The importance of failure theories in assessing crisis management: The Columbia space shuttle disaster revisited

Policy and Society

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 77-87

  Boin, Arjen ^a   Fishbacher Smith, Denis ^b  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956087337     PISSN: 14494035     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.polsoc.2011.03.003     Document Type: Article

References (48)

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