The forgotten decision rules: Majority rules based on difference of votes

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 51, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 311-326

  Llamazares, Bonifacio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VALLADOLID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Cancellation; Decisiveness; Majority rules; p Pareto; Stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646005474     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.12.001     Document Type: Article

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