Collective and unitary models: A clarification

Review of Economics of the Household

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 5-14

  Browning, Martin ^a   Chiappori, Pierre André ^b   Lechene, Valérie ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^c WADHAM COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Collective; Demand; Distribution factors; Intrahousehold allocation; Unitary

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645744142     PISSN: 15695239     EISSN: 15737152     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11150-005-6694-2     Document Type: Article

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