The explanatory power of models and simulations: A philosophical exploration

Simulation and Gaming

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 155-176

  Weirich, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

cooperation; DIVIDE THE DOLLAR; evolution; explanation; explanatory power; game of strategy; isomorphism; model; PRISONER'S DILEMMA; robustness; simulation; STAG HUNT; strategic reasoning; theorems

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955736498     PISSN: 10468781     EISSN: 1552826X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1046878108319639     Document Type: Article

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