Voter turnout and electoral competition in a multidimensional policy space

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 376-384

  Hortala Vallve, Rafael ^a   Esteve Volart, Berta ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Electoral competition; Turnout

Indexed keywords

EID: 79954819900     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.11.003     Document Type: Article

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