Assessing NASA's safety culture: The limits and possibilities of high-reliability theory

Public Administration Review

Volumn 68, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1050-1062

  Boin, Arjen ^a   Schulman, Paul ^b  

^a LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MILLS COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 54049097487     PISSN: 00333352     EISSN: 15406210     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.00954.x     Document Type: Review

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