Uncertainty of voters' preferences and differentiation in a runoff system

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 1185-1189

  Matsushima, Noriaki ^a  

^a KOBE UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Hotelling; Location; Minimum differentiation; Runoff elections; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 36048991138     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.09.005     Document Type: Article

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