Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 156-182

  Repullo, Rafael ^a  

^a CEMFI   (Spain)

Author keywords

Bank regulation; Capital requirements; Deposit rate ceilings; Franchise values; Imperfect competition; Moral hazard; Risk shifting

Indexed keywords

EID: 1942435478     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2003.08.005     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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