Noncooperative household demand

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 146, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 504-527

  Lechene, Valérie ^a,b   Preston, Ian ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Intra household allocation; Nash equilibrium; Slutsky symmetry

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952702744     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.013     Document Type: Article

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