Constructing a philosophy of science of cognitive science

Topics in Cognitive Science

Volumn 1, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 548-569

  Bechtel, William ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Control theory; Explanation; Mechanism; Philosophy of science; Recomposition; Reduction; Representation

Indexed keywords

BRAIN; COGNITION; HUMAN; PHILOSOPHY; PHYSIOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGY;

BRAIN; COGNITION; COGNITIVE SCIENCE; HUMANS; PHILOSOPHY;

EID: 79957648368     PISSN: 17568757     EISSN: 17568765     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01039.x     Document Type: Article

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