Game based capacity allocation for utility computing environments

Telecommunication Systems

Volumn 47, Issue 1-2, 2011, Pages 165-181

  Yolken, Benjamin ^a   Bambos, Nicholas ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; Queuing theory; Utility computing

Indexed keywords

ALLOCATION MECHANISM; BEST RESPONSE; CAPACITY ALLOCATION; COMPLEX PROBLEMS; CONTINUOUS FLOWS; EFFICIENCY LOSS; MULTIPLE USER; PRICE OF ANARCHY; QUEUING THEORY; SERVICE RATES; SYSTEM OPERATOR; USER COST; UTILITY COMPUTING;

COST FUNCTIONS; COSTS; GAME THEORY; QUEUEING THEORY;

COMPUTATION THEORY;

EID: 79958156396     PISSN: 10184864     EISSN: 15729451     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11235-010-9309-z     Document Type: Conference Paper

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