Market regulation and multimarket rivalry

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 596-617

  Phillips, Owen R ^a   Mason, Charles F ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030515044     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2555846     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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