Life after Bilski

Stanford Law Review

Volumn 63, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 1315-1348

  Lemley, Mark A ^a   Risch, Michael ^b   Sichelman, Ted ^c   Wagner, R Polk ^d  

^a STANFORD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959824299     PISSN: 00389765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (166)

1. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
2. 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
3. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922 (July 27, 2010) (providing an explanation of considerations to use in determining subject matter eligibility of method claims in view of the abstract idea exception).
4. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65, 71-72 (1972).
5. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187, 191-93 (1981) ("On the other hand, when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.... [W]e do not view respondents' claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber products....").
6. The one exception-J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001)-involved the interaction of the patent statute with other specialized statutes protecting plants.
7. Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2001).
8. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). While there were three dissents, only Judge Pauline Newman would have found the claims to be patentable subject matter.
10. Id. at 954.
11. See id. at 957.
12. Id. at 959-61.
13. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229-30 (2010).
14. See id. at 3227.
15. Id. at 3227;
16. id. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 3258 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
17. Kristen Osenga, Waiting for Bilski: A Patent Story 5 (July 12, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1650061 ("In the end, [Bilski] tells Bar and Academy nothing more than has already been said. The men remain in the same fog of confusion.").
18. In fact, the Bilski patent had a co-inventor, Rand Warsaw. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3218. However, for simplicity, we assume in the text that Bilski was the sole inventor.
19. See id. at 3249 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Indeed, many believe that the concurrence was originally to be the majority opinion.
20. Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski's Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1289 (2011).
21. See No. CV 09-06918 RGK (PLAx), 2010 WL 3360098, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010).
22. Id. at 3.
23. Dave Healey, BPAI: Tough on Software Claims Post-Bilski, Pat. Math (Dec. 7, 2010), http://patentmath.com/bpai-tough-on-software-claims-post-bilski.
24. No. 2009-006352, 2010 WL 2985362, at *2 (B.P.A.I. July 28, 2010).
25. Beauregard claims are directed to software stored on a medium such as a CD-ROM claimed as an article of manufacture. See In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
26. Tse-Huong Choo, 2010 WL 2985362, at *5 (citations omitted); accord Ex parte Kelkar, No. 2009-004635, 2010 WL 3768175 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 2010).
27. See also Ex parte Christian, No. 2009-006589, 2010 WL 3389297, at 2 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 23, 2010) ("A claim that recites no more than software, logic, or a data structure (i.e. an abstraction) does not fall within any statutory category.... 'Abstract software code is an idea without physical embodiment.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 449 (2007))); Note
28. Ex parte Ramanujam, No. 2009-002483, 2010 WL 3214559, at 4 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 12, 2010) (finding that claims "are therefore directed to software per se, which falls outside the scope of patentable subject matter"); Ex parte Caccavale, No. 2009-006026, 2010 WL 2901727, at 5 (B.P.A.I. July 23, 2010) ("Claim 8 simply fails to recite that the computations are performed by the 'distributed processing units' or any other machine in claim 8."). Contra Ex parte Russo, No. 2009-001876, 2010 WL 3441058 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 30, 2010) (holding a system claim directed to data structures unpatentable, but a Beauregard claim to the same data structures patentable).
29. No. 2009-004590, 2010 WL 3072973 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 4, 2010); accord Ex parte Venkata, No. 2009-007302 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 5, 2010); Ex parte MacKenzie, No. 2009-007332 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 4, 2010).
30. Heuer, 2010 WL 3072973, at *8.
31. Id.
32. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
33. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject-Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922 (July 27, 2010).
34. One Board opinion supports this more lenient approach. See Ex parte Ulf, No. 2009-008071, 2010 WL 3611779, at 8 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 7, 2010) ("Dependent claim 4 explicitly recites 'an inquiry, made on an opportunity reservation computer database.' In particular, since a computer is required to query a computer database, we find evidence that the method steps of dependent claim 4 are implemented on a 'machine.' Therefore, claim 4 is tied to a 'machine' consistent with the bounds of the machine-or-transformation test."). But see Ex parte Aklilu, No. 2009-007075, 2010 WL 4315178, at 4 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 29, 2010) ("[M]ere use of a generic machine or a general purpose computer to perform the steps of an otherwise unpatentable algorithm is not sufficient to meet the requirements for § 101 statutory subject matter.").
35. 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
36. Id. at 869.
37. See id. at 868.
38. See id. at 869.
39. See id. ("The fact that some claims in the'310 and'228 patents require a 'high contrast film,' 'a film printer,' 'a memory,' and 'printer and display devices' also confirm [sic] this court's holding that the invention is not abstract.").
40. 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
41. Id. at 1355 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010)) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
42. See infra Part II.D.2.
43. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). The court dodged the question about whether Nuijten's process for creating signals sufficed.
44. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); see In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958-60.
45. A process that is implemented in a computer can be claimed either as a process or as a computer system that is programmed to perform the steps of the process. Only the form has changed.
46. See 545 F.3d at 962 ("We leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise contours of machine implementation, as well as the answers to particular questions, such as whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular machine.").
47. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
48. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 8, at 9 (describing the "doctrine of the magic words").
49. Don't worry, we haven't.
50. Cf. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Through the expedient of putting his music on known structure, can a composer now claim as his invention the structure of a compact disc or player piano roll containing the melody he discovered and obtain a patent therefor? The answer must be no.").
51. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
52. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960-61 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
53. Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Industry Norms, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 875-876 (describing the throwing of a curve ball as transformative).
54. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963.
56. Id.
57. Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on In re Bilski: Tangibility Gone Meta, Patently-O Blog, 1 (Nov. 1, 2008), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/law/collinsmetabilski.pdf.
58. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962-63.
59. See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
60. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
61. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
62. Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 591-649 (2008) (noting that current subject matter rules "cannot be applied narrowly").
63. Kevin Emerson Collins, Claims to Information Qua Information and a Structural Theory of Section 101, 4 I/S: J.L. & Pol'y for Info. Soc'y 11 (2008);
64. Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. Rev. 317 (2007);
65. Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 Ind. L.J. 1378 (2010);
66. Jay Dratler, Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and Business-Method Patents, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 823 (2003);
67. Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. Rev. 31, 86-87 (1999);
68. Menell, supra note 20, at 1312-13 (arguing that patents should be limited to the technological arts);
69. David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 Temp. L. Rev. 181-184 (2009);
70. Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 Emory L.J. 1025-43 (1990);
71. Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, "Clues" for Determining Whether Business and Service Innovations Are Unpatentable Abstract Ideas, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 110 (2010) (arguing that business methods should generally be unpatentable despite Bilski);
72. John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 1139 (1999);
73. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory (Feb. 07, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1757272.
74. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
75. Even the categories in the Patent Act are sometimes difficult to apply. See, e.g., Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1931) (determining whether an orange dipped in borax is a "manufacture"); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (determining whether an electrical signal falls into a statutory category).
76. See Risch, supra note 61, at 591.
77. For example, T.J. Chiang argues that patentable subject matter encompasses both gatekeeping and scope limitations, and suggests that the abstract ideas exclusion is primarily a scope limitation.
78. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 1353-1381.
79. He does not, however, attempt to articulate the scope-limitation analysis.
80. Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 Tul. L. Rev. 323-89 (2010);
81. Jur Strobos, Stalking the Elusive Patentable Software: Are There Still Diehr or Was It Just a Flook?, 6 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 363-365 n.8 (1993);
82. Bryan Treglia, Separating Abstract Ideas and Laws of Nature from Patentable Subject Matter, 48 Jurimetrics J. 427-37 (2008).
83. Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Court's Business Method Patents Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope 8-10 (Oct. 27, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698633.
84. 500 F.3d at 1351, 1353. Even that conclusion was questionable as a matter of physics and statutory interpretation.
85. John F. Duffy, Inre Nuijten: Patentable Subject Matter, Textualism and the Supreme Court, Patently-O Blog (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/DuffyOnNuijten.pdf. Even so, the policy consequences of holding that a signal is "made" whenever it passes through a wire would have been dire.
86. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
87. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853).
88. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
89. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980); see also Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131.
90. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
91. See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131.
92. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
93. See The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895) (holding that claim to light filaments made from any carbonized textile or vegetable fiber was too broad in light of disclosure that described only one type of fiber).
94. See, e.g., id. While the filament claims were broader than the disclosure allowed, they were not abstract.
95. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155-65 (2002) (arguing that judicial attribution of high skill level to programmers has nullified enablement requirement for software patents);
96. Michael Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written Description Requirement, 119 Yale L.J. Online 127-39 (2010) (arguing that description is critical because high skill means more claims with less disclosure of actual invention).
97. One of the authors has argued that we could accomplish the same end with a more capacious understanding of § 112. Risch, supra note 61, at 591. But we currently do not have such an understanding.
98. See infra Part III.
99. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972)).
100. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 Hastings L.J. 65-127 (2009) (arguing that inventions should be reduced to practice to improve commercialization)
101. Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1195-34 (discussing practical utility as a commercialization lever);
102. Ted Sichel-man, Commercializing Patents, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 341-343 (2010) (discussing incentives provided by patent law to commercialize inventions).
103. T.J. Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 6), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1434465 (noting that determining whether a claim is enabled requires us to choose the level of abstraction at which we assess that claim);
104. Timothy R. Hol-brook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 Ind. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 18-19), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1650819;
105. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1141-1168 (2008).
106. There may also be distributive concerns in § 101 analysis: subject matter jurisprudence consistently recites that certain principles must be "free to all men." Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). This language is not present in enablement and definiteness cases.
107. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
108. Id. at 86.
109. See id. at 112-17.
110. See id. at 113;
111. see also id. at 118-19 (describing the importance of description of the patented invention).
112. Craig Allen Nard, The Law of Patents 51 (2008) (presenting Morse at the beginning of a patent textbook section on enablement).
113. The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895) (holding that enablement is based on undue experimentation); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (describing factors to consider for undue experimentation in enablement).
114. Cf. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1346 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Morse, decided under the 1836 Act, can also be interpreted as involving a separate written description inquiry.").
115. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113.
116. 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
117. See id. at 535.
118. See id. at 538.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 536.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 538.
123. See id. at 544.
124. Id. at 535.
125. Id.
126. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1939).
127. Id. at 94.
128. See id.
129. 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
130. See id. at 67.
131. Id. at 68.
132. 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
133. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
134. Id. at 594.
135. Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735045 (critiquing this aspect of Flook).
136. 450 U.S. at 187.
137. See In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 22 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
138. See Brief Amici Curiae of 20 Law and Business Professors in Support of Neither Party at 31-32, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964).
139. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223-24.
140. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
141. See id. at 903.
142. See id. at 904.
143. See id. at 908.
144. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
145. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).
146. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963.
147. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It 142-66 (2009) (identifying abstract ideas doctrine as a policy lever that is likely to be more important in some industries than others).
148. The authors are not of one mind as to whether (and how much) courts should expressly consider the industry in deciding abstractness, but there is little question that abstract ideas claims will be more common in certain industries.
149. See, e.g., Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 207 (1894) ("If the invention is broad or primary in its character, the range of equivalents will be correspondingly broad, under the liberal construction which the courts give to such inventions."); Note
150. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("A pioneer invention is entitled to a broad range of equivalents."); John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 High Tech. L.J. 35, 37 (1995) ("Courts construe pioneer patent claims... to encompass a broader range of so-called 'equivalents' during an infringement determination.").
151. See Kokomo Fence Mach. Co. v. Kitselman, 189 U.S. 8, 18-19 (1903) ("In view of what passed in the Patent Office, and the state of the art, we cannot regard the Kitselman patent as a pioneer patent, but think its claims must be limited in their scope to the actual combination of essential parts as shown....").
152. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). But see In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950-51 n.1 (stating that Comiskey did not require patentable subject matter to be examined first).
153. Michael Risch, The Idea's the Thing, Legal Times, May 12, 2008, available at http://law.wvu.edu/r/download/9874 (expressing concern that the weakness of Bilski's application would cause courts to create over-restrictive subject matter rules).
154. Christopher T. Abernethy, Cruel Hand of Bilski: Culminating the Shortsighted Crusade for Marginalization of the 'Process' Patent 27-37 (May 2009) (unpublished comment), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1420205.
155. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006). Disclosure: Author Mark A. Lemley represented the patentee in this case.
156. See Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006).
157. See Metabolite Labs., 126 S. Ct. at 2922, 2927 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
158. See Risch, supra note 61, at 600 ("Everything that happens may be deemed the work of nature...." (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134-35 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
159. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (granting certiorari, vacating underlying judgment, and remanding for reconsideration in light of Bils-ki).
160. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3543.
161. See Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25062 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev'd, 581 F.3d 1336, vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3543.
162. See Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1345-46; see also Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (on remand).
163. See Brief of Amici Curiae Interested Patent Law Professors in Support of Neither Party at 1, Prometheus, 581 F.3d 1336 (No. 2008-1403).
164. See Ex parte Heuer, No. 2009-004590, 2010 WL 3072973, at 8 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 4, 2010).
165. See Magliocca, supra note 52, at 876 n.7.
166. There may, of course, be "fairness" concerns in the game that counsel in favor of allowing pitchers to freely throw a new type of curveball, but such issues are best handled by league rules and not by courts determining what should be patentable. See Risch, supra note 61, at 645.