Fortune favours the bold: An agent-based model reveals adaptive advantages of overconfidence in war

PLoS ONE

Volumn 6, Issue 6, 2011, Pages

  Johnson, Dominic D P ^a   Weidmann, Nils B ^b,c   Cederman, Lars Erik ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OSLO PRIO   (Norway)

^d ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGGRESSION; ARTICLE; CONFLICT OF INTEREST; CONTROLLED STUDY; CRISIS THEORY; DECISION MAKING; DEFENSIVE BEHAVIOR; ILLUSION; OVERCONFIDENCE; PERSONALITY; POLITICS; PREDICTION; PROBABILITY; RISK; TERRITORIALITY; WAR; ADAPTATION; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR; COMPUTER SIMULATION; HIGH RISK BEHAVIOR; TIME;

ADAPTATION, PHYSIOLOGICAL; AGGRESSION; COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR; COMPUTER SIMULATION; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; RISK-TAKING; TIME FACTORS; WAR;

EID: 79959585241     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0020851     Document Type: Article

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