Ideologies of Jihad in Europe

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 173-200

  Nesser, Petter ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN DEFENCE RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT FFI   (Norway)

Author keywords

Europe; Ideology; Jihadism; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952502438     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: 15561836     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2010.537587     Document Type: Article

References (186)

1. Jihadist ideologue Omar Abu Omar alias Abu Qatada, as quoted in United States District Court of Colombia, "Jamil El-Banna et al. vs. George W. Bush President of the United States et al.," dated 21 October 2004, 67.
2. Brynjar Lia and Ashild Kjøk, "Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993-2000," report, FFI, 2001.
3. Petter Nesser, "Jihad in Europe," report, FFI, 2004.
4. Alison Pargeter, The New Frontiers of Jihad Radical Islam in Europe (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008).
5. The article defines ideology as systematic, normative thinking about how to change societies. Ideologies typically contain descriptions of societal problems, specifying their causes (diagnosis); the reasons why the problems should be solved; who should solve them (rationale); as well as prescriptions on how to solve the problems and the consequences of solving them (prognosis);
6. John Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
7. The "jihadism" terminology is disputed and indeed sub-optimal; for a good discussion see Jarret M. Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2009), 4 ff.
8. Consult also Quintan Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 2 (February 2005): 75-97.
9. Sayyid Qutb wrote primarily about the situation in Egypt, but emphasized that the principle applied to the whole world;
10. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Revised Translation 1990) (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1964).
11. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).
12. Consult Camille al-Tawil, Al-Qaida and Her Sisters, the Story of the Arab Jihadis (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 2008).
13. The main salafist principles are monotheism (tawhid), being loyal to Islam and disavowing everything un-Islamic (wala wa'l bara), correcting un-Islamic behavior through the principle of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil (hisba), always trying to convert and Islamize people (dawa), and (for the salafist jihadists) jihad fi sabil Allah (jihad in the cause of God), in the meaning of armed struggle;
14. Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement (London: Hurst=Columbia University Press, 2009).
15. Most Islamists seek to be as salafist as possible, and use the term to distinguish between themselves and the non-pious, the deviants, the apostates, the hypocrites, and the unbelievers. In practice, the term salafist is used about Islamists who go to lengths to emulate the Prophet and his Companions, by way of how they dress, pray, etc.
16. For a "salafist jihadist" exposition of the concepts, see Omar Bakri Mohammed, The World Is Divided into Two Camps. Daar Ul-Kufr and Daar Ul-Islaam (London: Ad-Da'wah Publications, 2004).
17. For a more fine-grained classification of the political rationales of jihadism, consult Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 6 ff.
18. Hegghammer differentiates between "socio-revolutionary Islamism" (toppling of local regimes), "classical jihadism" (liberation of occupied Muslim countries), and "global jihadism" (the global war of Al Qaeda and likeminded groups).
19. For example, the book regarded as a major inspiration for the salafist jihadist trends, Milestones, emphasizes the duty of training before going into battle; making tactical truces with the enemies or fleeing to a secure base in times of weakness;
20. see Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (see note 7 above).
21. There have been communiqués on the Internet in the names of Al Qaeda in Northern Europe, Al Qaeda in Britain, Al Qaeda in Sweden, etc., calling for attacks on the U.S.'s European allies, but they have not been traced to operational cells;
22. consult for example "Skepticism greets 'Al Qaeda in Britain' founding," Reuters, 16 January 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/16/US-Britain-AlQaeda-Website-idUSL1535200620080116
23. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (see note 7 above).
24. The common understanding of covenants between Muslims and unbelievers was summarized by the jihadist translation service At-Tibyan Publications in a note to bin Laden's speech dated 16 December 2004 as follows: ". The Sheikh (bin Laden) is talking about 'Covenants in Islam,' which is a very crucial topic. Because of the vital importance of this topic, we will address it separately, at a later date, insha Allah. But here is a brief summary: Covenants in Islam are a regulated matter and the regulations are spelled out clearly in Quran. Also the consensus of Islamic scholars has been known for very long time. Muslims are allowed to enter into covenant agreement(s) with their enemies when they (Muslims) are weak, and only under the following conditions: - The length of any covenant should not be for more than ten years under any circumstances. - Muslims are obligated to use the time of covenant to prepare and strengthen themselves to resume Jihad as soon as possible. - Once Muslims' state of weakness has changed, they are obligated to call off the covenant, inform their enemies of their decision to call the covenant off, and resume Jihad. - Covenant agreement(s) is=are automatically cancelled if the enemies attack any Muslim or Muslim land anywhere. - And Also this Taghuts are Murtadeen and thair covenant are not valid, etc.)."
25. For a more detailed exposition of indicators on the various drivers of jihadist cells in Europe, consult Petter Nesser, "Jihad in Europe" (see note 3 above).
26. Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (London: Harper Perennial, 2006).
27. See for example Petter Nesser, "Jihad in Europe" (see note 16 above)
28. Lorenzo Vidino and Steven Emerson, Al Qaeda in Europe (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005),
29. Alison Pargeter, The New Frontiers (see note 4 above).
30. Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory (see note 17 above).
31. See for example Mark Honigsbaum and Alan Travis, "Al-Qaida's 'spiritual ambassador' faces return to Jordan," Guardian, 12 August 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/aug/12/alqaida.terrorism
32. The organization al-Muhajiroun was formed in 1996, and focused primarily on supporting the separatist struggle in Kashmir;
33. see Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
34. Members of the group have rarely been tied concretely to terrorist acts before the early 2000s, when several members were involved in terrorism in Pakistan=Kashmir and Israel. After the invasion of Iraq, several people involved in terrorism in Europe (including the London bombers) had been affiliated with al-Muhajiroun.
35. Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza, and Omar Bakri are assumed to have had a particularly strong ideological influence on Europe's jihadists. From the early 1990s until quite recently they interacted with a substantial number of militants convicted of terrorism in Europe and abroad. Leading figures of well-known terrorist cells in Europe, such as the London-bombers, attended sermons and study circles of the London preachers and members of terrorist cells accessed ideological texts and propaganda material produced by them;
36. see for example Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory (see note 17 above).
37. Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad (New York: Basic Books, 2006).
38. Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad (see note 21 above), 150.
39. Brynjar Lia, "Al-Qaeda online: Understanding jihadist internet infrastructure," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 2005.
40. Hanna Rogan, "Jihadism Online: A study of how al-Qaida and radical Islamist groups use the Internet for terrorist purpose," report, FFI, 2006.
41. James Brandon, "Virtual Caliphate: Islamic Extremists and Their Websites," Centre for Social Cohesion (Throwbridge: The Cromwell Press, 2008), http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/VirtualCaliphate.pdf
42. Consult At-Tibyan Publications, http://www.tibyan.co.cc/
43. The ideological material corresponds largely to material available on the Internet library Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad analyzed by the acknowledged Combating Terrorism Centre, CTC, William McCants (ed.), "Militant Ideology Atlas, Executive Report," report, Combating Terrorism Centre, West Point, 2006.
44. William McCants (ed.), "Militant Ideology Atlas, Research Compendium," report, Combating Terrorism Centre, West Point, 2006.
45. Camille al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998), 73 ff.
46. Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe, "Indictment of the Unemployed Hairdresser and Asylum Applicant Shadi Moh'd Mustafa Abdalla Alias Emad Abdelhadie" (in German, translation courtesy Peter Bergen), Federal Court Frankfurt am Main, "Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali ("Aeurobui Beandali") et al.," (in German), dated 20 June 2003, with author.
47. Federal Court Frankfurt am Main, "Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr. Djilali Benali" (see note 29 above).
48. Court of First Instance no 6 of the Audencia National, "Proceedings 20/2004" (Indictment of the Madrid bombers) (in Spanish, translated by Tine Gade), dated 10 April 2006, with author, 436 ff.
49. Court of First Instance, "Proceedings 20/2004" 1428 ff (see note 31 above).
50. The Madrid bombers, e.g., downloaded several texts by the Saudi jihadist ideologues Abd al-Aziz al-Jarbu and Nasir bin Hamad al-Fahd;
51. Court of First Instance, "Proceedings 20/2004436 ff (see note 31 above).
52. Court of First Instance, "Proceedings 20/2004" 1217 (see note 31 above).
53. According to Rudolph Peters, covenant of security rationales functioned as constraints on Mohammed Bouyeri and the "Hofstadgroup" seeking theological justifications for terrorism in the Netherlands. Peters argues Bouyeri found the solution in Taymiyyah's ruling on individual punishment for people insulting the Prophet, while other members of the network went "preacher shopping" among self-declared religious advisors such as the ethnic Dutchman Abdul Jabbar Van de Ven seeking permission to use violence in their home-country;
54. Rudolph Peters, "Dutch Extremist Islamism: Van Gogh's Murderer and His Ideas," in Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge in Europe, Rik Coolsaet (ed.) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 116.
55. Consult Helen Carter, "Beheading Plot Trial Told of Abu Hamza Material," Guardian, 31 January 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jan/31/terrorism.world and Sean
56. O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory (see note 17 above).
57. Albert Benschop, "Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold: Jihad in the Netherlands," report, University of Amsterdam, 2005.
58. Rudolph Peters, "Dutch Extremist Islamism," 116 (see note 35 above).
59. Woolwich Crown Court, "The Queen v Bilal Talal Abdul Samad Abdulla and Mohammed Jamil Abdelqadader Asha, Opening note," 7 October 2008, with author, 254 ff.
60. Ibid., 76.
61. Abu Qatada, "Address to the Muslims from Abu Qatada=Umar Bin Mahmud Abu Umar" (in Arabic) (dated March 2009), http://zuheer17.blogspot.com/2009/03/blog-post_2002.html
62. Mustafa Setmariam Nasir alias Abu Musab al-Suri, "A Summary of My Testimony on the Holy Struggle in Algeria, 1988-1996" (in Arabic, 2004) (translated excerpts courtesy Brynjar Lia).
63. In the manifest for jihadism "Milestones," Qutb called on Muslims to leave Muslim societies not governed by Islamic law (undertake hijra) and establish bases in which Muslims can prepare for war (fard ayn jihad) against their governments (like the Prophet and his Companions in Medina);
64. consult Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (see note 7 above).
65. Ideologically, many jihadists appear to perceive Europe to be the modern-day Medina (for a vanguard of true believers aiming to restore the Caliphate), a base in which to prepare for violent Islamization.
66. Abu Musab al-Suri, "A Summary of My Testimony" (see note 42 above).
67. At the forefront of the jihadist mocking of political Islamists was Abu Qatada, who considered the Muslim Brotherhood deviant for "throwing itself on the threshold of the Taghut [tyranny]" by joining political processes and negotiating with non-believers;
68. Abu Qatada, "Between the Two Methods" (translated excerpts courtesy Will McCants), Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad.
69. The war between Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia was very important in the radicalization of European Islamists in the early 1990s and was seen by many jihadists as a potential base for the mujahidin in Europe;
70. see Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network (London: Berg, 2004).
71. While Bosnia is known to have been a radicalizing factor in the lives of Europe-based radical preachers and terrorist operatives, no acts of terrorism seem to have been triggered directly by events in Bosnia, however, such as was the case with the Algerian war, the insurgency in Chechnya, and later the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq;
72. see Petter Nesser, "Jihad in Europe" (see note 3 above).
73. Lorenzo Vidino and Steven Emerson, Al Qaeda in Europe (see note 18 above).
74. The war in Bosnia was first and foremost a symbol of atrocities against civilian Muslims, and the failure of Western powers to prevent genocide.
75. The main groups were the MIA guerrillas, headed by Mustafa Bouyali, and youth gangs from Algiers' suburbs under the leadership of Mohammed Alal;
76. see Camille al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria (see note 28 above).
77. Abu Musab al-Suri, "A Summary of My Testimony" (see note 42 above).
78. Indeed, Qari Said sat on Al Qaeda's Advisory Council (majlis al-shura) in the organization's formative period;
79. consult Camille al-Tawil, Al Qaeda and Her Sisters (see note 8 above.)
80. According to Abu Musab al-Suri, Zitouni rejected the salafi-jihadism of the Arab Afghans and burnt books by Qutb, al-Zawahiri, and al-Suri;
81. Umar Abd al-Hakim, "Summary of My Testimony on the Holy Struggle in Algeria, 1988-1996" (in Arabic), Courtesy Brynjar Lia, (2004). Zitouni pursued his own ideology close to the Madkhali School of Islamic thought.
82. Qatada defended this fatwa in a televised debate in November 2000 and in an interview with CNN in November 2001;
83. consult Special Immigration Appeals Commission, "Abu Qatada vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department," 2007.
84. Camille al-Tawil, Al Qaeda and Her Sisters, 195 ff (see note 8 above).
85. Abu Qatada, "Characteristics of the Victorious Party in the Foundation of the State of the Believers (the Land of Ash-Sham)," At-Tibyan Publications.
86. Abu Qatada, "Globalization and the Troops of the Jihad" (in Arabic), Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad, 2001.
87. United States District Court of Colombia, "Jamil El-Banna et al. vs. George W. Bush President of the United States et al.," dated 21 October 2004, 67.
88. Camille al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement, 216 ff (see note 28 above).
89. Mahan Abedin, "Al-Muhajiroun in the UK: An Interview with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed," Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 1, no. 7, 2004.
90. Abu Abdulrahman Amin (Djamel Zitouni), "Open Letter to All Muslims" (English translation), in ISLAMREPORT (American Islamic Group, 1995).
91. The majority of the Council, especially the Algerianists, opposed Zitouni's plan, on the grounds that it would divert resources from the war in Algeria and jeopardize international support networks;
92. Camille al-Tawil, Al Qaeda and Her Sisters, 201 (see note 8 above).
93. Abu Abdulrahman Amin (Djamel Zitouni), "Open Letter to All Muslims" (see note 58 above).
94. Camille al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement, 162 (see note 28 above).
95. Abu Abdulrahman Amin (Djamel Zitouni), "Open Letter to All Muslims" (see note 58 above).
96. Under GIA's first Emir, Abd al-Haq Layada, the group operated as a genuinely local insurgent group, targeting mainly representatives and symbols of the regime. After Layada, leadership was transferred to Aish Bin Amar, who was killed shortly afterwards by security forces, in August 1993. The next leader of the GIA, Saif Allah Jafar al-Afghani (Saif Allah) opened new fronts for the GIA. He announced that "he who fights us with the pen, we will fight with the sword," and urged his fighters to attack secularist intellectuals and journalists critical of the mujahidin. Saif Allah was also the first GIA leader to suggest the expulsion of French citizens from Algeria. During the fall of 1993 Saif Allah declared war on all foreigners in the country. In a communiqué he gave the foreigners one month to leave the country before the GIA would attack them. Saif Allah was killed in February 1994 and replaced by the Afghanistan veteran Sharif Qusumi (Abu Abdullah Ahmad). Qusumi continued the brutalization of the GIA and the aggression against foreigners, especially the French (during his reign the GIA killed several French teachers and workers for oil companies);
97. Camille al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement (see note 28 above).
98. Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 156.
99. For an exposition of diverging organizational-ideological allegiances and motivational patterns, consult Petter Nesser, "Jihad in Europe," (see note 3 above).
100. United States District Court Southern District of New York, "United States of America vs. Abu Doha," 2001.
101. High Court of Paris, "Verdict against Marbah, Lebik, Benahmed et al" (translated by Tine Gade), dated 14 June 2006 with author, 27 ff.
102. Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory (see note 17 above).
103. John Hooper and Nick Hopkins, "Al Qaeda Cell in UK 'Planned Attack,"' Guardian, 26 October 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2001/oct/26/afghanistan.world1;
104. United States District Court Southern District of New York, "United States of America vs. Mokhtar Haouari" (hearing), dated 3 July 2001, "United States of America vs. Mokhtar Haouari" (hearing), dated 5 July 2001.
105. "Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr. Djilali Benali" 14 ff (see note 29 above).
106. Hanna Rogan, "Violent Trends in Algeria since 9=11," CTC Sentinel 1, no. 12, 2008, Algerian jihadists, GSPC=AQIM did not start to utilize suicide bombers as a tactic before 11 April 2007, after joining Al Qaeda. It is believed, however, that the GIA planned to blow up, or crash, an aircraft over Paris in December 1994;
107. Camille al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement, 194 ff (see note 28 above).
108. Petter Nesser, "Jihad in Europe," (see note 3 above).
109. Claiming first they wanted to strike a Jewish synagogue, during interrogations they argued they were interested in a "media-effective" operation aiming to "help the Palestinian people";
110. "Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr. Djilali Benali" (see note 29 above).
111. Peter Taylor, "Inside Story, a Jihad Warrior in London," Guardian, 9 February 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/feb/09/alqaida.terrorism;
112. "The Third World War: Al Qaeda, the Breeding Ground," documentary (BBC, Peter Taylor, 2004).
113. Saif al-Adel, "The Jihad Biography of the Leader of Slaugther Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi" (in Arabic), Global Islamic Media Front, 2005.
114. Yassin Musharbash, "Greetings from the Butcher of Baghdad," Spiegel 26 April 2006, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,413157,00.html.
115. Federal Court of Dü sseldorf, "Indictment of the Jordanian Citizen of Palestinian Origin, Mohamed Ghassan Ali Saud Abu Dhess et al.," (in German), dated 27 August 2003, with author.
116. Abu Hamza, "How to Live Islamically in the Land of the Kuffar" (1999), video file with author downloaded from the jihadist web forum Al-Hesbah.
117. In the speech Hamza states, ". because we are studying now our existence in Europe, then this is Dar al-Harb, Dar al-Kufr, it implies many-many things. One of those things is that we have to enjoin the good and forbid the evil and make sure it is Dar al-Islam somehow, or we have to plan to leave. Otherwise we are doing a very, very great haram. What is Dar al-Kufr, it is haram to stay in Dar al-Kufr, cause basically you have to compromise with your religion."
118. Abu Hamza, "How to Live Islamically in the Land of the Kuffar" (1999).
119. In the speech Hamza states, "it [the notion of security pacts] gives the people the impression that it is halal for them to stay there and it is okay for them to stay there as long as they have mosques, the more mosques they have, the more Islamic the state it is, and that is why we start listening to this crap that this is dar al-aman, the dar of safety and of security."
120. Abu Hamza, "How to Live Islamically in the Land of the Kuffar" (1999).
121. About killing unbelievers Hamza states, "If he doesn't respect Dawa, kill him. You have to understand that Dawa is good but it doesn't survive alone. There are many prophets before Muhammad. they were killed because they did not have the sword with them."
122. Abu Hamza, "How to Live Islamically in the Land of the Kuffar" (1999).
123. "The preachings of Abu Hamza," Guardian, 7 February 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/2006/feb/07/terrorism.world
124. Omar Bakri Mohammed, The World Is Divided, 66 (see note 10 above).
125. Consult, e.g., the martyrdom testaments of the London bombers Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, Wasiya Fursan Ghaswat London [Testaments of the Knights of the London Attacks], Al-Sahab Media Production, 2006 and the letters Mohammed Bouyeri pinned to the body of Theo Van Gogh.
126. Petter Nesser, "The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker," report, FFI, 2005, 29.
127. An overview of Al Qaeda communiqués between 1990 and 2002 by Thomas Hegghammer contains very few references to Europe;
128. Thomas Hegghammer, "Documentation on Al-Qaida: Interviews, Communiqués and other Primary Sources 1990-2002" (in Norwegian), report, FFI, 2003.
129. Ibid., 184.
130. "The Complete Archive of Speeches and Sermons by the Imam of the Mujahidin Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Laden" (in Arabic) Shabakat al-Buraq al-Islamiyya, 2007.
131. "'Al-Qaeda' statement: Full text," BBC News, 21 May 2003. Norway did not contribute to the invasion, however.
132. Retrieved from "The Complete Archive of Speeches and Sermons by the Imam" (see note 86 above).
133. A search for the word Europe in a complete collection of Bin Laden's speeches between 2001 and 2006 returned four hits, "The Complete Archive of Speeches and Sermons by the Imam" (see note 86 above).
134. Similar communiqués were issued by the GIA leadership in connection with the terrorist attacks in France in 1995-The GIA's Emir Zitouni said operations would stop if France withdrew its support for the Algerian regime. Zitouni also "invited" French president Chirac to Islam, according to the Prophet's traditions;
135. consult Lia and Kjøk, "Islamist Insurgencies."
136. One letter linked to the Madrid bombers stated, "We regard whoever supports the American occupation as our enemy, and see the Spanish government as responsible for the killing of each element of its forces in Iraq or outside of Iraq," Court of First Instance no 6 of the Audencia National, "Proceedings 20/2004" 542-544 (see note 31 above).
137. Consult for example the martyrdom testament of Mohammed Siddique Khan, in which he states that "Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier."
138. "London Bomber: Text in Full," BBC News, 2 September 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4206800.stm
139. See for example Jean-Pierre Filiu, "The Local and global Jihad of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib," The Middle East Journal 63, no. 2, Spring 2009, 213-226.
140. "Taliban Pakistan tuakkid istihdaf uruba wa amrika" [Taliban Pakistan Confirm Targeting of Europe and the U.S.] al-Hayat 30 September 2010. There has also been one attempt to launch attacks in Spain by terrorists with alleged ties to the Pakistani Taliban;
141. see Fernando Reinares, "A case study of the January 2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in Barcelona," CTC Sentinel, January 2009, 5-7.
142. "Headscarf Ban May Cause Attack on France," Daily Times, 26 February 2004, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_26-2-2004_pg4_10
143. In November 2007 bin Laden again appealed to Europeans to pressure their governments to withdraw forces from Muslim lands (specifying Blair, Brown, Berlusconi, Asnar, and Sarkozy), or face the consequences. In March 2008 bin Laden warned the EU and portrayed the publication of the "insulting drawings" of the Prophet as "within the framework of new crusade" demanding "punishment," and claiming that "The Pope and the Vatican" had been involved in the crime. He added that the cartoons represented a worse crime than bombings of "villages that collapsed over our women and children."
144. Osama bin Laden, "O People of Islam," Al-Sahab Media Production, 2006.
145. "May Our Mothers Be Bereaved If We Do Not Defend Our Prophet," Al-Sahab Media Production, 2008.
146. Consult extracts from Ibn Taymiyyah's al-sarim al-maslul ala shatim al-rasul, quoted in al-Zawahiri's Exoneration, At-Tibyan Publications, http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/exoneration.pdf
147. Abu Hamza mocked the concept of security pacts in Abu Hamza, "How to Live Islamically in the Land of the Kuffar," Video, al-Hesbah, 1999, with author.
148. Omar Bakri Mohammed, The World Is Divided, 66 (see note 10 above).
149. Bakri states that individual Muslims are no longer restricted by the contract "as soon as the state begins to arrest the Muslims on a wide scale without charge, or publicly declares its animosity or hatred towards the Muslims and Islam."
150. Omar Bakri Mohammed, The World Is Divided, 67 (see note 10 above).
151. Bakri states that "non-Muslim lands of safety turned into lands of jihad when the countries declared their physical, verbal and financial support for many Western countries that have wasted the blood of Muslims, raped Muslim women and stolen the resources of Muslims." Although Bakri preached that the Covenant applied to UK Muslims he mentioned the UK as one example of such violations, together with the U.S. and Australia;
152. Omar Bakri Mohammed, The World Is Divided, 63 (see note 10 above).
153. Rosie Cowan, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Audrey Gillian, "Police search emails for trail to Pakistan, Canadian accused of aiding UK suspects," Guardian, 1 April 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/apr/01/terrorism.world
154. On the Internet Bakri declared, "I believe the whole of Britain has become Dar ul-Harb. the kuffar has no sanctity for their own life or property.," and he urged his followers to join jihad "wherever you are." He added that "Al Qaeda and all its branches and organisations of the world, that is the victorious group and they have the emir and you are obliged to join. There is no need. to mess about."
155. Sean O'Neill and Yaakov Lappin, "Britain's Online Imam Declares War as He Calls Young to Jihad," Times 17 January 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article413387.ece
156. David Cohen, "Terror on the Dole," London Evening Standard, 20 April 2004, http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-10329634-terror-on-the-dole.do
157. BBC2 Newsnight (TV-program), 1 August 2005 (author's notes);
158. see also Lisa Myers, "Fighting words in an anxious London," MSNBC News, 3 September 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8816054/ns/nightly_news-nbc_news_investigates
159. In a propaganda document Bakri's pupils addressed UK foreign policy, the judicial system, secularism in schools, discrimination and racism against Muslims, Islam's "internal enemies" (Muslims and Islamists cooperating the with the UK government and spying on the true believers, for example the Metropolitan Police's Muslim Contact Unit), etc.;
160. See "The British Plans for Islam & Muslims a Continuation of the Crusader Wars" (Ad-Da'wah Publications, 2004).
161. The criticisms against the ideology and methods of Al Qaeda was pulished as an 111-page book entitled "Guiding Jihadist Action in Egypt and the World" by the Arabic Newspaper al-Jarida, http://www.aljareeda.com/aljarida/Default.aspx
162. Abu Basir al-Tartousi has written extensively on the covenant of security;
163. consult Abdul Mun'em Mustafa Hali-mah Abu Basi-r, "Covenants & Security in Islam," http:// www.en.altartosi.com/Covenants-eng.pdf
164. Consult Hamud Bin Uqla al-Shuaybi, "The Clarification of what happened in America," At-Tibyan Publications, http://tibyan.wordpress.com/
165. Ayman al-Zawahiri, "The Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri Part One," Al-Sahab Media Production, 2008.
166. Ayman al-Zawahiri, "Exoneration," Al-Sahab Media Production, 2008.
167. Guido Steinberg, "The Islamic Jihad Union," Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2008.
168. "IJU releases message from German-speaking militant," NEFA, 2009.
169. Petter Nesser, "Lessons Learned from the September 2007 German Terrorist Plot," CTC Sentinel 1, no. 4 (2008): 7-10.
170. James Brandon, "Virtual Caliphate" (see note 25 above).
171. The new generation of jihadists have an urge to become full-blown mujahidin like their predecessors, and they travel abroad to attend religious schools and training camps despite security risks, jeopardizing their operations;
172. Petter Nesser, "How Did Europe's Gobal Jihadis Obtain Training for Their Militant Causes?," Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 2 (2008): 234-256.
173. By "success" the author means that by timing the attacks with the Spanish general elections the terrorists prompted a chain of events that eventually led to the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. There were important intervening variables between the launching of the attacks and the withdrawal, however, most importantly the governing conservative party's handling of the crisis. The government's initial attempt to blame the attacks on the Basque terrorist group ETA (despite clear indication that Islamist radicals were behind them) is believed to have caused loss of confidence among the voters. contributing to the socialist party (which had withdrawal of the troops from Iraq on its election program) winning the elections. The success was "relative" in the way that they did not lessen Spain's resolve in combating terrorism. The withdrawal of forces from Iraq was followed by re-deployment of soldiers to Afghanistan;
174. William Rose, Rysia Murphy, and Max Abrahms, "Does Terrorism Ever Work? The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings," International Security 32, no. 1 (2007), 185-192.
175. Fernando Reinares, "The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism," Survival 52, no. 2, April-May 2010, 83-104.
176. Petter Nesser, "Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 10, 2008.
177. Abu Qatada, "Address to the Muslims from Abu Qatada=Umar Bin Mahmud Abu Umar," (in Arabic) (dated March 2009), via URL: http://zuheer17.blogspot.com/2009/03/blog-post_2002.html
178. Muhammad Al-'Arsan, "The Deportation of Abu Qatada to Jordan," Amman Net (in Arabic), 13 August 2005.
179. 'Who Is Abu Qatada the Palestinian, Who Demands the Islamic Army Release of the Reporter Johnston" (in Arabic), The Palestine Network for Dialogue, 2007, and e-mail correspondence with Dominique Thomas, March 2008.
180. Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory (see note 17 above).
181. Mahan Abedin, "Al-Muhajiroun in the UK" (see note 57 above)
182. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising (see note 20 above).
183. Omar Bakri Mohammed, The World Is Divided (see note 10 above).
184. Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad (see note 64 above).
185. In 2008 Tartousi issued a fatwa prohibiting suicide operations http://forums.islamicawakening.com/showthread.php?t=20144&highlight=baser.
186. James Brandon, "Virtual Caliphate" (see note 25 above).