environment. Further, the documentation on the implementation period in Somalia is less detailed than for Rwanda. For these reasons, the Somalia coding remains in tact.
65. Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict.
66. For discussions of the strengths and weaknesses of Sobel and related statistical tests for mediation effects, see R. M. Baron and D. A. Kenny, 'The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social-Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51 (1986), pp. 1173-82;
67. D. P. MacKinnon, C. M. Lockwood, J. M. Hoffman, S. G. West and V. Sheets, 'Estimating Mediated Effects in Prevention Studies', Evaluation Review, 23 (2002), pp. 418-44. For calculation procedures with SPSS and SAS
68. see K. J. Preacher and A. F. Hayes, 'SPSS and SAS Procedures for Estimating IndirectEffects in Simple Mediation Models', Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36 (2004), pp. 717-31. (Pubitemid 40251423)
69. For more on the relative strengths and weaknesses of these methods, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge MA.: MIT Press, 2005);
70. and Daniel Druckman, Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis (Thousand Oaks CA.: Sage, 2005), ch. 7.
71. Note that this scale differs from the one used in the quantitative analyses. It contains only four categories: Highly significant, important, marginal, none. The change was made to account for differences in the familiarity of the respective coders with the cases and concepts. The distinctions were less fine for the students who participated in the small-n focused-comparison study than for the more experienced coders of the complete set of agreements.
72. Correlations were also computed with the 16 cases, including Rwanda and the original implementation code for El Salvador. Similar results were obtained. However, as noted earlier, the correlation between DJ and implementation was lower, both when controlling and not controlling for difficulty of the conflict environment.
73. The correlation between number of justice principles and the measure of centrality of the principles is strong (.59). Number of principles also correlates significantly with implementation (r = .65). However, when the centrality variable is removed by partial correlation, the relationship between number of principles and durability drops to borderline significance (.48). Although not interchangeable with the centrality variable, number of principles is part of a cluster of correlated variables that includes centrality, implementation, and difficulty. The former three variables load positively while the fourth variable (difficulty) loads negatively on the same factor. This factor accounts for two-thirds of the explained variation in the analysis.
74. Similar results were obtained from a regression analysis. A significant main effect was obtained for difficulty, a borderline effect for justice (p < .10) and a borderline interaction between difficulty and justice. The interaction bolsters our interpretation of a modest moderating effect of justice on the relationship between difficulty and outcomes.
75. The related samples tests are based on the assumption that the four principles are multiple (correlated) measures of the same construct. An independent samples test is based on the assumption that the measures are uncorrelated. None of the six correlations among the four types of principles approach significance; they range from .03 to .40. A one-way ANOVA for independent samples was also calculated showing similar results: F = 7, 3 df, p < .0001. Tukey post hoc multiple comparisons showed that equality was more central to the agreements than proportionality (p < .0001), compensation (p < .081), and need (p < .066).
76. The borderline finding is impressive given the challenge of attaining a significant z with a small number of cases.
77. Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (source used by the coders).
78. Deutsch, Distributive Justice: A Social-Psychological Perspective.
79. Lewicki, Litterer, Minton and Sanders, Negotiation (2nd Edition).
80. Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law.
81. See also Jarstad and Sundberg, 'Peace by pact'.
82. Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace.
83. Jon Elster, 'The psychology of democracy in America', in The Great Ideas Today (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1994), p. 108.
84. Sources include the cases discussed by the contributed chapters in Stedman et al., Ending Civil Wars, and in Paris, At War's End.
85. Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1995).
86. P. Raszelenberg, The Cambodia Conflict: Search for a Settlement, 1979-1991: An Analytical Chronology (Hamburg, Germany: Institute of Asian Affairs, 1995).
87. See Druckman, Doing Research, ch. 6 for the procedures;
88. see Cynthia Irmer and Daniel Druckman, 'Explaining negotiation outcomes: Process or context?', Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 2 (2009), pp. 209-235 for an application to peace negotiations.
89. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff and Tom R. Tyler, 'Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential', Law & Social Inquiry, 33 (2008), pp. 473-500.
90. For example, Mikula and Wenzel, 'Justice and Social Conflicts'.
91. Maxwell A. Cameron and Brian W. Tomlin, The Making of NAFTA: How the Deal was Done (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 2000).
92. See also the ten trade cases analysed in Druckman for turning points in the negotiation process. (Daniel Druckman, 'Turning Points in International Negotiation: A Comparative Analysis', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45 (2001), pp. 519-44). These cases can also be used to evaluate the justice-durability hypothesis.
93. See Robert Keohane, 'Reciprocity in International Relations', International Organization, 40 (1986), pp. 1-28.