Collective voluntary agreements to eliminate polluting products

Resource and Energy Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 572-588

  Ahmed, Rasha ^a   Segerson, Kathleen ^b  

^a TRINITY COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective agreements; Energy fuel efficiency; Green products markets; Polluting products; Voluntary agreements

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS; ENERGY/FUEL EFFICIENCY; GREEN PRODUCTS; POLLUTING PRODUCTS; VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT;

PROFITABILITY; WASHERS;

INDUSTRY;

ENERGY EFFICIENCY; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; INCENTIVE; VOLUNTARY APPROACH;

EID: 79957617816     PISSN: 09287655     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2011.01.002     Document Type: Article

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