Just another change of guard? Broad-based politics and civil war in Museveni's Uganda

African Affairs

Volumn 110, Issue 440, 2011, Pages 387-416

  Lindemann, Stefan ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CIVIL WAR; MILITARY INTERVENTION; POLITICAL POWER; POLITICAL VIOLENCE; STATE ROLE;

UGANDA;

EID: 79959857145     PISSN: 00019909     EISSN: 14682621     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adr023     Document Type: Article

References (111)

1. President Yoweri Museveni, 1986 inauguration speech.
2. I define armed conflict as a civil war if: (1) the parties are politically and militarily organized and have publicly stated objectives; (2) the government is a principal combatant; (3) the insurgents are locally represented and recruit locally; (4) the conflict causes at least 500 to 1,000 deaths during the first year or at least 1,000 cumulative deaths in the next three years; and (5) the weaker party is able to mount effective resistance, measured by at least 100 deaths inflicted on the stronger party.
3. See Nicholas Sambanis, 'What is civil war?: Conceptual and empirical complexities of an operational definition', Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, 6 (2004), pp. 829-31.
4. Project Ploughshares, 'Armed Conflicts Report 2009' (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, 2009).
5. For a literature review see Michael L. Ross, 'What do we know about natural resources and civil war?', Journal of Peace Research 41, 3 (2004), pp. 337-56.
6. Frances Stewart (ed.), Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies (Palgrave, New York, NY, 2008).
7. Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, 'Ethnic politics and armed conflict: a configurational analysis of a new global data set', American Sociological Review 74, 2 (2009), pp. 316-37.
8. See, among many, Arendt Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1977).
9. Michael G. Burton and John Higley, 'Elite settlements', American Sociological Review 52, 3 (1987), pp. 295-307.
10. Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, 'Institutionalizing peace: power sharing and post-civil war conflict management', American Journal of Political Science 47, 2 (2003), pp. 318-32.
11. Douglas C. North, John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009).
12. For a different concept of the elite bargain see Jonathan DiJohn and James Putzel, 'Political settlements' (GSDRC Issues Paper, International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2009).
13. I define elites as 'holders of strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, including dissident ones, who are able to affect national political outcomes regularly and significantly'.
14. See Mattei Dogan and John Higley, 'Elites, crises, and regimes in comparative analysis', in Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds), Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 1998), p. 15.
15. Daniel Treisman, The Architecture of Government: Rethinking political decentralisation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007).
16. See below on why I considered ethnic and ethno-regional affiliations as the most salient social cleavages.
17. Following the Weberian tradition, I define ethnicity as a subjectively felt sense of belonging based on the belief in shared culture and common ancestry.
18. See Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundrisse der verstehenden Soziologie (Mohr, Tübingen, 1985), p. 237.
19. Abdu B. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985 (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1994).
20. Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism (James Currey, London, 1996).
21. Jan J. Jørgensen, Uganda: A modern history (Croom Helm, London, 1981).
22. Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985 (Palgrave, London, 1987).
23. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda.
24. Jørgensen, Uganda.
25. For an overview see Stefan Lindemann, 'Exclusionary elite bargains and civil war onset: the case of Uganda' (Crisis States Working Paper 76, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2010).
26. Interview evidence suggests that the significance of religious divisions has decreased since the 1980s and is now clearly outweighed by ethnic cleavages. As for class cleavages, social stratification has undoubtedly increased in both rural and urban areas but has hardly given rise to distinct class-based identities that shape collective behaviour (that is, in the form of political parties).
27. Uganda Bureau of Statistics, '2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census: Analytical Report Population Composition' (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Kampala, 2006).
28. On the role of the ethnic question in public debates see, for example, 'There is nothing wrong with tribalism', The Monitor, 5 January 2009.
29. The significant effects of ethnicity on vote choice are confirmed in the Uganda panel of the Afrobarometer survey.
30. Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion, Democracy and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004).
31. In Central Region, for instance, only 63 percent of the local residents actually belong to the Baganda ethnic group (see Uganda Bureau of Statistics, '2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census', p. 23).
32. The vast majority of the early NRA recruits were Banyankole (see Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence (Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2007), p. 108), and mostly from the Bahima subgroup (Museveni's group).
33. As the Bahima are numerically very small, the NRA chose to launch their guerrilla war in Buganda where the opportunity to mobilize popular support was greatest due to the almost unreserved resentment against the Obote II government (Interview, Maj.-Gen. Jim Muhwezi, MP, NRM, Kampala, 15 January 2009). The NRA's nationalist rhetoric notwithstanding, the insurgency had a strongly 'anti-northern' undertone, which reflected the rebels' shared hatred for the pro-Obote forces who hailed mostly - yet not exclusively - from northern Uganda. This is even confirmed by otherwise laudatory NRA insiders.
34. See Ondoga O. Amaza, Museveni's Long March: From guerrilla to statesman (Fountain, Kampala, 1998), p. 62.
35. On no-party democracy see Giovanni M. Carbone, No-Party Democracy? Ugandan politics in comparative perspective (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2008).
36. NRM Ten-Point Political Programme, reproduced in Amaza, Museveni's Long March, p. 242.
37. For details see Aili M. Tripp, Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of power in a hybrid regime (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2010), pp. 48-9.
38. Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record 1994-1996: Annual survey and documents (Holmes and Meier, New York, NY, 2002), p. B444.
39. Some interviewees argued that it is not enough to focus on key ministers since certain presidential advisers, deputy ministers or permanent secretaries are often more influential behind the scenes. While my approach may be limited, it still tells us more about where real power lies than simply focusing on ministers and deputies.
40. Various interviews, Kampala, December 2008.
41. Joshua B. Rubogoya, Regime Hegemony in Museveni's Uganda: Pax Musevenica (Palgrave, New York, NY, 2007).
42. While some claim that Museveni is a Muhororo/Tutsi, most Ugandans - including Museveni himself - consider him as a Munyankole from the Bahima subgroup.
43. For details see Tom Goodfellow and Stefan Lindemann, 'From strongest ally to fiercest rival? The fallout between the Museveni government and the Buganda Kingdom' (conference paper, African Studies Association UK Biennial conference, Oxford, 2010).
44. Interview, Kitara McMot, LCV vice-chairman, Gulu District, Gulu, 17 January 2009.
45. Various interviews, Kampala, December 2008.
46. A prominent example would be Cosmas Adyebo from Lango, who was Prime Minister in the early 1990s.
47. Government of Uganda, 'The Official Report of the Parliament of Uganda' (Hansard), 12 May 2009, col. 3.11.
48. Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record 1987-1988: Annual survey and documents (Holmes and Meier, New York, NY, 1990), p. B446.
49. 'Does Museveni favour Bahima kinsmen?', The Independent, 22 February-6 March 2008.
50. These include the Commander of Defence Forces (CDF), the Deputy Commander of Defence Forces (DCDF), the Joint Chief of Staff (JCOS), the Commander Land Forces (CLF), the Commander Air Forces (CAF), the Chief of Staff Land Forces (COS-LF) and the Chief of Staff Air Forces (COS-AF).
51. General, Lieutenant General, Major General, Brigadier, and Colonel.
52. These include the Chief Political Commissar (CPC), Francis Okello, and two of the current Division Commanders, Lucky Kidega and Charles Otema Owany (all Acholi).
53. Interview, Maj.-Gen. Mugisha Muntu, former Army Commander, Kampala, 9 December 2008.
54. Government of Uganda, 'Statutory report of the privatisation and utility sector reform project for the periods July to December 2004, 2005, 2006' (GoU, Kampala, 2008).
55. Andrew Mwenda and Roger Tangri, 'Patronage politics, donor reform and regime consolidation in Uganda', African Affairs 104, 416 (2005), p. 456.
56. James Okuku, 'Ethnicity, state power and the democratisation process in Uganda' (Discussion Paper 17, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 2002), p. 38.
57. Government of Uganda, 'The Official Report of the Parliament of Uganda' (Hansard), 29 April 2009, col. 7.17.
58. For details see Roger Tangri and Andrew Mwenda, 'Corruption and cronyism in Uganda's privatization in the 1990s', African Affairs 100, 398 (2001), pp. 117-33.
59. Examples include the Acholi Inn (Col. Otema Awany - Acholi), the Lira Hotel (Sam Engola - Langi), the Soroti Hotel (Mike Mukula - Itesot), or the Mount Moroto Hotel (Cornelius Kodet - Karamojong).
60. Nelson Kasfir, 'Guerrillas and civilian participation: the National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981-86', Journal of Modern African Studies 43, 2 (2005), pp. 271-96.
61. For details see Emmanuel Ssewankambo, Jesper Steffensen, and Per Tidemand, 'Local level service delivery, decentralisation and governance: Uganda case report' (Japan International Cooperation Agency, Tokyo, 2008).
62. International Monetary Fund, 'Government Finance Statistics' (ESDS International, University of Manchester, Manchester, 2009).
63. Government of Uganda, 'Decentralisation in Uganda: the policy and its implications' (GoU, Kampala, 1994).
64. 'Govt names fourteen new districts', The New Vision, 19 May 2009.
65. 'This is districtisation epidemic not service delivery', The Monitor, 15 May 2010.
66. Mwenda and Tangri, 'Patronage politics', p. 457.
67. Ssewankambo et al., 'Local level service delivery', p. 141.
68. Ole Therkildsen and Per Tidemand, 'Staff management and organisational performance in Tanzania and Uganda: public servants' perspectives' (Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2007), p. 71.
69. 'Museveni's letter: guidance on Banyoro Bafuuriki question', The Monitor, 31 July 2009.
70. Interview, Salaamu Musumba, Deputy President, Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), Kampala, 14 January 2009.
71. Cited in Amii Omara-Otunnu, 'The struggle for democracy in Uganda', Journal of Modern African Studies 30, 3 (1992), p. 456.
72. Dan Nabudere, 'The hidden war, the forgotten people: war in Acholiland and its ramifications for peace and security in Uganda' (Report, Human Rights and Peace Centre, Kampala, 2003), p. 45.
73. Zachary Lomo and Lucy Hovil, 'Behind the violence: causes, consequences and the search for solutions to the war in northern Uganda' (Working Paper 11, Refugee Law Project, Kampala, 2004), p. 5.
74. Interview, Walter Ochora, Resident District Commissioner, Gulu District, Gulu, 22 January 2009.
75. Adam Branch, 'Neither peace nor justice: political violence and the peasantry in northern Uganda, 1986-1998', African Studies Quarterly 8, 2 (2005), pp. 9-11.
76. Robert Gersony, 'The anguish of northern Uganda: results of a field-based assessment of the civil conflicts in northern Uganda' (Report, United States Embassy, Kampala, 1997), p. 31.
77. Caroline C. Lamwaka, 'Civil war and the peace process in Uganda, 1986-1997', East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 4, 2 (1998), pp. 139-69.
78. Heike Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits (James Currey, Oxford, 1999).
79. Unnamed HSM soldier, cited in Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits, p. 163.
80. For a detailed treatment of the LRA see Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot (eds), The Lords's Resistance Army: Myth and reality (Zed Books, London, 2010).
81. Lomo and Hovil, 'Behind the violence', p. 16.
82. Sverker Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings: War, history, and everyday moments in Uganda (Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2008), p. 122.
83. International Crisis Group, 'Northern Uganda: seizing the opportunity for peace' (ICG Africa Report 124, ICG, Kampala, Nairobi, and Brussels, 2007), p. 5.
84. International Crisis Group, 'Northern Uganda: the road to peace, with or without Kony' (ICG Africa Report 148, ICG, Nairobi, Kampala, Juba, and Brussels, 2008), p. 2.
85. Note that some question the authenticity of these demands, claiming that members of the Acholi diaspora - who dominated the LRA delegation during the Juba Peace Talks - have opportunistically imposed their own political agenda from the outside (Interview, Fabius Akumu-Alya, Director, Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies, Gulu University, Gulu, 21 January 2009).
86. Gérard Prunier, 'Rebel movements and proxy warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo', African Affairs 103, 412 (2004), p. 366.
87. This paragraph draws on Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Conflict Transformation and Social Change in Uganda: Remembering after violence (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2008).
88. In 1992, for instance, 3,000 ex-UPA rebels joined the NRA.
89. See 'Our politicians: Musa Ecweru', The Sunday Vision, 4 October 2008.
90. Zachary Lomo and Lucy Hovil, 'Negotiating peace: resolution of conflicts in Uganda's West Nile Region' (Working Paper 12, Refugee Law Project, Kampala, 2004), pp. 14-15.
91. Nabudere, 'The hidden war, the forgotten people', p. 34.
92. Lomo and Hovil, 'Negotiating peace', p. 11.
93. Gersony, 'The anguish of northern Uganda', p. 87.
94. Lomo and Hovil, 'Negotiating peace', pp. 12-13.
95. 'Rebels reap 10 govt posts', The New Vision, 27 December 2002.
96. Sallie S. Kayunga, 'The impact of armed opposition on the movement system in Uganda', in Justus Mugaja and Joe Oloka-Onyango (eds), No-Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and realities (Fountain, Kampala, 2000), p. 115.
97. Prunier, 'Rebel movements and proxy warfare', pp. 369-71.
98. For details see Nelson Kasfir, The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and ethnicity in African politics, with a case study of Uganda (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1976), pp. 130-6.
99. Note that Crispus Kiyonga, a key minister in Museveni's government since 1986 and often thought to be a Mukonzo, is in fact from the tiny Banyabindi ethnic group. As such, he was long the 'headmaster' of those opposed to the restoration of the Omusingaship and therefore strongly opposed by most Bakonzo.
100. Prunier, 'Rebel movements and proxy warfare', pp. 373-4.
101. 'ADF rebellion: guerrilla to urban terrorism', The New Vision, 21 May 2007.
102. Cited in Lomo and Hovil, 'Negotiating peace', p. 13.
103. Branch, 'Neither peace nor justice', p. 16.
104. Cited in Elliott D. Green, 'Decentralization and conflict in Uganda', Conflict, Security and Development 8, 4 (2008), p. 432.
105. Interview, Fabius Akumu-Alya, Director, Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies, Gulu University, Gulu, 21 January 2009.
106. Green, 'Decentralization and conflict in Uganda'.
107. 'Museveni districts breeding tribal wars', The Independent, 30 June 2009.
108. For details see Goodfellow and Lindemann, 'From strongest ally to fiercest rival?'.
109. Beti Kamya, 'Where is Museveni's heart?', The Monitor, 28 January 2008.
110. 'More deaths in Kampala riots', The New Vision, 11 September 2009.
111. According to eyewitnesses, people were dragged out of cars at roadblocks in several parts of the city because they looked like Banyankole, and beaten up.