The interest group analogy: International non-governmental advocacy organisations in international politics

Review of International Studies

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 93-120

  Bloodgood, Elizabeth A ^a  

^a Gina Cody School of Engineering and Computer Science   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79953096639     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: 14699044     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210510001051     Document Type: Article

References (321)

1. Kal Raustiala, 'States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions', International Studies Quarterly, 41 (1997), pp. 719-40;
2. Peter Spiro, 'New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-making Institutions', Washington Quarterly, 18 (1995), p. 49;
3. Princen and Finger 'Introduction', in Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger (eds), Environmental NGOs in World Politics (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 12;
4. and Janet Brown, Gareth Porter and Pamela S. Chasek, Global Environmental Politics (New York: Westview Press, 1991), p. 60.
5. Ronit and Schneider called for such an undertaking in their 2000 edited volume, but made little systematic progress towards this goal. See, Private Organizations in Global Politics (New York: Routledge, 2000).
6. Susan Sell and Aseem Prakash, 'Using Ideas Strategically', International Studies Quarterly, 48 (2004), pp. 143-76;
7. Shareen Hertel, Unexpected Power: Conflict and Change Among Transnational Activists (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006);
8. Clifford Bob, Marketing Rebellion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005);
9. Sarah Henderson, 'Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Organization Sector in Russia', Comparative Policy Studies, 35 (2002), pp. 136-67;
10. Alexander Cooley and James Ron, 'The NGO Scramble', International Security, 27 (2002), pp. 5-30;
11. and Paul Burnstein, 'Interest Organizations, Information and Policy Innovation', Sociological Forum, 22 (2007), pp. 174-99.
12. Kathryn Sikkink, 'Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America', International Organizations, 47 (1993), pp. 411-41;
13. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
14. Robert Bruce Hall and Thomas Biersteker (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
15. John Mearsheimer, 'False Promises of International Institutions', International Security, 19 (1994), pp. 5-49.
16. Steve Charnovitz, 'Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law', American Journal of International Law, 100:2 (2006), pp. 348-72; (Pubitemid 44116368)
17. Raustiala, 'States, NGOs';
18. Michele Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, 'NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations', Global Environmental Politics, 1:4 (2001), pp. 65-85.
19. In this article I focus on advocacy INGOs defined as formally organised bodies independent of government representation with international aims and projects in, and funding and members from, at least three countries and a permanent headquarters and governing body which have as their explicit goal political change. I focus on advocacy as opposed to national, grassroots, or service-delivery organisations. While select insights from interest group theories may apply to these organisations, that is beyond this scope of this article.
20. Kjell Skjelsbaek, 'The Growth of International Non-Governmental Organizations in the Twentieth Century', International Organizations, 25:3 (1971), pp. 420-42;
21. Werner J. Feld, Nongovernmental Forces and World Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972);
22. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998);
23. Richard Price, 'Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics', World Politics, 55 (2003), pp. 579-606;
24. R. Charli Carpenter, 'Setting the Advocacy Agenda', International Studies Quarterly, 51:1 (2007), pp. 99-120;
25. Charnovitz, 'NGOs and International Law';
26. Daphne Josselin and William Wallace (eds), Non-State Actors in World Politics (London: Palgrave, 2001);
27. Ann Florini (ed.), Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).
28. With the notable exception of Erica Johnson and Aseem Prakash, 'NGO Research Program: A Collective Action Perspective', Policy Sciences, 40 (2007), pp. 221-40. (Pubitemid 350020312)
29. Christine Mahoney and Frank Baumgartner, 'Converging Perspectives on Interest Group Research in Europe and America', West European Politics, 31:6 (2008), pp. 1251-71;
30. Grant Jordan, D. Halpin, and W. Maloney, 'Defining Interests: Disambiguation and the Need for New Distinctions', British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6 (2004), pp. 195-218.
31. Justin Greenwood and Marc Aspinwall (eds), Collective Action in the EU: Interests and the New Politics of Associability (London: Routledge, 1998);
32. Jan Beyers et al. (eds), Interest Group Politics in Europe: Lessons from EU Studies and Comparative Politics (London: Routledge, 2009).
33. While this article does not go very far towards answering this question, I put forth several future directions for research. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
34. Christine Mahoney, Brussels Versus the Beltway (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008).
35. In their review of the study of interest groups in American politics, Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech note 'When we refer to "interest groups" we mean not only membership organizations but also advocacy organizations that do not accept members, businesses, and any other organization or institution that makes policy-related appeals to the government.' (1998, p. xxii). Interest groups are also referred to as 'pressure groups' or 'organized interests' in the literature. I treat the two as the same and use the term interest groups for consistency.
36. Michael T. Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislators: Theory of Political Markets (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981), p. 71.
37. David Knoke, 'Associations and Interest Groups', Annual Review of Sociology, 12 (1986), p. 2;
38. Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech, Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 25;
39. Jeffrey Berry, Lobbying for the People (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977);
40. David Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951).
41. Berry, Lobbying for the People, pp. 10-11.
42. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (amended in 1974) imposes stringent requirements on PACs, including disclosure of their activities to the Federal Election Commission. For more see the Federal Election Commission website, {www.fec.gov/pages/fecfeca.html}.
43. According to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, lobbyists must file semi-annual reports with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House identifying their clients and the amount of income they receive. Companies also have to report their overall lobbying expenditure. For more information, see: {www.opensecrets.org/pubs/lobby00/rules.asp}.
44. Jan Potters and Frans Van Winden, 'Lobbying and Asymmetric Information', Public Choice, 74:3 (1992), p. 270.
45. Truman, The Governmental Process, chap. 3;
46. Berry, Lobbying for the People, p. 11;
47. Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislators, chap. 4.
48. Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Interests;
49. Berry, Lobbying for the People;
50. Norman J. Ornstein and Shirley Elder, Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1978);
51. Kay L. Schlozman and John Tierney, 'More of the Same: Washington Pressure Group Activity in a Decade of Change', Journal of Politics, 45:2 (1983), pp. 351-77;
52. Linda Fowler and Ronald Shaiko, 'The Grass Roots Connection: Environmental Activists and Roll Calls', American Journal of Political Science, 31:3 (1987), pp. 484-510;
53. John Wright, 'PAC Contributions, Lobbying and Representation', Journal of Politics, 51:3 (1989), pp. 713-29;
54. Laura Langbein and Mark Lotwis, 'The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money;
55. Gun Control in the US House, 1986', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15:3 (1990), pp. 413-40;
56. Craig Humphries, 'Corporations, PACs, and the Strategic Link Between Contributions and Lobbying Activities', Western Political Quarterly, 44:2 (1991), pp. 353-72;
57. Kevin B. Grier, Michael Munger, and Brian Roberts, 'The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986', American Political Science Review, 88:4 (1994), pp. 911-26;
58. Kevin M. Leyden, 'Interest Group Resources and Testimony at Congressional Hearings', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20:3 (1995), pp. 431-39;
59. John Wright, Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions and Influence (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996);
60. Marie Hojnacki and David C. Kimball, 'The Who and How of Organizations' Lobbying Strategies in Committee', Journal of Politics, 61:4 (1999), pp. 999-1024.
61. Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Interests, p. 29.
62. Ornstein and Elder, Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Policymaking, chap. 2;
63. Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Interests.
64. Lester Milbrath, 'Lobbying as a Communications Process', Public Opinion Quarterly, 24:1 (1960), pp. 32-53.
65. David Austen-Smith, 'Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes', American Journal of Political Science, 37:3 (1993), p. 799;
66. Morten Bennedsen and Sven E. Feldmann, 'Informational Lobbying and Political Contributions', Journal of Public Economics, 90 (2006), pp. 631-56. (Pubitemid 43585251)
67. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, revised edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971);
68. E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960);
69. Schlozman and Tierney, Organized Interests;
70. Jack L. Walker, Mobilizing Interest Groups in America (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991);
71. Virginia Gray and David Lowery, The Population Ecology of Interest Representation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996);
72. Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Interests, chap. 5.
73. Vincent P. Crawford and Joel Sobel. 'Strategic Information Transmission', Econometrica, 50:6 (1982), pp. 1431-51;
74. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, 'Relying on the Information of Interested Parties', RAND Journal of Economics, 17:1 (1986), pp. 18-32;
75. Austen-Smith, 'Information and Influence';
76. Susanne Lohmann, 'A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action', American Political Science Review, 87:2 (1993), pp. 319-33;
77. Eric Rasmusen, 'Lobbying When the Decision-Maker can Acquire Independent Information', Public Choice, 77 (1993), pp. 899-913;
78. Potters and Van Winden, 'Asymmetric Information';
79. David Austen-Smith and John Wright, 'Counteractive Lobbying', American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1994), pp. 25-44;
80. Ken Kollman, 'Inviting Friends to Lobby', American Journal of Political Science, 41:2 (1997), pp. 519-544;
81. Vijay Krishna and John Morgan, 'A Model of Expertise', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (2001), pp. 747-75;
82. Kevin Esterling, The Political Economy of Expertise (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005).
83. Potters and Van Winden, 'Asymmetric Information', p. 270;
84. Scott Ainsworth, 'Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence', Journal of Politics, 55:1 (1993), p. 52;
85. Arthur Lupia and Matthew McCubbins, 'Who Controls? Information and the Structure of Legislative Decision-making', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19:3 (1994), p. 364.
86. Lohmann, 'Signalling Model', pp. 320-1;
87. Milgrom and Roberts, 'Interested Parties', p. 19;
88. Potters and Van Winden, 'Asymmetric Information', p. 275;
89. Crawford and Sobel, 'Strategic Information', pp. 1432, 1441-2.
90. Potters and Van Winden, 'Asymmetric Information', p. 238.
91. Austen-Smith, 'Information and Influence';
92. Krishna and Morgan, 'Expertise'.
93. Bauer, Dexter and Pool, American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade, second edition (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972);
94. Thomas Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, 'Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1989), pp. 531-64;
95. Berry, Lobbying for the People;
96. Potters and Van Winden, 'Asymmetric Information', pp. 278-9;
97. Eric Rasmusen, 'Lobbying'.
98. Austen-Smith and Wright, 'Counteractive', p. 28;
99. Potters and Van Winden, 'Asymmetric Information', p. 278;
100. Robert Salisbury, John Heinz, Edward Laumann, and Robert Nelson, 'Who Works With Whom? Interest Group Alliances and Opposition', American Political Science Review, 81:4 (1987), pp. 1217-34.
101. Kollman, 'Inviting', pp. 520-1.
102. Berry, Lobbying for the People, chap. 10.
103. Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Interests, chap. 9;
104. Esterling, Political Economy of Expertise;
105. Wright, Interest Groups and Congress, chap. 1.
106. Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor (eds), Global Civil Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 4.
107. Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizations 1997/98, vol. 1 (Munchen: K. G. Saur, 1998);
108. John Boli and George Thomas (eds), Constructing World Culture: International Non-Governmental Organizations Since 1875 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999);
109. Skjelsbaek, 'Growth';
110. and Anheier et al., Global Civil Society all use UIA data in their studies of INGOs.
111. ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV).
112. Russell Dalton, The Green Rainbow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 178;
113. Peter Willetts, Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated Non-Government Organizations (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), p. 191.
114. James Ron, Howard Ramos, and Kathleen Rodgers, 'Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986-2000', International Studies Quarterly, 49 (2005), p. 558.
115. Raustiala, 'States, NGOs', p. 728.
116. Spiro, 'New Global', pp. 49-50.
117. Willets, Pressure Groups in the Global System;
118. Thomas Risse-Kappen, (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
119. Joshua Busby, 'Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics', International Studies Quarterly, 51 (2007), pp. 247-76;
120. Hertel, Unexpected Power;
121. Paul Burstein and April Linton, 'The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy', Social Forces, 81 (2002), pp. 380-408; (Pubitemid 36136539)
122. Bob, Marketing Rebellion.
123. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 18;
124. Diane Stone, 'Think Tanks and Informal Diplomacy', in Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler (eds), Actors and Authority in the Global System (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 217;
125. Princen and Finger (eds), Environmental NGOs in World Politics, p. 12.
126. This conclusion is based on the comparison of Dalton, Green Rainbow, Table 8.1, p. 182
127. and Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Interests, Table 8.1, p. 152, which are startlingly similar, given their different areas of study.
128. Raustiala, 'NGOs, States', p. 727.
129. Price, 'Transnational Civil Society', p. 589;
130. Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers, 'Transnational Information', p. 557;
131. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, pp. 18-21.
132. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders;
133. Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In;
134. Price, 'Transnational Civil Society'.
135. Princen and Finger (eds), Environmental NGOs in World Politics, p. 36;
136. Allison Brysk, 'From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human Rights in Argentina', Comparative Political Studies, 26:3 (1993), pp. 259-85;
137. Ann Marie Clark, 'Non-Governmental Organizations and the Influence of Civil Society', Journal of International Affairs, 48:2 (1995), pp. 507-25;
138. Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
139. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, pp. 12-3;
140. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (eds), Power of Human Rights, pp. 18-21;
141. Clark, 'NGOs', pp. 507-25;
142. Brysk, 'Above and Below', pp. 259-85;
143. Willets, Pressure Groups in the Global System, p. 194.
144. Princen and Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics, p. 5;
145. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 127;
146. Josselyn and Wallace, Non-State Actors in World Politics, pp. 10-13;
147. Anheier, et al., Global Civil Society, chap. 1;
148. Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In, chap. 1.
149. Brown, et al., Global Environmental Politics, pp. 17-9.
150. Hertel, Unexpected Power;
151. Carpenter, 'Advocacy Agenda';
152. Bob, Marketing of Rebellion;
153. Lisa Jordan and Peter Van Tuijl, 'Political Responsibility in Transnational NGO Advocacy', World Development, 28:12 (2000), pp. 2051-65. (Pubitemid 32013353)
154. While this dataset includes a range of non-profit organisations, including professional associations, sports organisations, and social groups, I have selected issue areas in which groups have political goals in order to focus on interest groups.
155. David Knoke, Organizing for Collective Action (Hawthore: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990);
156. Leyden, 'Interest Group Resources', pp. 431-39.
157. The search of Associations Unlimited produced 270 organisations under the category of the Environment, 183 organisations in Disarmament and Peace, 207 organisations concerned with Social Welfare, and 108 organisations interested in Human Rights. A similar search of the UN data did not give total tallies for each category; however the final data set results in roughly the same numbers of domestic interest groups and INGOs.
158. Data is available from author by email request.
159. This data source has also been used by Skjelsbaek, 'Growth';
160. Boli and Thomas (eds), Constructing World Culture;
161. and Anheier, et al. (2000), Global Civil Society. Organizations must have membership and resources from three countries as well as established leadership procedures to appear in this source. While there do not tend to be regional biases in the Yearbook, the UIA depends upon self-reporting as well as reporting by other organisations and so there may be organisations that self-select not to appear in the Yearbook.
162. These data sources are commonly used in American politics research on interest groups, for a survey of data sources, see Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Interests, chap. 8.
163. The only statistically significant differences concern lobbying budget and testimony. See note 62 for details.
164. This result is somewhat dependent on how overlapping organisations are categorised. In the analysis here, any group which is both a national interest group and an INGO is treated as an INGO. If the alternative coding is used, the results change slightly - the difference of means and variances of lobbying budget and legislative testimony become significant, both at the.01 level, but affiliation becomes insignificant. This likely implies that there are a range of different characteristics and behaviours within both categories, but some organisations are more likely to take on these characteristics and behaviours. Namely larger INGOs are more likely to use money for influence and have the reputations and expertise to testify before Congress than smaller INGOs. Interest groups which are also INGOs are more likely to build networks and have affiliates than traditional domestic interest groups, as was hypothesised earlier. When overlapping organisations are removed from the dataset, such that only 'pure' INGOs and interest groups are compared, only affiliations and PAC are statistically significantly different across the two groups, as the analogy leads us to expect (only US organisations can form PACs).
165. Table 2 like Table 1 reports the results when INGOs which are also interest groups are categorised as INGOs. When these overlapping organisations are treated as interest groups the results change somewhat. Contributions by organisation and testimony before Congress become significant (at the.01 level), having a D. C. office remains significant, and number of affiliates becomes insignificant.
166. This argument can be connected to the larger domestic analogy debate in International Relations. For examples, see, Hedley Bull, 'Society and Anarchy in International Relations', in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wright (eds), Diplomatic Investigations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968);
167. Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954);
168. and Ruth Reitan, 'A Global Civil Society in a World Polity, or Angels and Nomads Against Empire?', Global Governance, 13 (2007), pp. 445-60.
169. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders;
170. Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In;
171. Anheier et al., Global Civil Society;
172. Hall and Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority.
173. Samy Cohen, The Resilience of the State. trans. Jonathan Derrick (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006);
174. Paul Wapner, 'The State or Else! Statism's Resilience in NGO Studies', International Studies Review, 9 (2007), pp. 85-9.
175. Cooley and Ron, 'NGO Scramble';
176. Sebastian Mallaby, 'NGOs: Fighting Poverty, Hurting the Poor', Foreign Policy (2004), pp. 50-8; (Pubitemid 39196444)
177. Bob, Marketing Rebellion;
178. Abby Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert: NGO Information and Its Impact on US Foreign Policy (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2006).
179. Michael Edwards and David Hulme (eds), Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 1996);
180. Terje Tvedt, Angels of Mercy or Development Diplomats? NGOs and Foreign Aid (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1998).
181. Bob, Marking Rebellion;
182. Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert;
183. Volker Heins, Nongovernmental Organizations in International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
184. William De Mars, NGOs and Transnational Networks (New York: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 4.
185. Price, 'Transnational Civil Society', p. 601.
186. Price, 'Transnational Civil Society', p. 601.
187. Crawford and Sobel, 'Strategic Information';
188. Milgrom and Roberts, 'Interested Parties'.
189. Paul Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996);
190. Anne Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001);
191. Jonathan Power, Like Water on Stone: The Story of Amnesty International (Boston: Northeastern, 2001);
192. David Forsythe, The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005);
193. Busby, 'Bono';
194. Richard Matthew, Bryan MacDonald, and Kenneth Rutherford (eds), Landmines and Human Security (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004);
195. David Meyer, A Winter of Discontent (New York: Praeger, 1990);
196. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Across Borders;
197. Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999);
198. Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In;
199. Princen and Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics;
200. Dalton, Green Rainbow;
201. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (eds), Power of Human Rights;
202. Florini (ed.), Third Force;
203. Josselin and Wallace, Non-State Actors in World Politics.
204. Tvedt, Angels of Mercy;
205. Cooley and Ron, 'NGO Scramble';
206. Ron et al., 'Transnational Information'.
207. Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Interests, p. 9.
208. Olson, Collective Action.
209. Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Interests, pp. 67-77;
210. Susanne Staggenborg, Social Movements (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2008).
211. Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislators;
212. Knoke, Organizing for Collective Action;
213. Humphries, 'Corporations';
214. Walker, Mobilizing Interest Groups in America.
215. Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental Movement, revised edition (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2003).
216. Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In;
217. Busby 'Bono'.
218. Feld, Nongovernmental Forces, p. 186;
219. Skjelsbaek, 'Growth', p. 432.
220. Gray and Lowery, Population Ecology of Interest Representation;
221. Michael Hannan and John Freeman, Organizational Ecology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).
222. Cheryl Shanks, Harold Jacobsen, and Jeffrey Kaplan, 'Inertia and Change in the Constellation of Intergovernmental Organizations, 1891-1992', International Organization, 50:4 (1996), pp. 593-627. (Pubitemid 126315214)
223. Boli and Thomas (eds), Transforming World Culture, pp. 32-4, 41-3;
224. Skjelsbaek, 'Growth';
225. Feld, Nongovernmental Forces.
226. Boli and Thomas (eds), Transforming World Culture, p. 34.
227. Skjelsbaek, 'Growth', p. 429.
228. Carpenter, 'Advocacy Agenda', p. 103;
229. Bob, Marketing Rebellion;
230. Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay Gugerty (eds), Revisiting Advocacy Organizations: A Collective Action Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
231. Wapner, Environmental Activism;
232. Matthew et al., Landmines and Human Security.
233. Shabecoff, Fierce Green Fire.
234. Crawford and Sobel, 'Strategic Information';
235. Milgrom and Roberts, 'Interested Parties';
236. Austen-Smith, 'Information and Influence';
237. Rasmusen, 'Lobbying'.
238. Ainsworth, 'Regulating Lobbyists'.
239. Princen and Finger (eds), Environmental NGOs;
240. Wapner, Environmental Activism;
241. Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In;
242. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Across Borders;
243. Price, 'Transnational Civil Society';
244. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (eds), Power of Human Rights;
245. Florini (ed.), Third Force;
246. Bas Arts, Math Noortmann and Bob Reinalda (eds), Non-State Actors in International Relations (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001);
247. Betsill and Correll, 'NGO Influence';
248. Josselin and Wallace (eds), Non-State Actors in World Politics;
249. Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert;
250. Busby, 'Bono'.
251. Price, 'Transnational Civil Society', p. 605.
252. Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert.
253. Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In;
254. Carpenter, 'Advocacy Agenda';
255. Mahoney, Brussels Versus the Beltway.
256. Bob, Marketing Rebellion;
257. Carpenter, 'Advocacy Agenda'.
258. Matthew, et al., Landmines and Human Security;
259. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Across Borders;
260. Busby, 'Bono'.
261. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', International Organization, 52 (1998), pp. 887-917;
262. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (eds), Power of Human Rights;
263. Florini (ed.), Third Force.
264. Princen and Finger (eds), Environmental NGOs;
265. Raustiala, 'States, NGOs';
266. Charnovitz, 'NGOs and International Law'.
267. David Cameron et al., To Walk Without Fear (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998);
268. Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience;
269. Elizabeth Bloodgood, 'Influential Information: Non-Governmental Organizations' Roles in International Regime Formation', Ph. D. dissertation, Princeton University (2002);
270. Matthew, et al., Landmines and Human Security;
271. Busby, 'Bono'.
272. Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Interests, p. 134.
273. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Across Borders;
274. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (eds), Power of Human Rights;
275. Sell and Prakash, 'Using Ideas';
276. Carpenter, 'Advocacy Agendas';
277. Hertel, Unexpected Power;
278. and Bob, Marketing Rebellion are notable exceptions.
279. Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In;
280. Wapner, Environmental Activism.
281. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 2.
282. Feld, Nongovernmental Forces, p. 201.
283. Cooley and Ron, 'NGO Scramble';
284. Mallaby, 'NGOs';
285. Bob, Marketing Rebellion.
286. Bob, Marketing Rebellion. p. 6.
287. Milgrom and Roberts, 'Interested Parties', pp. 21-5;
288. Lupia and McCubbins, 'Who Controls', p. 365;
289. Krishna and Morgan, 'Expertise', p. 200.
290. Esterling, Political Economy of Expertise, p. x.
291. Milgrom and Roberts, 'Interested Parties', pp. 21-15;
292. Lupia and McCubbins, 'Who Controls', pp. 364-6.
293. Ainsworth, 'Regulating Lobbyists', p. 44.
294. Crawford and Sobel, 'Strategic Information';
295. Joel Sobel, 'A Theory of Credibility', Review of Economic Studies, 52:4 (1985), pp. 557-73;
296. Austen-Smith, 'Information and Influence';
297. Ainsworth, 'Regulating Lobbyists'.
298. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Across Borders;
299. Brysk, 'Above and Below';
300. Bob, Marketing Rebellion;
301. Busby, 'Bono'.
302. Bauer, Dexter, and Pool, American Business and Public Policy;
303. Gilligan and Krehbiel, 'Organization of Informative Committees';
304. Berry, Lobbying for the People.
305. Austen-Smith and Wright, 'Counteractive';
306. Salisbury et al., 'Who Works';
307. Potters and Van Winden, 'Asymmetric Information', p. 278.
308. Kollman, 'Inviting Friends';
309. Esterling, Political Economy of Expertise.
310. Edwards and Hulme (eds), Beyond the Magic Bullet;
311. Tvedt, Angels of Mercy;
312. Bob, Marketing Rebellion;
313. Mallaby, 'NGOs';
314. DeMars, Transnational Networks.
315. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Across Borders;
316. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (eds), Power of Human Rights;
317. Clark, 'Non-Governmental Organizations';
318. Brysk, 'Above and Below'.
319. Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert.
320. Ainsworth, 'Regulating Lobbyists', pp. 49-51.
321. Lisa Jordan and Peter Van Tuijl (eds), NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles, and Innovations (London: Earthscan, 2006) is a step in this direction.