Judicial deference to inconsistent agency statutory interpretations

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 85-113

  Givati, Yehonatan ^a   Stephenson, Matthew C ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

^b HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79958751350     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/658407     Document Type: Article

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