Nonpoint pollution control: Inducing first-best outcomes through the use of threats

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 165-184

  Segerson, Kathleen ^a   Wu, JunJie ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^b OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Ambient taxes; Cost minimizing abatement; Nonpoint source pollution control; Voluntary approach

Indexed keywords

COSTS; ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PUBLIC POLICY; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE;

AMBIENT TAXES; COST-MINIMIZING ABATEMENT; NONPOINT-SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL; VOLUNTARY APPROACH;

POLLUTION CONTROL;

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; ENVIRONMENTAL TAX; NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION; POLLUTION CONTROL; VOLUNTARY APPROACH;

EID: 33645984595     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2005.04.007     Document Type: Article

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