How did Europe's global jihadis obtain training for their militant causes?

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 234-256

  Nesser, Petter ^a,b  

^a NORWEGIAN DEFENCE RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT FFI   (Norway)

^b FFI's Terrorism and Political Violence Project

Author keywords

Europe; Jihadism; Terrorism; Training

Indexed keywords

EID: 42949126305     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: 15561836     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546550801920758     Document Type: Article

References (101)

1. In this article Europe refers to Western Europe, not including Turkey and former Soviet states.
2. In this article, the expression jihadi terrorists refers to militant activists of the Sunni strand of Islamism (so-called salafi-jihadis), who see terrorism as a legitimate and necessary means of struggle in a campaign aiming to: 1. Re-Islamize the Muslim world by toppling local regimes they accuse of having become too secular and too dependent on the West, and, 2. Rid Muslim lands of Western (and especially U.S. and Israeli) influences (social, political, economic, and especially military). In research on militant Islamism, the term jihadi is most often used about Islamist militants pursuing international or global aims and strategies (such as Al Qaeda) and not about militants predominantly involved in local, nationalist separatist conflicts (such as the Palestinian HAMAS). For a thorough and critical review of the terminology used in studies of Islamism and jihadism, consult Thomas Hegghammer, Islamist Violence in Saudi Arabia, 1979-2006: The Power and Perils of Pan-Islamic Nationalism (Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, 2007) - doctoral thesis.
3. In this article I utilize a narrow definition of Al Qaeda. The term is used to refer to the core group dominated by ethnic Arabs who became members of bin Laden's organization by swearing an oath to him, and people who belonged to his immediate circle of activists for shorter or longer periods of time. My use of the word corresponds to Jason Burke's expression "Al Qaeda hardcore"; consult Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 7 ff.
4. Consult, e.g., Sebastian Rotella, "A World Wide Web of Terrorist Plotting," Los Angeles Times, 16 April 2007.
5. For a well-informed outline of the structure of online jihadism, consult Brynjar Lia, "Al Qaeda Online: Understanding Jihadist Internet Infrastructure," Jane's Intelligence Review 18, no. 1 (2006).
6. In addition to analyzing concrete terror cells I have also consulted updated secondary literature on the broader activities of Islamist militants in European urban centers, and in London in particular, e.g., Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory, Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (London: Harper Perennial, 2006).
7. When I talk about Europe's 1st and 2nd generations of global jihadis, I refer to those activists operating inside Europe who were clearly associated with Al Qaeda and the global jihad ideology. Sunni Islamist militants (mujahidin or jihadis) have utilized Europe as a sanctuary and support base, as well as an attack arena, before Al Qaeda extended its campaign to European territory. However, the main drivers of Sunni Islamist militancy inside Europe during the 1980s and most of the 90s were local conflicts between Islamists and regimes in the Muslim world (local jihad - e.g., Egypt and Algeria) and international conflicts involving Muslims (International or "classic" jihad - e.g., Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya). Militants pursuing global aims and strategies did not start to prepare terror inside Europe before the late 1990s. What I define as the 1st generation of global jihadis dominated the picture until a couple of years after the invasion of Afghanistan, whereas the 2nd generation constitutes today's threat to Europe.
8. Consult, e.g., Peter L. Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda Leader (New York: Free Press, 2006), 261-266.
9. Anes Alic, "A Younger, Savvier Global Terror Cell," ISN Security Watch, 6 July 2006.
10. Capabilities can be subdivided into three main categories, the first being technical skills and conditions (e.g., technical expertise on terror tactics, how to conduct secret operations, how to conduct reconnaissance, how to construct bombs, and so forth), the second being the physical skills and conditions (physical strength and endurance), and the third being the psychological skills and conditions (lowering thresholds against inflicting harm on people, e.g., by dehumanizing the enemy, willingness to take risks and sacrifice, and so forth).
11. NATO defines military training as: "the permanent process of preserving and improving the skills (capabilities) of military individuals, staffs and forces to sound military operations. It encompasses education (as disseminating knowledge through formal or informal study), individual and collective training as well as exercises." The definition distinguishes between basic training which is "Training to achieve and maintain a fundamental level of knowledge and skills needed to fulfill a limited spectrum of assigned tasks/missions," and advanced training which is "Training to achieve and maintain a higher level of knowledge needed to the same end;" consult NATO, "Nato Training Policy - Mc 458/1" and "Nato Training Doctrine Bi-Sc 75-2."
12. For good analyses of the broader recruitment processes consult Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004),
13. Michael Taarnby, "Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe" (Aarhus: Danish Ministry of Justice, 2005),
14. Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam, The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst, 2004).
15. By analogy, Quintan Wiktorowicz's study of recruitment for the extreme, but mainly non-violent, Sunni-Islamist activist organization al-Muhajiroun gives valuable insights into the techniques used by recruiters to facilitate "cognitive openings" amongst potential recruits; consult Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
16. The relatively limited number of cases of clear-cut jihadi terrorism in Europe, and the varying levels of reliable open source information which is available about thwarted terrorist plots, make prospects for making scientific generalizations about them poor at this stage. My previous publications on the subject include Petter Nesser, "Jihad in Europe," (Kjeller: FFI, 2004),
17. Petter Nesser, "The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker: Religiously Motivated Violence or Islamist Terrorism in the Name of Global Jihad?," (Kjeller: FFI, 2005),
18. Petter Nesser, "Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006),
19. and Petter Nesser, "Profiles of Jihadist Terrorists in Europe," in A Future for the Young, Options for Helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization, ed. Cheryl Bernard (Washington D.C.: RAND, 2006).
20. By local jihad I refer to violent Islamist activism aiming to topple, reform, and re-Islamize Muslim states the Islamists accuse of being too secular and too dependent on the West, in addition to persecuting and to failing to fulfill the basic needs of their populations. Typical examples of local jihads are the Islamist/socio-revolutionary insurgencies and terrorism campaigns by Islamists in Algeria and Egypt. By International jihad I refer to violent Islamist activism in support of Muslims who came under attack by non-Muslims. The most important scenes of international jihad are: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and other places where Muslims came under attack by non-Muslims, such as the Soviets/Russians, the Serbs, and the Indians, respectively.
21. On Christmas Eve 1994 GIA activists hijacked an Air France flight carrying 180 passengers and planned to crash it into the Eiffel tower. The operation was intercepted by French Special Forces after the aircraft was directed to Marseilles airport to refuel. Three hostages and one policeman were killed as a result of the operation. During 1995, members and supporters of the GIA executed a series of bombings inside France (against the Metro, outdoor markets, a Jewish school, a high-speed train, and the Arc de Triomphe). Approximately 10 people died and 200 were injured during GIA's campaign. Consult Brynjar Lia and Ashild Kjøk, "Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993-2000" (Kjeller: FFI, 2001).
22. In 1998, another group formed on the remnants of GIA, The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which eventually became the leading force within Algerian jihadism. GSPC gradually forged closer ties with Al Qaeda and recently joined the network, adopting the name "the Al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb" [Tanzim Al Qaeda bi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami]. It has been widely assumed that the GSPC "replaced," or "took over" GIA's infrastructure in Europe; consult, e.g., Lorenzo Vidino and Steven Emerson, Al Qaeda in Europe: the New Battleground of International Jihad (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005). I made a similar interpretation in Nesser, "Jihad in Europe" (see note 12 above). A well-informed European government official I talked to in October 2007 said this was not exactly the case. According to the source, the GSPC focused nearly all of its capacities on the internal battle in Algeria, and maintained little or no organizational control over networks in Europe. Rather, the Algerian networks in Europe were mainly run by former GIA activists and Al Qaeda associates (who had denounced GIA under Antar Zuwabri) and ran their own networks out of Afghanistan [my interpretation of the source's statements].
23. For an overview of this period, consult Nesser, "Jihad in Europe" (see note 12 above).
24. London was referred to, sarcastically, by French counter-terrorism officials as "Londonistan," because the British capital functioned as a springboard for jihadis who wanted to go to Afghanistan to train. Consult, e.g., O'Neill and McGrory, The Suicide Factory;
25. Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda: A Spy's Story (New York: Basic Books, 2006);
26. Mohamed Sifaoui, Inside Al Qaeda, How I Infiltrated the World's Deadliest Terrorist Organization (London: Granta Books, 2003).
27. Bin Laden participated in the Jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s. After the Soviets pulled out, he returned to his native Saudi Arabia and offered the House of Saud military expertise and fighters to confront an emerging threat from Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The Saudi royal family rejected the offer and rather relied on U.S. military support. Angry about the rejection, the Saudi alliance with the U.S., and especially the placing of American troops in the Kingdom, bin Laden fell out with the Saudi Kings, lost his Saudi citizenship, and went into exile in Sudan. He stayed there until 1996, doing business, supporting local and international jihad, and consolidating the Al Qaeda organization, before he returned to Afghanistan when the Taliban gained power. Consult, e.g., Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2001).
28. Consult, e.g., Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (see note 18 above).
29. Mark Honigsbaum and Alan Travis, "Al Qaeda's 'Spiritual Ambassador' Faces Return to Jordan," Guardian, 12 August 2005.
30. Consult, e.g., Verdict in the criminal case against Shadi Mohammed Mustafa Abdalla (2003),
31. and Indictment of the Jordanian Citizen of Palestinian Origin Mohamed Ghassan Ali Saud Abu Dhess et al. (in German) (2003).
32. Consult, e.g., Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali ("Aeurobui Beandali") et al. (in German) (2003);
33. and The High Court of Paris against Daoudi, Beghal, Bounour et al., verdict of 15 Mars 2005 (in French - with Author) (2005).
34. Al-Zarqawi's al-Tawhid group ran its own training camp in Herat near the Iranian border where it trained recruits from the Levant. For a good description of the establishment of the camp, consult Saif al-' Adel, "The Jihad Biography of the Leader of Slaugther Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi (in Arabic)" (Global Islamic Media Front, October 2005 [downloaded October 2005]).
35. Consult the trail of the former Egyptian Army officer Ali Mohamed, who was recruited to the U.S. Special Forces and later became an instructor and agent for Al Qaeda, e.g., in Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (see note 18 above). U.S. military training manuals were used extensively in the camps.
36. See endnote no. 10.
37. Translated Excerpts of Interrogations of Shadi Abdullah, May through October 2002, translated by Steven Arons, courtesy Peter Bergen. The source has been corroborated with the verdict of the so-called Strasbourg plotters, and the verdicts against members of the so-called Beghal Network, and the biography of Omar Nasiri, the spy who infiltrated camps in Afghanistan shortly before Al Qaeda came to dominate the camps. Investigators have voiced concerns that Abdullah might be lying about some aspects of his stay in Afghanistan. However, the concerns seem to be mainly that he has overplayed his own role in relation to Al Qaeda leaders, not about the overall description of the training camps and procedures.
38. Consult also Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali ("Aeurobui Beandali") et al. (in German) (see note 23 above)
39. and Nasiri, Inside the Jihad (see note 17 above).
40. Translated Excerpts of Interrogations of Shadi Abdullah. Abdullah specifies recruits from the UK, France, Belgium, Spain, and Sweden.
41. Anonymous author, "Al-Qa'ida Trained Snipers, Trabelsi Says," De Standaard, 19 October 2002.
42. Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali ("Aeurobui Beandali") et al. (in German) (see note 23 above).
43. Consult Lia, "Al Qaeda Online: Understanding Jihadist Internet Infrastructure" (see note 4 above).
44. Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali ("Aeurobui Beandali") et al. (in German) (see note 23 above).
45. The High Court of Paris against Daoudi, Beghal, Bounour et al., verdict of 1.5 Mars 2005 (in French - with Author).
46. It has also been observed that an increasing number of European converts have been implicated, and women or girls took on a more active role in terrorism-related activities, such as issuing of propaganda and threats and hiding weaponry.
47. Scandinavia, and especially Sweden and Denmark, appears to have been a center for propagandists and fundraisers for various jihadi groups and factions with a presence in Europe (Manzour, Hizb al-Tahrir, al-Muhajiroun, Kavkaz, Tawhid, Mullah Krekar, etc.) consult, e.g., Lorenzo Vidino, "The Danger of Homegrown Terrorism to Scandinavia," Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 20 (2006).
48. For excellent overviews and analyses of the two organizations and the relations between them, consult O'Neill and McGrory, The Suicide Factory (see note 5 above)
49. and Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising (see note 11 above).
50. Whereas Qatada preached and wrote in Arabic, Hamza and Bakri mainly communicated with their followers (many of whom were non-Arabic speakers) in English.
51. Consult, e.g., "Ex-Spy Chief Links Suspects in Denmark to U.K. Radical," International Herald Tribune Europe, 27 August 2006, on the so-called "Glostrup Cell" in Denmark,
52. and Albert Benschop, "Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold: Jihad in the Netherlands" (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2005), on the so-called "Hofstad Group" in the Netherlands.
53. In the car of an Islamic activist in Oregon, police found an Abu Hamza video entitled "The Importance of Training," consult O'Neill and McGrory, The Suicide Factory (see note 5 above), 189.
54. In 1998 an SoS training team were stopped by the police after a firearms training session, but the weapons allegedly had been transported by the former Special Forces soldiers, consult O'Neill and McGrory, The Suicide Factory (see note 5 above), 84,
55. and "Hamza Set up Terror Camps with British Ex-Soldiers," Guardian, 12 February 2006.
56. O'Neill and McGrory, The Suicide Factory (see note 5 above).
57. "Meet the French Terror Connection," WorldNetDaily, 2 November 2003.
58. Kevin Sullivan and Mary Jordan, "English Woods a Suspected Cover for Terror," Washington Post, 13 September 2006.
59. A picture of camouflaged men carrying weapons at the bottom of a steep hill, entitled "Mujahidin Training in Germany," downloaded from the Internet, courtesy Brynjar Lia.
60. Movie downloaded from jihadi Internet site, courtesy Truls Hallberg Tonnessen.
61. Europol, "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007" (2007).
62. For example, the al-Mallah brothers, portrayed as recruiters and facilitators within Spain's militant networks and as inciters of the M-11 attacks, were in regular contact with Abu Qatada and his followers in London. According to the investigative journalist Lawrence Wright, core members of the cell tried to contact Qatada by telephone while they were surrounded by the police in Leganes in order to obtain a religious justification for committing collective suicide, consult Lawrence Wright, "The Terror Web," The New Yorker, 2 August 2004.
63. Consult, e.g., Javier Jordan and Robert Wesley, "The Madrid Attacks: Result of Investigation Two Years After," Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 5 (2006).
64. The M-11 indictment lists several North African groups as being "connected to the prosecuted," e.g., al-Takfir wa'l Hijra, al-Harakat al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya, Jama'at al-Sirat al-Mustaqim, but it focuses mainly on the links to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, consult Proceedings 20/2004, Indictment of April 10 2006, Court of First Instance Number 6 of the Audencia National (translation of the Indictment of the Madrid Bombers with author), (2006).
65. Proceedings 20/2004, Indictment of April 10 2006, Court of First Instance Number 6 of the Audencia National (translation of the Indictment of the Madrid Bombers with author).
66. Consult Nesser, "Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe," and Proceedings 20/2004, Indictment of April 10 2006, Court of First Instance Number 6 of the Audencia National (translation of the Indictment of the Madrid Bombers with author).
67. Consult, e.g., Javier Jordan and Nicola Horsburgh, "Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005).
68. Consult Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaeda Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 5 (2004).
69. Proceedings 20/2004, Indictment of April 10 2006, Court of First Instance Number 6 of the Audencia National (translation of the Indictment of the Madrid Bombers with author).
70. Several persons referred to in the indictment as "connected to the prosecuted" are believed to have been to training camps in Afghanistan and other places, e.g., Amer Azizi, Salaheddin Benyaich, Lachen Ikassrien, Fouad Charouali.
71. Interview with European counter-terrorism official, September 2004, name withheld on request.
72. The terrorists reportedly planned and prepared attacks against a nightclub, a shopping center, the public underground, gas pipes, and UK synagogues. Allegedly, they also scouted the possibility of utilizing a crude nuke device; consult Duncan Gardham, "The Crawley Targets," Daily Telegraph, 30 April 2007.
73. Members of the cell have been characterized as "former members" of al-Muhajiroun, who were amongst a 40-member group dubbed the "Crawley Group," that disassociated itself from al-Muhajiroun on the grounds it was not "radical enough," consult Rosie Cowan, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Audrey Gillian, "Police Search Emails for Trail to Pakistan Canadian Accused of Aiding UK Suspects," Guardian, 1 April 2004.
74. Consult Regina Vs Omar Khyam Et Al - Opening Note, (2006),
75. Crown's opening statement, indictment of Crevice group published in "Momin Khawaja constitutes the Canadian end of the conspiracy," Ottawa Citizen, 23 March 2006. Members of the network communicated extensively via Internet cafés and personal computers. They exchanged ideological and tactical information, and one of them maintained a radical blog, etc.
76. "Profile: Omar Khyam," BBC News, 30 April 2007.
77. I did not manage to find specific information on what kind of propaganda material Khyam accessed on the Web, but a European security official told me he was a very active user of the jihadi web and might be characterized as a "reader" with an intellectual, analytical approach to jihadism. Interview with European counter-terrorism official, April 2006, name withheld on request.
78. "UK Seven 'Were Ready to Start Bombing,'" Guardian, 21 March 2006.
79. Sami Yousafzai, Ron Moreau, and Mark Hosenball, "The Regathering Storm (Original Title: Al Qaeda British Recruits)," Newsweek, 25 December 2006.
80. Harb Al-Mustada'fin/ Qahr Al-Salib [War of the Oppressed/the Subjugation of the Cross] - Downloaded from Shibkat Sawt Al-Fajr (al-Sahab Media Production, 2005).
81. "Revealed: Bomber Transcript," BBC News, 1 May 2007.
82. UK Government, "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" (London: UK Government, 11 May 2006). In a video tape published in July 2006, produced by Al Qaeda's media production company al-Sahab, and featuring the testament of one of the bombers, Shehzad Tanweer, the organization took credit for the attacks, and boasted that they had supported and trained core operatives of the cell. However, the tape does not show the London bombers together with known Al Qaeda members, and although one cannot rule out that Al Qaeda was involved, it might very well have been a propaganda stunt by the organization trying to convince the world that it maintains an operational capacity; consult "Wasiya Fursan Ghaswat London [Testaments of the Knights of the London Attacks]," (al-Sahab Media Production, June 2006).
83. For overviews and analyses of the Hofstad Group, consult Nesser, "The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker: Religiously Motivated Violence or Islamist Terrorism in the Name of Global Jihad?" (see note 12 above) and Benschop, "Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold" (see note 66 below).
84. The film is entitled: Een Cadeautje Voor Geert Wilders [a Christmas Present for Geert Wilders] (Leeuwen Van Tawheed, 2004) and can be downloaded from Benschop, "Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold" on http://www.sociosite.org/jihad_nl_en.php.
85. With reference to the manual "How Can I train myself for Jihad?" which was posted on the radical website azzam.com in 2001, the Dutch-Moroccan Internet jihadi and Hofstad Group associate Bilal L. aka Aboe Qataadah advised Muslims in Holland to obtain weapons training in shooting clubs in Holland. Bilal L. belonged to the circle of activists surrounding Mohammed Bouyeri, the assassin of Theo Van Gogh, and the leader of the so-called Hofstad group that planned terrorism in Holland, consult Benschop, "Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold" (see note 66 above).
86. I have not managed to find sources illuminating exactly what he told his followers about training and preparation for jihadism.
87. Benschop, "Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold" (see note 66 above).
88. Ibid.
89. Consult, e.g., Alic, "A Younger, Savvier Global Terror Cell" (see note 8 above) and Colin Freeze, "First 'Homegrown' Terrorists Convicted, Swede Gets 15 Years; Related Hearings to Start Monday in Canada, UK," Globe and Mail, 11 January 2007.
90. Bektasevic and Cesur were convicted of plotting suicide terrorist attacks by a Bosnian court in January 2007, consult Colin, "First 'Homegrown' Terrorists Convicted" (see note 71 above).
91. Indictment against Mirsad Bektasevic, Abdulkadir Cesur et al, (2006).
92. Rotella, "A World Wide Web of Terrorist Plotting" (see note 4 above).
93. Consult, e.g., "London Airplane Bomb Plotters Used Ebay to Raise Funds, Built Detonators inside AA Batteries," ABC News, 12 October 2006.
94. Consult, e.g., Don Van Natta Jr., Elaine Sciolino, and Stephen Grey, "Details Emerge in British Terror Case," The New York Times, 28 August 2006,
95. and Jason Bennetto, "Airline Bomb Plot Suspects May Be Linked to 7/7 Attacks," The Independent, 18 August 2006.
96. Andreas Ulrich, "Failed Bomb Plot Seen as Al Qaeda Initiation Test," Spiegel Online International, 9 April 2007.
97. A Syrian activist allegedly helped them to download the bomb recipes from the Internet, consult "3rd Suspect in Failed German Train Plot a Syrian," Associated Press, 26 August 2006.
98. Tine Gade, "Fatah Al-Islam in Lebanon: Between Regional Nationalism and Global Jihadism?" (Kjeller: FFI, 2007).
99. Consult, e.g., Gunther Latsch et al., "Every Investigator's Nightmare" [translated by Christopher Sultan], Spiegel, 28 August 2007. Members of al-Zarqawi's al-Tawhid group were arrested in Germany in April 2002, and later convicted of preparing terrorist bomb attacks against Jewish targets inside Germany. Al-Zarqawi and al-Tawhid ran their own training camp in Herat, Afghanistan, before the invasion, which maintained close relations with the Al Qaeda leadership based in Qandahar at the time. Later, al-Tawhid members constituted core personnel in what was to become Al Qaeda in Iraq. Consult, e.g., al-'Adel, "Jihad Biography of the Leader of Slaughter."
100. Consult, e.g., Mark Handler, "2nd Suspect Captured in German Bomb Plot," International Herald Tribune, 24 August 2006,
101. and Roger Boyes, "Train Bomb Plot Brings Fear of Terrorism to Germany," The Times, 21 August 2006.