Why do civil wars occur? Understanding the importance of institutional quality

Civil Wars

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 195-217

  Taydas, Zeynep ^a   Peksen, Dursun ^b   James, Patrick ^c  

^a CLEMSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956256128     PISSN: 13698249     EISSN: 1743968X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13698249.2010.509544     Document Type: Article

References (178)

1. Nicholas Sambanis, 'A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil Wars', Defence and Peace Economics 13/3 (2002) pp.215-43.
2. Marina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler (eds), Political Capacity and Economic Behavior (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1997).
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4. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75-90.
5. Michelle Benson and Jacek Kugler, 'Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence', Journal of Conflict Resolution 42/2 (1998) pp.196-209.
6. Halvard Buhaug, 'Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War', Journal of Peace Research 43/6 (2006) pp.691-708.
7. Civil war onset and initiation are used interchangeably throughout this study.
8. Ted Robert Gurr, 'A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices', American Political Science Review 62 (1968) pp.1104-24.
9. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton UP 1970).
10. Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press 1993).
11. Ted Robert Gurr, 'Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945', International Political Science Review 14 (1993) pp.161-201.
12. Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, 'Greed, Grievance and Mobilization in Civil Wars', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49/3 (2005) pp.319-36.
13. Patrick J. Regan, Sixteen Million One: Understanding Civil War (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers 2009).
14. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'On Economic Causes of Civil Wars', Oxford EconomicPapers 50 (1998) pp.563-73.
15. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley 1978).
16. Mark I. Lichbach,. 'Will Rational People Rebel Against Inequality? Samson's Choice', American Journal of Political Science 34/4 (1990) pp.1049-76.
17. Mark I. Lichbach, 'What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary: Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action', World Politics 46 (1994) pp.383-418.
18. Mark I. Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Harbor: Univ. of Michigan Press 1995).
19. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movements: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New York: Cambridge UP 1994).
20. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'On Economic Causes of Civil Wars', Oxford EconomicPapers 50 (1998) pp.563-73.
21. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', Working Paper Series 2002-01, Center for the Study of African Economics, Univ. of Oxford 2002.
22. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'Greed versus Grievance in Civil War', Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004) pp.563-95.
23. Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, 'Greed, Grievance and Mobilization in Civil Wars', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49/3 (2005) pp.319-36.
24. Patrick J. Regan, Sixteen Million One: Understanding Civil War (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers 2009).
25. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', Working Paper Series 2002-01, Center for the Study of African Economics, Univ. of Oxford 2002.
26. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge UP 1965).
27. Mark I. Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Harbor: Univ. of Michigan Press 1995).
28. Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, 'How Much War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War', Journal of Conflict Resolution 46/3 (2002) pp.307-34.
29. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) p.75.
30. Karl R. De Rouen Jr and David Sobek, 'The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome', Journal of Peace Research 41/3 (2004) pp.303-20.
31. Mats Berdal, 'Beyond Greed and Grievance-and Not Too Soon... A Review Essay', Review of International Studies 31 (2005) pp.687-98.
32. Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, 'Greed, Grievance and Mobilization in Civil Wars', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49/3 (2005) pp. 319-36.
33. Mats Berdal, 'Beyond Greed and Grievance-and Not Too Soon... A Review Essay', Review of International Studies 31 (2005) pp.687-98.
34. Karl R. De Rouen Jr and David Sobek, 'The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome', Journal of Peace Research 41/3 (2004) p.305.
35. Karl R. De Rouen Jr and David Sobek, 'The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome', Journal of Peace Research 41/3 (2004) pp.303-20.
36. Janine Aron, 'Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence', The World Bank Research Observer 15/1 (2000) pp. 99-135.
37. We use the terms, capacity, strength, power and capabilities interchangeably.
38. For example, T. David Mason, Joseph Weingarten Jr and Patrick Fett, 'Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcomes of Civil Wars', Political Research Quarterly 52/2 (1999) pp. 239-68.
39. Richard Snyder, 'Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? States, Regimes and the Political Economy of Extraction', Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the APSA, San Francisco, CA, 30 Aug.-2 Sept. 2001.
40. Indra De Soysa, 'Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-1999', Journal of Peace Research 39/4 (2002) pp.395-416.
41. Andrew Mack, 'Civil War: Academic Research and the Policy Community', Journal of Peace Research 39/2 (2002) pp.515-25.
42. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75-90.
43. Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge, UK: CUP 2003).
44. For example, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'On Economic Causes of Civil Wars', Oxford EconomicPapers 50 (1998) pp.563-73.
45. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75-90.
46. Theda Skocpol, 'Bringing State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research' in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds) Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge UP 1985) p.29.
47. There is some ambiguity in the literature concerning the causal linkage between economic development and civil conflict. For instance, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', Working Paper Series 2002-01, Center for the Study of African Economics, Univ. of Oxford 2002; perceive the level of economic development in a country as an indication of the opportunity cost of insurgency.
48. While James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75-90; interpret economic development as the most important indicator of a state's coercive ability.
49. Halvard Buhaug, 'Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War', Journal of Peace Research 43/6 (2006) p. 691-708, on the other hand, argues that wealth captures the ability of the state to buy off opposition and make costly reforms to mitigate grievances.
50. Anne Mette Kjaer, Ole Hersted Hansen, Jens Peter and Frolund Thomsen, 'Conceptualizing State Capacity', DEMSTAR Research Report No. 6, Dept. of Political Science, Univ. of Aarhus, Denmark, Jan. 2002.
51. For exceptions see Karl R. De Rouen Jr and David Sobek, 'The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome', Journal of Peace Research 41/3 (2004) pp.303-20.
52. Hanne Fjelde,. 'Buying Peace? Oil Wealth, Corruption and Civil War, 1985-99', Journal of Peace Research 46/2 (2009) pp.199-218.
53. Karl R. De Rouen Jr and David Sobek, 'The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome', Journal of Peace Research 41/3 (2004) pp.303-20; use only bureaucratic quality in estimating the duration of civil conflict. Fjelde (2009), on the other hand, shows that the level of corruption in government is a major covariate of civil war onset.
54. Tanja Ellingsen, '"Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew?" Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War', Journal of Conflict Resolution 44/2 (2000) pp.228-49.
55. Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change and Civil War, 1816-1992', American Political Science Review 95/1 (2001) pp.33-48.
56. Marta Reynal-Querol, 'Political Systems, Stability and Civil Wars', European Journal of Political Economy 21/2 (2002a) pp. 445-65.
57. Marta Reynal-Querol,. 'Ethnicity, Political Systems and Civil War', Journal of Conflict Resolution 46/1 (2002b) pp.29-54.
58. Marta Reynal-Querol, 'Does Democracy Preempt Civil Wars?' European Journal of Political Economy 21 (2005) pp.445-65.
59. James D. Fearon, 'Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?' Journal of Peace Research 41/3 (2004) pp.275-301.
60. Ian Loader and Neil Walker, Civilizing Security (New York: Cambridge UP 2007).
61. Higher levels of democracy, characterised by high levels of freedom and civil liberties, still may not be capable of preventing social conflicts. Institutions could be in existence but remain weak. Rules may be absent, suboptimal or poorly enforced.
62. see Janine Aron, 'Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence', The World Bank Research Observer 15/1 (2000) pp. 99-135.
63. Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, 'Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of Democracy: Reassessing Recent Evidence', Studies in Comparative International Development 39/4 (2005) pp.87-106.
64. Philip Keefer, 'Clientalism, Credibility and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies.' World Bank unpublished MS 2005, p. 2.
65. See also Thomas Carothers, 'Democracy's Sobering Current State', Current History (Dec. 2004) pp.412-17.
66. Marc F. Plattner, 'The Quality of Democracy: A Skeptical Afterword', Journal of Democracy 15/4 (2004) pp.106-10.
67. Janine Aron, 'Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence', The World Bank Research Observer 15/1 (2000) pp. 99-135.
68. As Kurt Schock, 'A Conjectural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict.' Journal of Conflict Resolution 40/1 (1996) p.107 indicates, 'If the state is weak, personalistic, ineffective at channeling political participation, or nonreponsive to the needs of its citizens, then it is more likely that its legitimacy will be questioned and more likely that violent challenges to the state or its policies will develop and be sustained.'
69. Thomas Ohlson and Mimmi Soderberg, 'From Intra-State War to Democratic Peace in Weak States', unpublished MS (2002) p.8.
70. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 'Trust in Large Scale Organizations', American Economic Review 87/2 (1997) pp.333-8.
71. Bo Rothstein,. 'Social Capital and Quality of Government: The Causal Mechanism', unpublished paper (2002).
72. See Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 'Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures', Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995) pp.207-27.
73. Alberto Chong and Luisa Zanforlin, 'Law, Tradition and Institutional Quality: Some Empirical Evidence', Journal of International Development 12/8 (2000) pp.1057-68.
74. William Easterly, 'Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? Economic Development and Cultural Change', Economic Development and Cultural Change 49/4 (2001) pp.687-706.
75. Deborah A. Bräutigam and Stephen Knack, 'Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa', Economic Development and Cultural Change 52 (2004) pp.255-85.
76. Islam Roumeen and Claudio E. Montenegro, 'What Determines the Quality of Institutions', World Bank, unpublished MS (2002).
77. Wayne Sandholtz and William Koetzle, 'Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, Democracy and Trade', International Studies Quarterly 44 (2000) p.32.
78. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 'Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures', Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995) pp.207-27.
79. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 'Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures', Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995) pp.207-27.
80. Thomas Carothers, 'The Rule of Law Revival', Foreign Affairs (March/April 1998) pp.95-106.
81. Guillermo O'Donnell, 'The Quality of Democracy: Why the Rule of Law Matters', Journal of Democracy 15/4 (2004) pp.32-46.
82. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, 'The Quality of Democracy', Journal of Democracy 15/4 (2004) pp.20-31.
83. Philip Keefer, 'Clientalism, Credibility and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies.' World Bank unpublished MS 2005, p. 2.
84. Thomas Ohlson and Mimmi Soderberg, 'From Intra-State War to Democratic Peace in Weak States', unpublished MS (2002) p.8.
85. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 'Trust in Large Scale Organizations', American Economic Review 87/2 (1997) pp.333-8.
86. Bo Rothstein,. 'Social Capital and Quality of Government: The Causal Mechanism', unpublished paper (2002).
87. Daniel Treisman, 'The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study', Journal of Public Economics 76/3 (2000) pp.399-457.
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89. Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi and Rosa Alonso-Terme, 'Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?', IMF Working Paper No. 98/76 (Washington DC 1998).
90. Wayne Sandholtz and William Koetzle, 'Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, Democracy and Trade', International Studies Quarterly 44 (2000) p.32.
91. Mark E. Warren, 'What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?' American Journal of Political Science 48/2 (2002) pp.328-43.
92. Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannuci, Corrupt Exchanges: Actors Resources and Mechanisms of Political Corruption (New York: Walter de Gruyter 1999).
93. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1999).
94. Donatella Della Porta, 'Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political Corruption' in Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam (eds) Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries? (Princeton UP 2000).
95. Mitchell A. Seligson, 'The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries', Journal of Politics 64/2 (2002) pp.408-33.
96. Christopher J. Anderson and Yuliya V. Tverdova, 'Corruption, Political Allegiances and Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science 47/1 (2003) pp.91-109.
97. Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi and Rosa Alonso-Terme, 'Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?', IMF Working Paper No. 98/76 (Washington DC 1998).
98. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, 'The Quality of Democracy', Journal of Democracy 15/4 (2004) pp.20-31.
99. Steven Rogers,. 'Philippine Politics and the Rule of Law', Journal of Democracy 15/4 (2004) pp.111-26.
100. Stephen Knack, 'Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests', Southern Economic Journal 68/2 (2001) pp.310-29.
101. Karl R. De Rouen Jr and David Sobek, 'The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome', Journal of Peace Research 41/3 (2004) p.307.
102. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 'Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures', Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995) pp.207-27.
103. Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, 'Greed, Grievance and Mobilization in Civil Wars', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49/3 (2005) p.320.
104. see also Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton UP 1970).
105. Jack H. Nagel, 'Inequality and Discontent: A Non-linear Hypothesis', World Politics 26 (1974) pp.453-72.
106. Edward N. Muller, 'Income, Inequality, Regime Repressiveness and Political Violence', American Sociological Review 50 (1985) pp.47-61.
107. Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: CUP 1973).
108. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge UP 1990).
109. Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 'Corruption', Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (1993) pp.599-617.
110. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 'Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures', Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995) pp.207-27.
111. Paolo Mauro, 'Corruption and Growth', Quarterly Journal of Economics 90/3 (1995) pp.681-711.
112. Paolo Mauro, 'Why Worry about Corruption', Economic Issues 6. (Washington DC: IMF 1997).
113. Christopher Clague, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack and Mancur Olson. 'Property and Contract Rights under Democracy and Dictatorship', Journal of Economic Growth 1/2 (1996) pp.243-76.
114. Daron Acemoglu and Thierry Verdier, 'Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach', Economic Journal 108 (1998) pp.1381-1403.
115. Dani Rodrik, 'Where Did All the Growth Go?', Journal of Economic Growth 4 (1999) pp.385-412.
116. Janine Aron, 'Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence', The World Bank Research Observer 15/1 (2000) p.105.
117. Stephen Knack, 'Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests', Southern Economic Journal 68/2 (2001) pp.310-29.
118. Philippe Le Bilion, 'Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts', Journal of International Development 15 (2003) pp.412-26.
119. A. Cooper Drury, Jonathan Krieckhaus, and Michael Lusztig, 'Corruption, Democracy and Economic Growth', International Political Science Review 27/2 (2006) pp.121-36.
120. Mark I. Lichbach,. 'Will Rational People Rebel Against Inequality? Samson's Choice', American Journal of Political Science 34/4 (1990) pp.1049-76.
121. Mark I. Lichbach, 'What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary: Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action', World Politics 46 (1994) pp.383-418.
122. Mark I. Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Harbor: Univ. of Michigan Press 1995).
123. Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, 'Greed, Grievance and Mobilization in Civil Wars', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49/3 (2005) pp.319-36.
124. Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, 'Greed, Grievance and Mobilization in Civil Wars', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49/3 (2005) pp.319-36.
125. Other data sources exist but they are not as comprehensive as ICRG. Transparency International, an international non-governmental organisation, has a corruption perception index and ranks more than 150 countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. The problem with this data is that it is limited to one indicator, namely corruption, and the data are available only for 1995-2005. The World Bank's data is much broader, with multiple indicators (i.e., voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) available for 209 states.
126. however, the time span of the data is limited to the years between 1996 and 2004.
127. James D. Fearon, 'Primary Commodity Exports and Civil Wars', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49/4 (2005) pp.483-507.
128. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75-90.
129. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75-90.
130. These studies include Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 'Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures', Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995) pp.207-27.
131. Alberto Chong and Luisa Zanforlin, 'Law, Tradition and Institutional Quality: Some Empirical Evidence', Journal of International Development 12/8 (2000) pp.1057-68.
132. Daron Acemoglu and Thierry Verdier, 'Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach', Economic Journal 108 (1998) pp.1381-1403.
133. Stephen Knack, 'Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests', Southern Economic Journal 68/2 (2001) pp.310-29.
134. William Easterly, 'Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? Economic Development and Cultural Change', Economic Development and Cultural Change 49/4 (2001) pp.687-706.
135. Deborah A. Bräutigam and Stephen Knack, 'Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa', Economic Development and Cultural Change 52 (2004) pp.255-85.
136. Hanna Back and Axel Hadenius, 'Democracy and Governance: A Dynamic Study of a J-Shaped Relationship', prepared for delivery at the Quality of Governance Conference in Göteborg, Sweden, 17-19 Nov. 2005.
137. and Simon Dietz, Eric Neumayer and Indra De Soysa, 'Corruption, the Resource Curse and Genuine Saving', Environment and Development Economics 12 (2007) pp.33-53.
138. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 'IRIS-3 File for International Country Risk Guide Data Codebook', College Park, Maryland, USA: PRS Group 1998. This measure accounts for the rule of law that we commonly observe in liberal democratic states. Otherwise, the rule of law might be upheld in an authoritarian regime but since it is of an illiberal kind, we still would expect citizens to rebel. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
139. Philip Keefer, 'Clientalism, Credibility and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies.' World Bank unpublished MS 2005, p. 2.
140. William Easterly, 'Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? Economic Development and Cultural Change', Economic Development and Cultural Change 49/4 (2001) pp.687-706.
141. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 'Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures', Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995) pp.207-27; In the original data set, this variable ranges from zero to four. It was rescaled to make it compatible with the two other quality of institutions variables.
142. For example, Stephen Knack, 'Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance', IRIS CenterWorking Paper, Univ. of Maryland 1999.
143. William Easterly, 'Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? Economic Development and Cultural Change', Economic Development and Cultural Change 49/4 (2001) pp.687-706.
144. Deborah A. Bräutigam and Stephen Knack, 'Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa', Economic Development and Cultural Change 52 (2004) pp.255-85.
145. Jeffrey Huther and Anwar Shah, 'A Simple Measure of Good Governance' in Anwar Shah (ed.) Public Services Delivery (Washington DC: The World Bank 2005).
146. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75-90.
147. For example, Tanja Ellingsen, '"Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew?" Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War', Journal of Conflict Resolution 44/2 (2000) pp.228-49.
148. Nicholas Sambanis, 'A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil Wars', Defence and Peace Economics 13/3 (2002) pp.215-43.
149. Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, 'How Much War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War', Journal of Conflict Resolution 46/3 (2002) pp.307-34.
150. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75-90.
151. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', Working Paper Series 2002-01, Center for the Study of African Economics, Univ. of Oxford 2002.
152. Katherine Barbieri and Rafeal Reuveny, 'Economic Globalization and Civil War', Journal of Politics 67/4 (2005) pp. 1228-47.
153. Clayton L. Thyne, 'ABC's, 123's, and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980-1999', Journal of Conflict Resolution 50/4 (2006) pp.733-54.
154. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75-90.
155. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75-90.
156. Tanja Ellingsen, '"Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew?" Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War', Journal of Conflict Resolution 44/2 (2000) pp.228-49.
157. Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change and Civil War, 1816-1992', American Political Science Review 95/1 (2001) pp.33-48; The Democracy score utilised in this study is based on three major characteristics of a political regime including the regulation, competitiveness, and openness of executive recruitment; executive constraints; and regulation and competitiveness of political participation. Some scholars challenge the conceptualisation of democracy as an institutional compromise that is built upon the limits of the executive and national legislature.
158. see Wolfgang Merkel and Aurel Croissant, 'Conclusion: Good and Defective Democracies', Democratization 11/5 (2004) pp. 199-213.
159. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, 'The Quality of Democracy', Journal of Democracy 15/4 (2004) pp.20-31;. They suggest that such a minimalist approach to the definition of democracy is too reductionist and neglects other prerequisites of democracy such as civil and political rights, rule of law, and horizontal accountability. While we recognise the possible limitations of our democracy measure, it is arguably a good fit for our analysis since rule of law, bureaucratic quality, and corruption in government are proxies for good governance in this study.
160. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75-90.
161. Katherine Barbieri and Rafeal Reuveny, 'Economic Globalization and Civil War', Journal of Politics 67/4 (2005) pp. 1228-47.
162. Tanja Ellingsen, '"Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew?" Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War', Journal of Conflict Resolution 44/2 (2000) pp.228-49.
163. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75-90.
164. As an alternative way of controlling for temporal dependence, we included the peace years variable and three natural cubic splines to smooth the baseline hazard over time as suggested by Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz and Richard Tucker, 'Taking Time Seriously: Time-series-cross section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable', American Journal of Political Science 42 (1998) pp.825-44. This had no appreciable effect on the estimates, and the splines were insignificant.
165. Gary King and Langche Zeng. 'Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data', Political Analysis 9/2 (2001) pp.137-63.
166. Gary King and Langche Zeng, 'Explaining Rare Events in International Relations', International Organization 55/3 (2001) pp.693-715.
167. We did not include the new state variable because no new states with complete data experienced civil wars, making it a perfect predictor of peace.
168. Clayton L. Thyne, 'ABC's, 123's, and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980-1999', Journal of Conflict Resolution 50/4 (2006) pp.733-54.
169. We use Clarify software to generate the post-estimation interpretation of regression models for categorical outcomes.
170. see Gary King, Michael Tomz and Jason Wittenberg, 'Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation', American Journal of Political Science 44/2 (2000) pp.347-61.
171. Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg and Gary King, CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.0 Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ., 1 June 2001, .
172. Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, 'Greed, Grievance and Mobilization in Civil Wars', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49/3 (2005) pp.319-36.
173. The models presented in Table 2 and 3 do not suffer from multicollinerarity. They reveal relatively low collinearity among regressors (mean variance inflation factor [VIF] scores of 1.43, 1.48, 1.50 and 1.56 for models in Table 2 and 1.47, 1.50, 1.51 and 1.58 for models in Table 3).
174. Christopher Achen, 'Toward a New Political Methodology: Microfoundations and ART', Annual Review of Political Science 5 (2002) pp.423-50. Anocracies refer to political regimes that demonstrate characteristics of both democracies and autocracies and the central authority in such regimes is usually weak or nonexistent.
175. Karl R. De Rouen Jr, Jacob Bercovitch and Jun Wei, 'Duration of Peace and Recurring Civil Wars in Southeast Asia', Civil Wars 11/2 (June 2009) pp.103-20.
176. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 'IRIS-3 File for International Country Risk Guide Data Codebook', College Park, Maryland, USA: PRS Group 1998
177. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 'IRIS-3 File for International Country Risk Guide Data Codebook', College Park, Maryland, USA: PRS Group 1998
178. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 'IRIS-3 File for International Country Risk Guide Data Codebook', College Park, Maryland, USA: PRS Group 1998