Credit market competition and capital regulation

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 983-1018

  Allen, Franklin ^a   Carletti, Elena ^b   Marquez, Robert ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b European University Institute   (United States)

^c BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79953890382     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhp089     Document Type: Article

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