Representations and cognitive explanations: Assessing the dynamicist's challenge in cognitive science

Cognitive Science

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 295-318

  Bechtel, William ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032109050     PISSN: 03640213     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1207/s15516709cog2203_2     Document Type: Article

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