Preference Intensities and Majority Decisions Based on Difference of Support Between Alternatives

Group Decision and Negotiation

Volumn 19, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 527-542

  Garcí Lapresta, J Luis ^a   Llamazares, Bonifacio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VALLADOLID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Fuzzy decision rules; Intensities of preference; Majorities based on difference of votes; Simple majority; Voting systems

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959226751     PISSN: 09262644     EISSN: 15729907     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10726-009-9156-z     Document Type: Article

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