Liberal lawfare and biopolitics: Us juridical warfare in thewar on terror

Geopolitics

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 280-305

  Morrissey, John ^a  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND   (Ireland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GEOPOLITICS; LIBERALISM; MILITARY INTERVENTION; NATIONAL SECURITY; POLITICAL VIOLENCE; TERRORISM; WAR;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 79956342486     PISSN: 14650045     EISSN: 15573028     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2010.538872     Document Type: Article

References (209)

1. See, for example: D. Gregory, The Black Flag: Guantánamo Bay and the Space of Exception', Geografiska Annaler B 88/4 (2006) pp. 405-427;
2. S. Reid-Henry, Exceptional Sovereignty? Guantanamo Bay and the Re-Colonial Present', Antipode 39/4 (2007) pp. 627-648;
3. G. Kearns, The Geography of Terror', Political Geography 27/3 (2008) pp. 360-364;
4. A. D. Barder, Power, Violence and Torture: Making Sense of Insurgency and Legitimacy Crises in Past and Present Wars of Attrition', in F. Debrix and M. Lacy (eds.), The Geopolitics of American Insecurity: Terror, Power and Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge 2009) pp. 54-70;
5. A. Macklin, Transjudicial Conversations about Security and Human Rights', in M. B. Salter (ed.), Mapping Transatlantic Security Relations The EU, Canada and the War on Terror (New York: Routledge 2010) pp. 212-235.
6. Both strategies work in concert with each other of course, with various locations acting as both 'base' and 'prison'.
7. US Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 2005 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense 2005) p. 9.
8. H. Rishikof, Juridical Warfare: The Neglected Legal Instrument', Joint Force Quarterly 48 (2008) p. 11.
9. W. Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, trans. by E. Jephcott (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1978) p. 283.
10. M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978, trans. by G. Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2007) p. 10.
11. L. Amoore, Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror', Political Geography 25/3 (2006) pp. 336-351;
12. M. Dillon, Governing Through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical Governance', Political Geography 26/1 (2007) pp. 41-47;
13. J. Donzelot, Michel Foucault and Liberal Intelligence', Economy and Society 37/1 (2008) pp. 115-134;
14. J. Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2009).
15. J. W. Crampton and S. Elden (eds.), Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate 2007);
16. K. Schlosser, Bio-Political Geographies', Geography Compass 2/5 (2008) pp. 1621-1634;
17. M. Coleman and K. Grove, Biopolitics, Biopower, and the Return of Sovereignty', Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 27/3 (2009) pp. 489-507.
18. See, for example, M. Dillon and A. W. Neal (eds.), Foucault on Politics, Security and War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2008).
19. Problems of space and the treatment of space were focal to his theorising of sovereignty, discipline and security, and their complex relational multiplicities;
20. see Foucault (note 6) pp. 11-23.
21. D. Gregory, Seeing Red: Baghdad and the Event-Ful City', Political Geography 29/5 (2010) pp. 266-279.
22. Such transitions were certainly taking place earlier in the Early Modern Period (particularly with the onset of the expansion of the major European centralised states of England and Spain to their various new colonial populations);
23. in Foucault's extensive canon of work, however, colonial societies have been largely overlooked. Foucault's thinking and lines of political inquiry were not, of course, without various other lacunae and unresolved problematics, as Michael Dillon and Andrew Neal have recently pointed out;
24. see Dillon and Neal (note 9) Introduction.
25. Foucault (note 6) pp. 10-11.
26. Ibid., pp. 8-23;
27. Donzelot (note 7) p. 118.
28. Foucault (note 6) p. 70.
29. Ibid., pp. 116, 117, 120.
30. Ibid., p. 108.
31. Ibid., pp. 109, 110.
32. J. Morrissey, Closing the Neoliberal Gap: Risk and Regulation in the Long War of Securitization', Antipode 43/4 (2011) doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2010.00823.x. In theorising the securitization strategy of the contemporary US military, I have drawn especially upon the Copenhagen school of security studies use of the term 'securitization', understood as a powerful discourse through which 'security risks' come to legitimise the use of 'emergency powers' and 'apparatuses of security';
33. see, for example, B. Buzan, O. Wæver, and P. de Wilde P, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1997);
34. M. Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security (London: Routledge 2007).
35. See also S. Dalby, Security and Environmental Change (Cambridge: Polity 2009) pp. 46-49.
36. I have recently explored this powerful assemblage of what are, in effect, classical geopolitical knowledges, advanced by what can be termed Washington's 'military-strategic studies complex':
37. J. Morrissey, Architects of Empire: The Military-Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security', Antipode 43/2 (2011) pp. 435-470.
38. Foucault (note 6) pp. 20-21.
39. The US military's six regional commands are: US Northern Command (NORTHCOM);
40. US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM);
41. US Pacific Command (PACOM);
42. US European Command (EUCOM);
43. US Central Command (CENTCOM);
44. US Africa Command (AFRICOM;
45. the most recently established command, attaining 'full operational capabilities' in October 2008).
46. Foucault (note 6) p. 20.
47. Source: US Department of Defense, 'U.S. Africa Command', briefing slide (7 Feb. 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/dodcmsshare/briefingslide%5C295%5C070207-D-6570C-001.pdf, accessed 9 Feb. 2008.
48. Foucault (note 6) p. 70.
49. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
50. Ibid., p. 21.
51. Dillon, 'Governing Through Contingency' (note 7) p. 46.
52. M. Dillon, Governing Terror: The State of Emergency of Biopolitical Emergence', International Political Sociology 1/1 (2007) p. 12.
53. M. Hannah, Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a Geographical Imagination of Power/Knowledge', Annals of the Association of American Geographers 96/3 (2006) p. 622.
54. R. Martin, An Empire of Indifference: American War and the Financial Logic of Risk Management (Durham: Duke University Press 2007).
55. N. Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan Books 2007).
56. R. Grusin, Premediation', Criticism 46/1 (2004) p. 19
57. M. de Goede, Beyond Risk: Premediation and the Post-9/11 Security Imagination', Security Dialogue 39/2-3 (2008) p. 158.
58. Foucault (note 6) p. 33.
59. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
60. D. Nally, The Biopolitics of Food Provisioning', Transactions of the Institute of British
61. Geographers (forthcoming).
62. Dillon, 'Governing Terror' (note 31) p. 9.
63. A. Krepinevich and R. O. Work, A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2007).
64. Cf. Morrissey, 'Architects of Empire' (note 20).
65. US Department of Defense, Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (31 Dec. 2009), available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0912.pdf, accessed 10 June 2010.
66. See J. Morrissey, The Geoeconomic Pivot of the Global War on Terror: US Central Command and the War in Iraq', in D. Ryan and P. Kiely (eds.), America and Iraq: Policy-Making, Intervention and Regional Politics (New York: Routledge 2009) pp. 103-122.
67. US Department of Defense, Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981: Hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington, DC: Senate Armed Services Committee 1980) p. 484.
68. US Congressional Budget Office, Rapid Deployment Forces: Policy and Budgetary Implications (Washington, DC: US Congressional Budget Office 1983) p. 38. In the contemporary world, prepositioning continues to be a key tool in advancing US geostrategic capabilities overseas - its current aim is to keep the capacity to quickly fill out up to eight ground combat brigades with equipment stored overseas;
69. see M. O'Hanlon, Unfinished Business: U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security 2008) p. 14.
70. J. Record, The Rapid Deployment Force: Problems, Constraints, and Needs', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 457 (1981) pp. 109-112.
71. Ibid., p. 112.
72. J. M. Epstein, 'Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent', International Security 6/2 (1981) p. 127.
73. See also: T. L. McNaugher, Arms and Oil: U.S. Strategy and the Persian Gulf (Washington,
74. DC: Brookings Institution 1985)
75. J. M. Epstein, Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 1987).
76. Further Bright Star exercises in 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1987, saw up to 10,000 US troops at a time training in the desert with troops from Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Somalia and Sudan. From Bright Star 1983 onwards, Egypt emerged as the most committed military partner in the region in the 1980s, and therefore its role in American preparations for the defence of Southwest Asia became a key component;
77. see D. Gold, America, the Gulf and Israel: CENTCOM (Central Command) and Emerging US Regional Security Policies in the Middle East (Jerusalem: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1988) p. 41. With the Department of Defense focused on deterring an imminent Soviet attack in the region (that never of course materialised), the Egyptian army's use of Soviet military equipment made it an excellent training partner for the first CENTCOM forces deployed in the Middle East. Egypt's importance to US grand strategy in the Middle East continues to this day; it was the only African country retained in CENTCOM's AOR upon the initiation of the new Africa unified command, AFRICOM, in 2008.
78. J. Record, The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf (Washington, DC: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 1981) p. 58. In Oman, US access was given at Muscat airfield and port, Seeb airfield and port, Masirah airfield, Salalah airfield and Thumrait airfield;
79. Somalia granted use permissions at Berbera airfield and port and Mogadishu airfield and port;
80. while Kenya approved access at Mombasa port, Nairobi airfield and Nanyuki airfield;
81. see ibid., p. 59.
82. See Krepinevich and Work (note 40) pp. 149-150;
83. see also D. Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military (New York: W.W. Norton and Co. 2003) pp. 78-98.
84. S. G. Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 2002) p. 20.
85. Overseas Basing Commission, Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States Report to the President and Congress (Arlington, VA: Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States 2005) pp. iii, 6-7.
86. Ibid., p. G5.
87. US CENTCOM Director of Logistics Major General Brian Geehan, 'Current Operations in the Long War', National Defense Transportation Association Forum and Expo, Memphis, Tennessee, 23-27 Sep. 2006.
88. Various sources attribute a far greater number of bases and access facilities to each GCC country;
89. for example, Global Security (globalsecurity.org) puts the number of US major bases in at 16. However, this table is conservatively based on official US government data, compiled from the following sources: Overseas Basing Commission (note 52)
90. K. Katzman, The Persian Gulf States: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2006 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 2006);
91. US Department of Defense, Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2007 Baseline (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) 2007)
92. United States Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia, 'USMTM Welcome Package' (13 June 2010), available at http://www.usmtm.sppn.af.mil/newFRG2/Documents/Newcomer-booklet.pdf, accessed 12 July 2010.
93. Prior to the current Iraq war, NAVCENT was the only component command of CENTCOM permanently located in its AOR.
94. See, for example, B. A. Thayer, The Pax Americana and the Middle East: U.S. Grand Strategic Interests in the Region after September 11 (Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies 2003)
95. more recently, R. D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography', Foreign Policy (May/June 2009), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4862, accessed 6 May 2009.
96. A. Bâli and A. Rana, American Overreach: Strategic Interests and Millennial Ambitions in the Middle East', Geopolitics 15/2 (2010) p. 233.
97. See: Overseas Basing Commission (note 52) Appendix G;
98. Katzman (note 55) pp. 7-11
99. O'Hanlon (note 44) pp. 28-32.
100. J. Gerson, Enduring' U.S. Bases in Iraq: Monopolizing the Middle East Prize', Common
101. Dreams News Center (19 March 2007), available at http://www.commondreams.org/views07/0319-26.htm, accessed 12 Feb. 2008. In a showing of its renewed confidence for the success of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US also announced plans of a further military base just four miles short of the Iraq-Iran border
102. see BBC News, 'US Plans Base on Iraq-Iran Border' (10 Sep. 2007), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6987306.stm, accessed 25 Jan. 2008. Furthermore, the figure of fourteen 'enduring bases' appears to be quite a conservative estimate, as Patrick Cockburn recently revealed in The Independent; Cockburn details leaked press reports that put the number of long-term bases being planned for by the US military in Iraq at fifty;
103. see P. Cockburn, Revealed: Secret Plan to Keep Iraq Under US Control', The Independent, 5 June 2008.
104. In March 2006, for example, the Pentagon announced a ten-year plan for 'deep storage' of weapons, munitions, equipment and supplies in six countries in the CENTCOM AOR, and by 2016 the tonnage of air munitions alone, stored at sites outside Iraq, will be double the 2006 levels
105. see W. M. Arkins, U.S. Plans New Bases in Iraq', Early Warning Blog, The Washington Post (22 March 2006), available at http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2006/03/us_plans_new_bases_in_the_midd.html, accessed 25 Jan. 2008.
106. Dillon, 'Governing Terror' (note 31) p. 9.
107. Dillon, 'Governing Through Contingency' (note 7) p. 46.
108. D. Gregory, The Biopolitics of Baghdad: Counterinsurgency and the Counter-City', Human Geography 1/1 (2008) p. 19.
109. This is part of Bruce Braun's argument about why it is necessary to trace the ways that biopolitics has merged with geopolitics
110. see B. Braun, Biopolitics and the Molecularization of Life', Cultural Geographies 14/1 (2007) p. 8. For Agamben, Western politics, at its very heart, equated to a form of bio-politics from the very beginning;
111. see G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power & Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1998) p. 181.
112. Schlosser (note 8) p. 1624. As Steve Legg argues, the very concept of governmentality is transscalar
113. see S. Legg, 'Foucault's Population Geographies: Classification, Biopolitics and Governmental Spaces', Population, Space and Place 11/3 (2005) p. 142.
114. Schlosser (note 8) p. 1631.
115. Gregory, 'Seeing Red' (note 11).
116. C. von Clausewitz, On War, trans. by J. J. Graham and Introduction by J. W. Honig. New York: Barnes and Noble 2004) p. 17.
117. C. J. Dunlap, Lawfare Amid Warfare', Op-Ed, The Washington Times (3 Aug. 2007), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/aug/3/lawfare-amid-warfare, accessed 10 July 2008.
118. D. Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2006) pp. 37, 121, 122, 148, 167.
119. E. Weizman, Lawfare in Gaza: Legislative Attack', openDemocracy (1 March 2009), available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/legislative-attack, accessed 10 July 2009. Weizman soberly concludes that rather than moderation and restraint, the violence and destruction of Gaza might be the true face of international law and urges anyone concerned with the interests and rights of people affected by war to employ a double, even paradoxical strategy that uses international humanitarian law, while highlighting the dangers implied in it and challenging its truth claims and thus also the basis of its authority (ibid.).
120. Weizman's argument here echoes strongly David Kennedy's concerns about the recent emergence of a powerful legal vocabulary for articulating humanitarian ethics in the context of war (Kennedy (note 72) p. 8).
121. Kennedy asks how do we react when we find the humanist vocabulary of international law mobilised by the military as a strategic asset or when the military legally conditions the battlefield by informing the public that they are entitled to kill civilians or when our political leadership justifies warfare in the language of human rights (ibid.).
122. Rishikof (note 4) p. 11. The term 'lawfare' was one of several alternative war-making concepts outlined by two Chinese People's Liberation Army officers in 1999: Q. Liang and W. Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House 1999).
123. The Department of Defense's Defense Legal Services Agency received a staff increase of 100 FTEs from FY 2005 to FY 2006
124. see US Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Budget Estimates, Volume II, Defense Wide Data Book (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense 2006) p. 26. The proliferation of 'lawfare' of course does prompt the question posed by the Comaroffs regarding what does the fixation on legalities in times of disorder really mean. Does the contemporary fetishisation of the law simply mask (as throughout colonial history) the contemporary American empire's relative impotence?
125. See J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: An Introduction', in J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff (eds.), Law and Disorder in the Postcolony (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2006) pp. 1-56.
126. Dunlap (note 71).
127. As the war on terror began, the international Geneva Conventions, for example, were quickly identified as restrictive for the 'new paradigm' of modern warfare. In January 2002, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, as White House Chief Legal Counsel, advised President Bush that the war on terrorism render[ed] obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions; see Center for American Progress, Memorandum on the Geneva Conventions (18 May 2004), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/kfiles/b79532.html, accessed 1 July 2008.
128. Kennedy (note 72) p. 8.
129. Rishikof (note 4) p. 12. The 2007 conference, New Battlefields, Old Laws, held in Washington and jointly organised by the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT) at Syracuse University and Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel, addressed similar issues. The joint concern of the INSCT and ICT is that recent conflicts underscore the continuing shortcomings of international law and policy in responding to asymmetric warfare mounted by non-state terrorist groups in the 21st century (http://insct.syr.edu/Battlefields/overview.htm, accessed 10 July 2008). The conference and goals of both institutes has stirred considerable controversy
130. see, for example, Howard Friel's article Changing the Laws of War: Conference Seeks to Legitimize Civilian Casualties' in the National Catholic Reporter (5 Oct. 2007), available at http://ncronline.org/index1005.htm, accessed 10 July 2008.
131. J. P. Terry, Habeas Corpus and the Detention of Enemy Combatants in the War on Terror', Joint Force Quarterly 48 (2008) p. 18.
132. K. M. Cieply, Rendition: The Beast and the Man', Joint Force Quarterly 48 (2008) p. 20.
133. P. M. Cullen, The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign Against Terror', Joint Force Quarterly 48 (2008) p. 22.
134. B. A. Hoyt, Rethinking the U.S. Policy on the International Criminal Court', Joint Force Quarterly 48 (2008) p. 34 (my emphasis).
135. J. P. Terry, The International Criminal Court: A Concept Whose Time Has Not Come', Joint Force Quarterly 48 (2008) pp. 36-40.
136. Dunlap (note 71).
137. US Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (note 3) p. 9.
138. Ibid., p. 19.
139. Ibid., p. 20.
140. US Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense 2007) p. 512. This definition derives from various Department of Defense (DoD) directives and instructions dating back to the late 1970s: DoD, Instruction 2050.1, 6 July 1977;
141. DoD Directive 5525.1, 7 Aug. 1979
142. DoD Directive 5530.3, 6 Dec. 1979;
143. DoD Directive 3310.1, 22 Oct. 1982
144. see also the recently amended Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 2300.01D, International Agreements (2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/2300_01.pdf, accessed 7 July 2008.
145. SOFAs also typically serve to legally securitize facilities access and lethal and non-lethal US equipment prepositioning; they commonly set out too commitments to joint training exercises;
146. finally a key component secures arms sales;
147. see Katzman (note 55) p. 7.
148. Foucault (note 6) p. 21.
149. Quoted in: W. C. Smith, Lawyers at War', American Bar Association Journal 89/2 (2003) p. 14. Smith outlines the multiple imports of a SOFA as follows: SOFAs govern mission-critical and mundane matters including base access and security; provision or purchase of food, fuel, electricity and other supplies;
150. taxes, visas and customs regulations; and criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel (ibid.).
151. W. A. Stafford, How to Keep Military Personnel from Going to Jail for Doing the Right Thing: Jurisdiction, ROE and the Rules of Deadly Force', The Army Lawyer, Nov. 2000, p. 1. The Army Lawyer, published by The Judge Advocate General's School of the US Army at Charlottesville, Virginia, has been in publication since 1971
152. its stated purpose is to provide practical, how-to-do-it information to Army lawyers (The Army Lawyer, Aug. 1971, p. 1).
153. See Overseas Basing Commission (note 52).
154. J. S. Robbins, U.S. Central Command: Where History Is Made', in D. S. Reveron (ed.), America's Viceroys: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2004) p. 180.
155. Overseas Basing Commission (note 52). In the case of both Afghanistan and Iraq, all local jurisdiction was removed when both host governments fell subsequent to the US-led invasions.
156. See the comments of M. Cherif Bassiouni, quoted in A. Fahim, The Perils of Colonial Justice in Iraq', Asia Times (6 July 2005), available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GG06Ak02.html, accessed 1 July 2008.
157. Krepinevich and Work (note 40) p. 33.
158. This coincides with the established trend of the US military keeping its overseas troops based in isolated compounds away from local residents - a policy which Mark Gillem (2007) has shown inhibits any chance of even the most basic fostering of cross-cultural understanding
159. see M. Gillem, America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2007).
160. Global Security, U.S. Serviceman Accused of killing Kyrgyz Sent Home' (3 May 2007), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/05/mil-070503-rianovosti02.htm, accessed 1 July 2008. As M. Cherif Bassiouni, explains, with most SOFAs, the US has the primary jurisdiction and obligation to prosecute, and if it fails to do so, the host country gets the opportunity;
161. see Fahim (note 98). Despite various Kyrgyz protests, no prosecution has been undertaken to date in this case, and Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev has belatedly demanded that US forces in the country be stripped of their diplomatic immunity.
162. Democracy Now, UN Human Rights Investigator in Afghanistan Ousted Under U.S. Pressure' (28 April 2005), available at http://www.democracynow.org/2005/4/28/un_human_rights_investigator_in_afghanistan, accessed 1 July 2008.
163. See also UN News Centre, Afghanistan: UN Expert Denounces Abuses in Illegal Prisons' (24 Aug. 2004), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=11703&Cr=Afghanistan&Cr1=, accessed 1 July 2008.
164. US Under Secretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith, Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies 3 Dec. 2003), available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=590, accessed 5 July 2010.
165. US Department of Defense, Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture (Washington, DC: Department of Defense 2004).
166. Ibid., p. 8. For a summation of the report to Congress and a discussion of some its implications
167. see R. Henry, Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture', Naval War College Review 59/2 (2006) pp. 12-28.
168. US Department of Defense, Strengthening (note 106) p. 15.
169. Feith's SOFA agreement plans have been challenged on the grounds that they have not adequately consulted the State Department, US Congress or key US allies. Critics include Michael O'Hanlon at the Brookings Institute and former US Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Hamre, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
170. see J. D. Klaus, U.S. Military Overseas Basing: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 2004) pp. 4-6.
171. US Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (note 3) p. 5.
172. Cockburn (note 60).
173. Agamben, Homo Sacer (note 65);
174. G. Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2005).
175. C. Minca, Agamben's Geographies of Modernity', Political Geography 26/1 (2007) p. 92.
176. See also C. Minca, The Return of the Camp', Progress in Human Geography 29/4 (2005) pp. 405-412.
177. Many others have pointed out, of course, the manner in which exceptional events are used to legitimate authority to exceptional practices, as Andrew Neal most recently underlines;
178. see A. Neal, Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism: Liberty, Security and the War on Terror (New York: Routledge 2010) p. 1.
179. Minca, 'Agamben's Geographies' (note 112) pp. 93-94.
180. US CENTCOM Commander General John P. Abizaid, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of United States Central Command (Washington, DC: Senate Armed Services Committee 2006).
181. M. Neocleous, Critique of Security (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2008) p. 13. On this,
182. see also Neal (note 113) p. 2
183. where he asks, How can the sovereign state make exceptions to liberty in the name of liberty, or exceptions to the law in the name of the law and argues that the discourse of liberty is used both to oppose illiberal security practices and to legitimate them.
184. By drawing on the twentieth-century history of government in the US and UK, in particular, Neocleous rigorously exemplifies why we should reject any theorisation of contemporary Western society portrayed in terms of periodic episodes of 'emergency' in otherwise 'normal' times.
185. Kennedy (note 72) p. 170.
186. On this point, see J.-C. Paye, Global War on Liberty (Trans. J. H. Membrez. New York: Telos Press 2007) pp. 1-3.
187. M. Dillon and J. Reid, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Live (New York: Routledge 2009).
188. Neocleous (note 116).
189. I have outlined elsewhere how US military commanders have, in recent years, consistently utilised a powerful and persuasive neoliberal 'risk-securitization discourse' to legitimise command strategies
190. see Morrissey, 'Closing the Neoliberal Gap (note 19).
191. Or what Jean-Claude Paye defines as a 'permanent state of exception', arrived at from the perpetual invoking of the 'state of emergency';
192. see Paye (note 119) pp. 40-48.
193. Kennedy (note 72) p. 165.
194. Ibid., pp. 8, 10, 12
195. Benjamin (note 5) p. 283.
196. Kennedy (note 72) p. 167
197. Ibid., p. 169
198. See D. Grondin, The New Frontiers of the National Security State: The US Global Governmentality of Contingency', in M. Doucet and M. de Larrinaga (eds.), Security and Global Governmentality (London: Routledge 2010) pp. 79-95.
199. Foucault (note 6);
200. see also M. Dillon, Underwriting Security', Security Dialogue 39/2-3 (2008) p. 309.
201. U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage 1992)
202. M. Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London: Sage 1999)
203. P. O'Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Government (London: Glasshouse Press 2004)
204. G. Mythen and S. Walklate (eds.), Beyond the Risk Society: Critical Reflections on Risk and Human Security (Maidenhead: Open University Press 2006).
205. Dalby (note 19) p. 47.
206. C. Aradau and R. Van Munster R, Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (Un)Knowing the Future', European Journal of International Relations 13/1 (2007) p. 108.
207. Cf. Y.-K. Heng, War as Risk Management: Strategy and Conflict in an Age of Globalised Risks (New York: Routledge 2006).
208. Aradau and Van Munster (note 133) p. 108.
209. Kennedy (note 72) p. 165.