The United Nations and global energy governance: Past challenges, future choices

Global Change, Peace and Security

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 175-195

  Karlsson Vinkhuyzen, Sylvia I ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURKU   (Finland)

^b LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Climate change; Commission on Sustainable Development; Effectiveness; Global energy governance; Institutions; Legitimacy; Norms; United Nations

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956249257     PISSN: 14781158     EISSN: 14781166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14781151003770820     Document Type: Article

References (156)

1. Around 2.4 billion people lack access to modern energy services and almost 2 million children die each year from respiratory infections as a result of exposure to indoor air pollution from traditional cooking fuels. Commission on Sustainable Development, Fourteenth Session 1-12 May 2006. Energy for Sustainable Development, Industrial development, Air Pollution/Atmosphere and Climate Change: Integrated Review of Progress in Meeting the Goals, Targets and Commitments of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Report of the Secretary-General, E/CN.17/ 2006/3 (New York: United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2006).
2. Andreas Goldthau and Jan Martin Witte, 'Back to the Future or Forward to the Past? Strengthening Markets and Rules for Effective Global Energy Governance', International Affairs 85, no. 2 (2009): 373-90, 383.
3. Mohamed ElBaradei, 'A Global Agency is Needed for the Energy Crisis', Financial Times, 23 July 2008, http://www. ft.com/home.europe (accessed August 1, 2008).
4. 'Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action taken.' Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 2.
5. James N. Rosenau, 'Governing the Ungovernable: The Challenge of a Global Disaggregation of Authority', Regulation & Governance 1 (2007): 88-97.
6. Craig N. Murphy, 'Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood', International Affairs 76, no. 4 (2000): 789-803.
7. The word institutions is often used to encompass both of these avenues, encompassing both norms and organisations: Robert O. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988): 379-96.
8. I follow Young, who makes a distinction between norms and organisations. He uses the term 'institutions' only for norms (rules etc.), and the term 'organizations' for bodies with a physical identity (such as a secretariat and headquarters) which in contrast to norms possess agency-see Oran R. Young, Institutional Dimensions of Global Environmental Change Science Plan, IHDP Report, No. 9 (Bonn: International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change, 1999). However, while Young limits the term institutions to norms of various types, I follow the everyday meaning of 'institutions' in world politics as referring to organisations. In this paper 'institutional' refers to a structure or process linked to an organisation.
9. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', 380.
10. I use the term 'norms' in the sense of standards of appropriate behaviour which, depending on author and discipline, can also be referred to as institutions or rules. See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917, for a discussion on the range of definitions.
11. See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., 'The Concept of Legalization', International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 401-19.
12. For a detailed discussion on soft law, see Christine Chinkin, 'Normative Development in the International Legal System', in Commitment and Compliance. The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, ed. Dinah Shelton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 21-42.
13. Abbott et al. define hard law as norms which measure high on obligation, precision and delegation where obligation means that states or other actors 'are legally bound by a rule or commitment in the sense that their behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of international law, and often of domestic law as well'. They define precision as meaning that 'rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe' and delegation means that 'third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules', Abbott et al., Concept of Legalization, 401.
14. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 'Hard and Soft Law in International Governance', International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 421-56.
15. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 943-69.
16. Robert O. Keohane, 'Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations', Journal of Legal Studies XXXI (2002): S307-S19, emphasises that self-interest in the rationalist approach should not be equated with materialistic self-interest since strategic behaviour can be applied to reach altruistic goals. However, I argue that most applications of the rationalist perspective seem to assume that material self-interest over the short or long term is the dominant motivation for action.
17. Robert O. Keohane, 'International Relations and International Law: Two Optics', International Law Journal 38, no. 2 (1997): 487-504, 489.
18. Keohane, 'International Relations'.
19. Keohane, 'International Relations'.
20. March and Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics'.
21. Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994): 384-96.
22. Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, 'Interactional International Law', International Law FORUM 3 (2001): 186-92.
23. Keohane, 'International Relations'.
24. Sylvia I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Antto Vihma, 'Comparing the Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Global Hard and Soft Law: An Analytical Framework', Regulation & Governance 3, no. 4 (2009): 400-20.
25. Such hard sanctions are, however, rare in international law: Chinkin, 'Normative Development'.
26. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty. Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (London: Harvard University Press, 1995).
27. Edith Brown Weiss, 'Conclusions: Understanding Compliance with Soft Law', in Commitment and Compliance. The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, ed. Dinah Shelton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 535-53.
28. John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 38.
29. These mechanisms of influence revolve around motivations to comply with norms or engage in international collaboration. There are also many cases when states may wish to comply or interact but lack the capacity to do so. Capacity-building can then have an important influence on compliance: Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma, 'Comparing the Legitimacy'.
30. Martha Finnemore and Stephen J. Toope, 'Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer Views of Law and Politics', International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 743-58.
31. For a discussion on normative vs. subjective legitimacy see Michael Zürn, 'Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems', Government and Opposition 39, no. 2 (2004): 260-87.
32. Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
33. See, for example, Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
34. Moshe Hirsch, 'Compliance with International Norms in the Age of Globalization: Two Theoretical Perspectives', in The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation, eds. Eyal Benvenisti and Moshe Hirsch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 166-93.
35. Jan Aart Scholte, 'Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance', Global Governance 8 (2002): 281-304.
36. Monica Blagescu, Lucy de Las Casas, and Robert Lloyd, Pathways to Accountability: The GAP Framework (London: One World Trust, 2005).
37. Scholte, 'Civil Society and Democracy'.
38. Zürn, 'Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems'.
39. Robyn Eckersley, 'Ambushed: The Kyoto Protocol, the Bush Administration's Climate Policy and the Erosion of Legitimacy', International Politics 44 (2007): 306-24.
40. Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). A more comprehensive description of these components of legitimacy and the literature that supports them is found in Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma, 'Comparing the Legitimacy'.
41. For a more extensive discussion on the concepts of input and output legitimacy see, Scharpf, Governing in Europe.
42. The energy sector can naturally be approached indirectly from a number of other policy issues: climate change, poverty, health etc. But even if I leave out those indirect approaches here, it does not mean they are not important. As I discuss in the final section, the strongest influence on national energy policies may come from the climate regime.
43. Jacques de Jong, Wilbur Perlot, and Stephan Slingerland, Global Energy Issues and the United Nations. Challenges for the UN CSD Meetings in 2007 and Beyond (den Haag: Clingendael International Energy Programme, 2007).
44. Jacques de Jong, Wilbur Perlot, and Stephan Slingerland, Global Energy Issues and the United Nations. Challenges for the UN CSD Meetings in 2007 and Beyond (den Haag: Clingendael International Energy Programme, 2007), 11.
45. Ann Florini and Benjamin K. Sovacool, 'Who Governs Energy? The Challenges Facing Global Energy Governance', Energy Policy 37, no. 12 (December 2009): 5239-48.
46. Sylvia I. Karlsson, 'Global Energy Governance, an (Im)possibility? Conflict and Consent in United Nations Deliberations on Sustainable Energy' (paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Science Conference, Pisa, September 6-9, 2007).
47. Dries Lesage, Thijs Van de Graaf, and Kirsten Westphal, 'The G8's Role in Global Energy Governance Since the 2005 Gleneagles Summit', Global Governance 15, no. 2 (2009): 259-78.
48. Thijs Van de Graaf and Dries Lesage, 'The International Energy Agency After 35 Years: Reform Needs and Institutional Adaptability', Review of International Organizations 4 (2009): 293-317.
49. Goldthau and Witte, 'Strengthening Markets and Rules'.
50. Goldthau and Witte, 'Strengthening Markets and Rules'.
51. Lesage et al., 'The G8's Role'.
52. Van de Graaf and Lesage, 'The International Energy Agency'.
53. Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, did look at the global regulation of nuclear energy in their study, as well as the regulation of the sea, road and air transport, three other energy related sectors, but not the energy sector as a whole. Florini and Sovacool, 'Who Governs Energy?', is one example of these few efforts; they make a brief overview and analysis of the types of international institutional actors which are involved in global energy governance.
54. The legitimacy of the host organisation or regime is central, as its authority is considered to override the legitimacy of a particular law: Daniel Bodansky, 'The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environment Law?', The American Journal of International Law 93 (1999): 596-624.
55. Bruce Podobnik, 'Global Energy Inequalities: Exploring the Long-Term Implications', Journal of World-Systems Research VIII, no. 2 (2002): 252-74.
56. John Deutch, Anne Lauvergeon, and Widhyawan Prawiraatmadja, Energy Security and Climate Change, A Report to the Trilateral Commission (Paris: Trilateral Commission, 2007).
57. The international oil market has changed dramatically since the 1970s, becoming liberalised to the extent that market forces are the primary determinants of global oil (and to some extent gas) prices-see Goldthau and Witte, 'Strengthening Markets and Rules'.
58. Susanne Peters, 'Coercive Western Energy Security Strategies: "Resource Wars" as a New Threat to Global Security', Geopolitics 9, no. 1 (2004): 187-212, 188.
59. Mason Willrich, 'International Energy Issues and Options', Annual Reviews 1 (1976): 743-72.
60. Hillard G. Huntington and Stephen P.A. Brown, 'Energy Security and Global Climate Change Mitigation', Energy Policy 32 (2004): 715-18.
61. At least in principle, the WTO trade rules cover energy goods but so far they have not had any major consequences for energy. This may change in the future due to the admission to the WTO of major energy exporters such as Russia and Saudi Arabia: Lesage et al., 'The G8's Role'. Of course the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol implicitly deal with energy as this is the most important mitigation sector; but, apart from certain Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) methodologies for energy technologies, it does not interfere with sovereignty regarding a state's energy choices.
62. The Energy Charter Treaty, strongly supported by the EU, seeks to provide a basis for applying WTO principles on energy so as to create an open international energy market in the future: Kirsten Westphal, 'The EU-Russian Relationship and the Energy Factor: A European View', in A Focus on EU-Russian Relations. Towards a Close Partnership on Defined Road Maps?, ed. Kirsten Westphal (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2005), 1-36. It has been ratified by 46 states and the European Communities.
63. Björn-Ola Linnér, The World Household. Georg Borgström and the Postwar Population-Resource Crisis (Linköping, Sweden: Linköping University, 1998).
64. United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1961 (New York: Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1963).
65. Resolutions 33/148 and 34/190. Its first origins can however be traced to the Sixth Special Session of UN General Assembly's Declaration and Program of Action for the New International Economic Order: Michael G. Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences (London: Routledge, 2005).
66. United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1981, vol. 35 (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1985).
67. Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences.
68. Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences.
69. Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences.
70. Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences.
71. Both the USA and the Eastern European countries voted against the GA resolution 37/250 that made provisions for the implementation of the plan and setting up the committee to follow it up: United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1982 (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1986).
72. United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1981.
73. This committee also took over the work on energy which had been carried out by the ECOSOC Committee on Natural Resources and was charged to address energy-related issues in Agenda 21 (United Nations Economic and Social Council, Committee on New and Renewable Sources of Energy and on Energy for Development. First Session. February 7-18, 1994. Energy and Sustainable Development: Issues Concerning Overall Energy Development, With Particular Emphasis on Developing Countries. Changing Global Energy Patterns. Report of the Secretary-General, E/C.13/1994/2 (New York: United Nations, 1993).
74. Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation.
75. A description of their activities in recent years can be found in UN-Energy, Energy in the United Nations: An Overview of UN-Energy Activities (United Nations, 2006).
76. UN-Energy, Energy in the United Nations: An Overview of UN-Energy Activities (United Nations, 2006).
77. Adil Najam and Cutler J. Cleveland, 'Energy and Sustainable Development at Global Environmental Summits: An Evolving Agenda', Environment, Development and Sustainability 5 (2003): 117-38.
78. The sources for the statements in Box 1 are, in order: UNCED, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992, Volume I Resolutions Adopted by the Conference, A/CONF.151/26. Rev.1 (New York: United Nations, 1993).
79. Commission on Sustainable Development, Report on the Ninth Session (May 5, 2000 and April 16-27, 2001), Economic and Social Council, Official Records, 2001, Supplement No.9, E/CN.17/2001/19 (New York: United Nations, 2001).
80. United Nations, Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. In: Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Johannesburg, South Africa, August 26-September 4, A/CONF.199/20 (New York: United Nations, 2002).
81. Conference on the Establishment of the International Renewable Energy Agency, Statute of the International Renewable Energy Agency (Bonn: IRENA, 2009).
82. See http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/csd_mandate.htm (accessed October 30, 2009).
83. Kui-Nang (Peter) Mak and Friedrich Soltau, 'Policy Options', in The Law of Energy for Sustainable Development, ed. Adrian J. Bradbrook et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 202-21.
84. IISD, 'Summary of the Ninth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development: 16-28 April 2001', Earth Negotiations Bulletin 5, no. 183 (2001): 1-10.
85. Irene Freudenschuss-Reichl, 'Agreement Making and Implementation: An Analysis of International Negotiations', Non-State Actors and International Law 2 (2002): 119-39.
86. Commission on Sustainable Development, Report on the Ninth Session.
87. United Nations, Plan of Implementation.
88. Achim Steiner et al., 'International Institutional Arrangements in Support of Renewable Energy', in Renewable Energy. A Global Review of Technologies, Policies and Markets, ed. Dirk Aßmann, Ulrich Laumanns, and Dieter Uh (London: Earthscan, 2006), 152-65.
89. Division for Sustainable Development United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs, 'Ad Hoc Interagency Task Force on Energy', UNDESA, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/energy/intergov/iaenr.htm (accessed September 26, 2005).
90. Randall Spalding-Fecher, Harald Winkler, and Stanford Mwakasonda, 'Energy and the World Summit on Sustainable Development: What Next?', Energy Policy 33 (2005): 99-112. Proposals for developing a system-wide coherent approach to energy issues had been given by the co-chairs of the Ad Hoc expert group but were opposed by delegates from both developed and developing countries: Freudenschuss-Reichl, 'Agreement Making'.
91. Freudenschuss-Reichl, 'Agreement Making'.
92. United Nations, Plan of Implementation, para. 152.
93. United Nations, 'UN-Energy Terms of Reference', Department of Economic and Social Affairs, http://esa.un.org/ un-energy/tor.htm (accessed November 23, 2005).
94. UN-Energy, Energy in the United Nations.
95. United Nations, 'UN-Energy'.
96. Deutch et al., Energy Security.
97. IISD, 'Summary of the Fifteenth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development: 30 April-11 May 2007', Earth Negotiations Bulletin 5, no. 254 (2007): 1-14.
98. 11 May, 4:00 am. A. Energy for Sustainable Development, Negotiation compilation document (New York: Commission on Sustainable Development, 2007).
99. 11 May, 4:00 am. A. Energy for Sustainable Development, Negotiation compilation document (New York: Commission on Sustainable Development, 2007).
100. 11 May, 4:00 am. A. Energy for Sustainable Development, Negotiation compilation document (New York: Commission on Sustainable Development, 2007), para. 17j.
101. United Nations, Plan of Implementation, para. 20e.
102. JREC was established by the EU as a response to the, from their perspective, disappointing failure of the WSSD to agree on a quantitative target for renewable energy in the global energy mix. Its members constituted over 80 governments who wanted to push the renewable energy agenda forward.
103. In the background report for the JREC discussions, experts concluded that there existed no single international body that had 'the very broad expertise, capability and/or mandate to develop a state of the art progress report' for renewable energy: Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition Secretariat, Towards an Effective Arrangement to Review Progress on Increasing the Global Market Share of Renewable Energy. Draft Discussion Paper, Version 7. Prepared by international team of experts with logistical support from JREC Secretariat (JREC, 2007).
104. 11 May, 4:00 am. A. Energy for Sustainable Development.
105. Commission on Sustainable Development, Report on the Fifteenth Session (May 12, 2006 and April 30-May 11, 2007).
106. Economic and Social Council, Official Records, 2007 Supplement No. 9, E/CN.17/2007/15 (New York: United Nations, 2007).
107. Economic and Social Council, Official Records, 2007 Supplement No. 9, E/CN.17/2007/15 (New York: United Nations, 2007).
108. The IEA was created in 1974 as part of the OECD thus excluding non-OECD developing countries, many of which were also dependent on energy imports. Its primary mandate was to provide a mechanism for energy security and emergency response: Peters, 'Coercive Western Energy Security Strategies'.
109. This norm was, for example, expressed in GA resolution 626 in 1952 (and later in declarations emerging from the 1972 and 1992 environment conferences) which stated that 'the right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is inherent in their sovereignty and is in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations'-quoted in Louis B. Sohn, 'The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment', Harvard International Law Journal 14 (1973): 423-515.
110. The norm is regarded as part of customary international law: Adrian J. Bradbrook and Ralph D. Wahnschafft, 'International Law and Global Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption', in The Law of Energy for Sustainable Development, ed. Adrian J. Bradbrook et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 181-201
111. The CSD decisions are very imprecise, contain no numerical targets and no timetables. The reporting on state implementation is entirely voluntary and not subject to any systematic review except through the UN Secretary-General's summary report.
112. Bradbrook and Wahnschafft, 'International Law'.
113. Freudenschuss-Reichl, 'Agreement Making'.
114. Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics'.
115. United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and World Energy Council, eds., World Energy Assessment. Energy and the Challenge of Sustainability (New York: UNDP, 2000).
116. World Health Organization, The World Health Report 2002: Reducing Risks, Promoting Health Life (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002).
117. Stine Madland Kaasa, The Commission on Sustainable Development. A Study of Institutional Design, Distribution of Capabilities and Entrepreneurial Leadership (Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2005).
118. Ban Ki-moon, 'Secretary-General's Remarks to the High-Level Segment of the 15th Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development', United Nations, http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2561 (accessed October 29, 2007).
119. For information on these conferences see http://www.ren21.net/PolicyProcess/renewables2004.asp (accessed October 30, 2009).
120. The CSD Partnerships (previously called WSSD Partnerships) are multi-stakeholder partnerships which have been registered with the CSD. In 2007 there were 58 registered CSD Partnerships which had energy as a primary theme. However, my analysis of these, based on criteria such as reports on progress and existence of websites, showed that only 24 of these were active.
121. While formally part of the UN system the World Bank and the other Bretton Woods institutions often want to distance themselves from the UN.
122. Sylvia I. Karlsson, 'G8 Climate Action from Gleneagles to Hokkaido-Dying Flare or Lasting Flame?' (paper presented at the 50th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association 'Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future', New York, February 15-18, 2009).
123. Lesage, Van de Graaf, and Westphal, 'G8's Role'.
124. Van de Graaf and Lesage, 'International Energy Agency'.
125. Lesage et al., 'The G8's Role'.
126. Lesage et al., 'The G8's Role'.
127. The countries participating in this agreement were initially the G8 members as well as the EU, China, India and South Korea. The secretariat of the IPEEC will be hosted by the IEA in Paris and the partnership itself will be based on the pattern of an IEA Implementing Agreement. Energy ministers of the G8 China India and South Korea, 'Declaration: International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation', http://www.energy.gov/media/ IPEEC_declarationfinal_June082008.pdf (accessed November 1, 2009).
128. The reason for IRENA to be established outside the UN was for speed: Karsten Sach, Chairman, Administrative Committee for IRENA, as quoted in IISD, 'Summary of the Vienna Energy Conference 2009 Towards an Integrated Energy Agenda Beyond 2020: Securing Sustainable Policies and Investments: 22-24 June', Earth Negotiations Bulletin 93, no. 6 (2009): 1-9.
129. See www.irena.org (accessed November 1, 2009). Germany had lobbied for setting up such an organisation for many years but previously without much success. The headquarters of IRENA will be in Abu Dhabi with subsidiary offices in Bonn (for technology and innovation) and Vienna (for liaison with other organisations).
130. There is no scheduled opportunity to address energy in the CSD within the work programme that runs until 2017.
131. Vaclav Smil, Energy at the Crossroads: Global Perspectives and Uncertainties (London: The MIT Press, 2003).
132. Goldthau and Witte, 'Strengthening Markets and Rules'.
133. Freudenschuss-Reichl, 'Agreement Making'.
134. In the case of, for example, some smaller partnerships which have a multi-stakeholder participation these can earn considerable legitimacy for some (but far from all) states and other actors. REN21 is such a multi-stakeholder partnership. On the other hand, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate which involves only state and business actors, has, for many, very little legitimacy: Sylvia I Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Harro van Asselt, 'Introduction: Exploring and Explaining the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate', International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 9, no. 3 (2009): 195-211.
135. Universal participation can also be a factor for effectiveness, as universal organisations expose the least willing countries to the issues and 'force' them to engage and deliberate. Over time this engagement may enable learning and changed beliefs and interests. Smaller coalitions of the willing such as IRENA (which is already quite large however) may include only those countries who are already enthusiastic about, in this case, renewable energy.
136. For a discussion on 'executive multilateralism' which foreign policy is usually characterised by implying a low level of parliament involvement, see Zürn, 'Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems'.
137. UNIDO, Towards an Integrated Energy Agenda Beyond 2020. International Energy Conference, Vienna, Austria, June 22-24, 2009.
138. UNIDO, Towards an Integrated Energy Agenda Beyond 2020. International Energy Conference, Vienna, Austria, June 22-24, 2009. Conference Report, (Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2009), 1.
139. UNIDO, Towards an Integrated Energy Agenda Beyond 2020. International Energy Conference, Vienna, Austria, June 22-24, 2009. Conference Report, (Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2009), 1.
140. The conference report does not explain how these recommendations were developed, if participants could be involved in the drafting process, etc. It is likely that the organising partners were mainly responsible for formulating these.
141. What the future UNFCCC regime will look like is at the time of writing highly uncertain. The efforts to negotiate a new legally binding agreement to supersede or run parallel to the Kyoto Protocol have not yet succeeded. The outcome of the fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP15) that took place in Copenhagen in December 2009 was only a political accord (the Copenhagen Accord) which has no legal status, yet it invites developed countries to adopt voluntary quantified emission reduction targets and developing countries to take on nationally appropriate mitigation actions. The short text is silent on which sectors' reductions should or could be involved (except for forests) and does not mention energy at all. The Accord is, despite its weaknesses, at least a stepping stone in the continuing negotiations for a new legally binding agreement.
142. Goldthau and Witte, 'Strengthening Markets and Rules', make this argument particularly with reference to the global oil and gas markets where the interest of consumers and producers are converging.
143. UN-Energy, Energy in the United Nations.
144. Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation', 389-90.
145. Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation', 393.
146. This is exemplified by two major global assessments of the energy sector in recent years, IPCC, ed., Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, UK and New York, USA, 2007).
147. United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and World Energy Council, eds., World Energy Assessment. Notable exceptions are the development of a draft 'Non-Legally Binding Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption' as a normative framework.
148. see Bradbrook and Wahnschafft, 'International Law'
149. the analysis of global international institutional arrangements to support renewable energy, see Steiner et al., 'International Institutional Arrangements'.
150. and to support energy for sustainable development, J. Gururaja, 'Energy for Sustainable Development: Review of National and International Energy Policies', Natural Resources Forum 27 (2003): 53-67.
151. IPCC, Scoping Paper-IPCC Special Report. Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation (Submitted by the Co-Chairs and Mr. Hohmeyer, Vice-Chair of WGIII) (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008).
152. See, for example, Fritz W. Scharpf, 'Introduction: The Problem-Solving Capacity of Multi-level Governance', Journal of European Public Policy 4, no. 4 (1997): 520-38.
153. Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders, eds., Multi-level Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
154. Sylvia I. Karlsson, 'Allocating Responsibilities in Multi-level Governance for Sustainable Development', International Journal of Social Economics 34, no. 1/2 (2007): 103-26.
155. Inge Kaul et al., eds., Providing Global Public Goods. Managing Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
156. Thomas G. Weiss, Tapio Kanninen, and Michael K. Busch, Sustainable Global Governance for the 21st Century. The United Nations Confronts Economic and Environmental Crises Amidst Changing Geopolitics, Occasional Papers, 45 (New York: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Ralph Bunche Institute, 2009).