Signing unconstitutional laws

Indiana Law Journal

Volumn 86, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 303-333

  Baude, William ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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EID: 79951801159     PISSN: 00196665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (297)

1. E.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 81 (2007);
2. Michael B. Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 735, 766-83 (1993) [hereinafter Rappaport, Veto] (making a related argument);
3. Michael B. Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality of "Signing and Not-Enforcing", 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 113 (2007) [hereinafter Rappaport, Signing] (same); infra notes 15-16.
4. Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1361 (1953).
5. See infra note 31;
6. see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 917 (1990) (acknowledging this practice without defending it).
7. Jackson, supra note 2, at 1361.
8. Prakash, supra note 1, at 93;
9. Rappaport, Signing, supra note 1, at 114.
10. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
11. Cf. TOM STOPPARD, THE REAL THING 75 (1984) ("You shouldn't have done it if you didn't think it was right.").
12. Prakash, supra note 1, at 81-82.
13. Id. at 83.
14. Id. at 84-85.
15. Id. at 84.
16. Id. at 84-86.
17. It is not necessarily so. See infra text accompanying notes 182-193; cf. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 183 (2005) ("Early practice did not go so far as to oblige the president to veto whenever he deemed any of a bill's provisions unconstitutional.").
18. Compare M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (grounding constitutional interpretation in "the practice of the government" and "[a]n exposition of the constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts")
19. with Letter from James Madison to N. P. Trist (Dec. 1831), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS of JAMES MADISON, 211 (J. B. Lippincott ed., 1867) ("There has been a fallacy... in confounding a question whether precedents could expound a Constitution, with a question whether they could alter a Constitution. ")
20. Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2001) (Pubitemid 33656639)
21. See also William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L. J. 1807, 1823 (2008).
22. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION of POWERS DOCTRINE: RECOMMENDATION 23 (Aug. 2006) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], available at http://www.abanet.org/op/ signingstatements;
23. see also id. at 1, 19.
24. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U. S. 385, 409 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The President, after all, is bound not to sign an improperly originated... bill by the same oath that binds us not to apply it...." (emphasis omitted));
25. T. J. Halstead, Congressional Research Service, Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and Institutional Implications, at 14 (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf.
26. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive's Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L. J. 1613 (2008).
27. Rappaport, Signing, supra note 1; Rappaport, Veto, supra note 1, at 766-83.
28. Baude, supra note 14, at 1810-11 n. 13 (citing sources).
29. Indeed, the President's independent power to interpret the Constitution buttresses my argument that he may sign unconstitutional laws. But even if one does not share that assumption, it does not change the basic argument, although it may alter the calculus of which laws he must sign.
30. See infra Part IV. D.
31. Prakash, supra note 1, at 83-84.
32. Rappaport, Signing, supra note 1, at 121;
33. see also Prakash, supra note 1, at 90-91;
34. Rappaport, Veto, supra note 1, at 774.
35. Rappaport, Signing, supra note 1, at 121.
36. Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, The Presidential Signing Statements Controversy, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 11, 21-22 (2007).
37. Id. at 22.
38. Nelson Lund, Presidential Signing Statements in Perspective, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 95, 101 (2007).
39. Id. at 101-07.
40. Id. at 102 (emphasis in original).
41. Amar, supra note 13, at 184.
42. E.g., Cass & Strauss, supra note 24, at 23-25.
43. Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 341 (2006) ("[W]e believe that the argument... is unrealistic in an age of omnibus legislation....");
44. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, to Bernand N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President (Nov. 3, 1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/signing.htm;
45. David Barron, Walter Dellinger, Dawn Johnson, Neil Kinkopf, Marty Lederman, Chris Schroeder, Richard Shiffrin, & Michael Small, Untangling the Debate on Signing Statements, Geo. Faculty L. Blog (July 31, 2006), http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown-university-law/2006/07/thanks-to-the-p. html ("[E]ven if one thinks that it would be good policy for the President to veto all bills containing unconstitutional provisions, it will never happen. ").
46. U. S. C ONST. art. I, § 7;
47. id. art. II, § 1; id. art. II, § 3.
48. Id. art. I, § 7.
49. Id.
50. See NOAH WEBSTER, 2 AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY of THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828) (unpaginated).
51. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
52. Id. art. II, § 3.
53. Id. art. VI.
54. For expansion of this argument, see infra Part III. A.
55. U. S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
56. Id.
57. A rare exception is Morning Edition: Where Does the Oath of Office Come from? (NPR Broadcast Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/ story/story.php?storyId=99323353 (interview with Marvin Pinkert, Executive Director of the National Archives Experience);
58. see also 2 THE RECORDS of THE FEDERAL CONVENTION of 1787, at 422, 427, 575, 599 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (recording earlier drafts).
59. Baude, supra note 14, at 1809-11.
60. See infra Part IV. A-B.
61. See WEBSTER, supra note 35 (unpaginated entries for "preserve", "protect", and "defend").
62. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 802-12 (1999).
63. 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803);
64. see Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N. Y. U. L. REV. 738, 755-77 (2010) (discussing and defending this view).
65. PCHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 101-02, 202-08 (2008).
66. Mary Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L. J. 502, 508-09 (2006).
67. Id.
68. Walsh, supra note 47, at 762-66.
69. U. S. CONST. art. II, § 3;
70. Baude, supra note 14, at 1810-11 & n. 13;
71. Prakash, supra note 1.
72. Walsh, supra note 47, at 762-66.
73. Id. at 739 (discussing Marbury, 5 U. S. (1 Cranch.) at 176-80).
74. See generally infra part IV (discussing such laws and giving examples).
75. See infra Part III. A.
76. Prakash, supra note 1, at 91-92;
77. Rappaport, Signing, supra note 1, at 117.
78. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION of THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS of THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 567 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
79. Baude, supra note 14, at 1826-27.
80. HAMBURGER, supra note 48, at 103-16.
81. Amar, supra note 13, at 144.
82. Baude, supra note 14, at 1844-45;
83. see also Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N. Y. U. L. REV. 123, 126-27 (1999).
84. Hartnett, supra note 62, at 138-40 (discussing John M. Rogers, "I Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong": The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 KY. L. J. 439 (1991)).
85. For the classic exploration, see Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975);
86. see also Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N. C. L. REV. 587 (1983).
87. See infra Part II. C.
88. See Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281 (2008) (exploring this scenario).
89. Prakash, supra note 1, at 90-91;
90. Rappaport, Signing, supra note 1, at 121;
91. see also Rappaport, Veto, supra note 1, at 774.
92. See Prakash, supra note 1.
93. Baude, supra note 14, at 1844-45.
94. U. S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
95. Id. § 3 ("He shall from time to time... recommend to [Congress's] Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.");
96. see Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 41-63 (2002).
97. Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 95-97 (1976) (discussing how the threat of a veto enhances the President's bargaining power).
98. I dismiss, however, the risk that "a President who believes that some statutory provision is void may decide that he should enforce it out of a sense that the issue should be resolved by the courts."
99. Id. at 90. If he really thinks it unconstitutional, he should not do that. See infra Part IV. D. and if he behaves that way, he is not going to pay any attention to my analysis or Prakash's.
100. See Prakash, supra note 1, at 90.
101. Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 27-31), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677014.
102. 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
103. See Paul Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U. S. C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 203-22 (1999).
104. Davis v. United States, 512 U. S. 452, 464-65 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Executive has the power (whether or not it has the right) effectively to nullify some provisions of law by the mere failure to prosecute-the exercise of so-called prosecutorial discretion. and it has the power (whether or not it has the right) to avoid application of
105. [18 U. S. C.] § 3501 by simply declining to introduce into evidence confessions admissible under its terms. But once a prosecution has been commenced and a confession introduced, the Executive assuredly has neither the power nor the right to determine what objections to admissibility of the confession are valid in law.").
106. Dickerson v. United States, 166 F.3d 667, 672 (4th Cir. 1999)
107. ("[T]he Department of Justice cannot prevent us from deciding this case under the governing law simply by refusing to argue it."), rev'd on other grounds, 530 U. S. 428 (2000).
108. Lawson, supra note 75, at 29-30.
109. Id. at 41-43.
110. Id. at 31.
111. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 170-72 (5th Cir. 1965);
112. id. at 190-96 (Wisdom, J., concurring specially);
113. Confiscation Cases, 74 U. S. 454, 457 (1868);
114. cf. Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2187-89 (2010) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
115. 28 U. S. C. § 2403 (a) (2006).
116. See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson v. Pope, 516 F.3d 1214, 1215-16 (10th Cir. 2008) ("At oral argument, neither party even seemed aware that this requirement existed.");
117. In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407, 1412-13 (8th Cir. 1996);
118. Wallach v. Lieberman, 366 F.2d 254, 256-57 (2d Cir. 1966).
119. 28 U. S. C. § 2403 (a) (2006).
120. See 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (2006)
121. (as interpreted by Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172-87 (1961));
122. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971);
123. see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 500-01 (1978) (equating immunities under § 1983 and Bivens).
124. E.g., Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2003);
125. Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1251-53 (10th Cir. 2003);
126. Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 1994);
127. Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 714 (1st Cir. 1986).
128. (Amore I), 610 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2010)
129. amended on rehearing by Amore v. Novarro (Amore II), No. 08-3150-cv, 2010 WL 3960574 (2d Cir. Oct. 12, 2010).
130. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 240. 35 (3)
131. invalidated by People v. Uplinger, 447 N. E.2d 62 (N. Y. 1983).
132. Amore I, 610 F.3d at 155.
133. *9 n. 20 (citing Joel Stashenko, Albany Catches Up With Courts, Repeals Voided Loitering Laws, N. Y. L. J., Aug. 4, 2010).
134. *8 (citing Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 478-479 (8th Cir. 2010);
135. Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 358-361 (6th Cir. 2007)).
136. See generally Amore II (issuing amended opinion with same result on rehearing).
137. *23-25.
138. A truly responsible executive would have taken greater measures to ensure that the statute was not enforced in the first place. Indeed, Amore separately sued the City of Ithaca for its failure to adequately train its officers not to enforce the unconstitutional law. That lawsuit remains pending and may well succeed.
139. *9 ("Amore 'may be richly entitled to a recovery on that cause of action. '" (quoting Rohman v. N. Y. C. Trans. Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 218-19 (2d Cir. 2000))).
140. Prakash, supra note 1, at 90-91;
141. Rappaport, Signing, supra note 1, at 121;
142. see also Rappaport, Veto, supra note 1, at 774.
143. Bills that have absolutely no constitutional problems can still create constitutional risks. For example, nearly every new federal officer might some day go on to violate the Constitution in the course of executing his duties. How to treat constitutional risks that do not come from signing unconstitutional laws is outside the scope of this Essay.
144. * 45-46.
145. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939) ("All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.").
146. 496 U. S. 310 (1990).
147. 18 U. S. C. § 700 (2006).
148. 543 U. S. 220 (2005).
149. 18 U. S. C. § 3553 (b) (1).
150. For examination of a similar hypothetical see Larry Alexander, There Is No First Amendment Overbreadth (But There Are Vague First Amendment Doctrines); Prior Restraints Aren't "Prior"; and "As Applied" Challenges Seek Judicial Statutory Amendments, at 3 (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1658106.
151. U. S. CONST. art. VI;
152. see also United States v. Velez, 586 F.3d 875, 879 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J.) (noting that there is "no need for a statutory exemption" for unconstitutional applications because the Constitution is "sufficient to exempt" them);
153. Alexander, supra note 105, at 3 ("[T]he hypothetical amendment is already a part of every statute. For Article VI of the Constitution... already accomplishes what the hypothetical amendment accomplishes.").
154. Cf. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U. S. 385, 397 (1990) ("[S]aying that a bill becomes a 'law' within the meaning of [Article 1, Section 7] does not answer the question whether that 'law' is constitutional." (emphasis in original)).
155. See, e.g., The Impact of the Presidential Signing Statement on the Department of Defense's Implementation of the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act: Hearing of the Oversight and Investigations Subcomm. of the H. Armed Serv. Comm., 110th Cong. 13-14 (2008) [hereinafter Presidential Signing Statement Hearing] (statement of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz).
156. Barron et al., supra note 31 (emphasis in original).
157. Id. (emphasis omitted).
158. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1225 (2010).
159. Id.
160. See id. at 1275-76.
161. Id. at 1212; id. at 1288 n. 327.
162. Id. at 1225 (emphasis omitted).
163. Id. (emphasis omitted).
164. Id. (emphasis in original).
165. Id. at 1212 n. 9 and accompanying text.
166. 18 U. S. C. § 113 (a) (6) (2006);
167. United States v. Martin, 528 F.3d 746, 751 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding a conviction under § 113 (a) (6)).
168. See Martin, 528 F.3d at 749 (describing gruesome consequences of untreated injuries).
169. 223 U. S. 442, 449 (1912) ("At the time of the trial for the [assault and battery] the death had not ensued, and not until it did ensue was the homicide committed. Then, and not before, was it possible to put the accused in jeopardy for that offense.").
170. * 197-98.
171. U. S. CONST. amend. I.
172. Even somebody who is not Holmes's "bad man", and therefore feels a moral obligation to obey the law, O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-61 (1897), ought to feel no obligation to obey a law that he knows and has been told is unconstitutional.
173. Rosenkranz, supra note 111, at 1273-88;
174. see also infra Part IV. A (discussing and defending President Nixon's decision to sign such a law).
175. U. S. CONST. amend. I.
176. Rosenkranz, supra note 111, at 1275.
177. Id. (emphasis in original).
178. U. S. CONST. amend. X.
179. In many respects, Rosenkranz's thesis also appears to be inconsistent with the treatment of the severability issue in the early days of the Republic.
180. See generally Walsh, supra note 47, at 755-77;
181. see also supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
182. Contra U. S. CONST. art. I., § 9;
183. id. amend. I. Thanks to Stephen Sachs for this observation.
184. David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 886 (1986) (concluding that generally "the Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties"
185. (quoting Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.))).
186. I discuss important examples infra Part IV. A-B;
187. see also Currie, supra note 132, at 872-76 (canvassing exceptions). But I am sure this discussion raises more questions than it answers. A more exhaustive defense of the government's constitutional obligations to legislate, and an attempt to reconcile that accounting with the fundamental principles of limited government and private ordering, must await a future work.
188. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
189. See Nw. Austin Municipality Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508-09 (2009);
190. see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 310-11 (1966);
191. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 105-11 (2000).
192. Voting Rights Act of 1965 (discussed in Nw. Austin, 120 S. Ct. at 2509-10).
193. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1784-85 n. 151 (2007).
194. See Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2510 ("As enacted, [sections] 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act were temporary provisions. They were expected to be in effect for only five years."). The Act did not have an explicit sunset provision, but it banned literacy tests and then terminated coverage after they had been gone for five years. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4 (a).
195. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2508-09
196. (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U. S. at 335).
197. See Act of June 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 1 (extending the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
198. For a summary see ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 31-42 (1987).
199. U. S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
200. § 302, 84 Stat. at 318;
201. see also Jenny Diamond Cheng, Uncovering the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 18-24 (2008) (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with University of Michigan Library), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu (detailing legislative history of this provision).
202. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
203. Letter to House Leaders Supporting a Constitutional Amendment to Lower the Voting Age, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 401, 401 (Apr. 27, 1970). "The President was supported in this view by the testimony of two senior Department of Justice officials-Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist."
204. Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N. C. L. REV. 1073, 1081 n. 33 (2001).
205. Letter to House Leaders Supporting a Constitutional Amendment to Lower the Voting Age, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 1401, 401 (Apr. 27, 1970);
206. see also Cheng, supra note 142, at 63.
207. Letter to House Leaders Supporting a Constitutional Amendment to Lower the Voting Age, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 401, 402-04 (Apr. 27, 1970);
208. see also Cheng, supra note 142, at 20 ("If the votes of 18-year-old citizens were disregarded as invalid, an election might be thrown into the House of Representatives. This uncertainty and confusion would arise at the very time when the Nation can ill afford to await the outcome of protracted litigation, and even worse, be divided by it." (quoting Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1969, 116 CONG. REC. 6877, 6947 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska))).
209. But see JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY'S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 162-92 (2007) (defending legislative privilege of resolving disputed elections).
210. Presidential Statement on Signing the Voting Rights Act of 1970, 1970 PCUB. PAPERS 512 (June 22, 1970).
211. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970). The Solicitor General informed the Court that the President thought the statute was unconstitutional, while also providing an argument for upholding the statute.
212. Waxman, supra note 144, at 1081-82.
213. U. S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
214. Id. art. IV, § 4; see also Currie, supra note 132, at 865 (noting that this is an affirmative obligation).
215. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REC. 32959, 32961 (Nov. 19, 1987) (statement of Rep. Conyers) ("[W]e not only have the power to act, we have the duty to act. The Constitution does not say we 'may.' It says that we 'shall' guarantee to every state a republican form of government.").
216. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 225-26 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
217. U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
218. I use the phrase "national security" in the technical sense of a law helping to prevent invasions or to protect republican governments.
219. See infra Part IV. D (discussing some of the parameters).
220. See, e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 15, at 15-18.
221. Presidential Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1834 (Dec. 28, 2001).
222. Id.
223. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-108, § 305, 115 Stat. 1394, 1398-99 (2001).
224. Presidential Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1834 (Dec. 28, 2001).
225. Presidential Statement on Signing the Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 46 (Jan. 10, 2002).
226. See id. at 47-48.
227. Presidential Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 49 (Jan. 10, 2002).
228. Id. at 50.
229. See, e.g., Presidential Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, 42 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1742 (Oct. 4, 2006);
230. Presidential Statement on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 39 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1549 (Nov. 6, 2003);
231. Presidential Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1834 (Oct. 23, 2002);
232. Presidential Statement on Signing the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 822 (May 14, 2002).
233. In some cases, the President may have chosen to "construe" the problematic provisions in a special way, rather than to disregard them. Presidential Signing Statement Hearing, supra note 108, at 2-6 (statement of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz). I do not regard the difference as material.
234. For example, some have claimed that the threat to America's borders was not as strong as the Executive Branch appeared to believe. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT of 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 554-55 (2004).
235. But see Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276-77 (2008) ("[N]either the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people.");
236. Jack L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 71-72 (2007).
237. Army Appropriations Act, ch. 170, 14 Stat. 485 (1867).
238. Andrew Johnson, Protest to the House of Representatives (Mar. 2, 1867), reprinted in 16 A COMPILATION of THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS of THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 58, at 472.
239. Id. The necessity was unexplained.
240. See Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 M1INN. L. REV. 347, 404-05 (forthcoming 2010).
241. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV;
242. On incorporation, see Amar, supra note 13, at 386-90;
243. Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: "Privileges and Immunities" as an Antebellum Term of Art, 99 GEO. L. J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 57), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1561183;
244. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
245. U. S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
246. To be sure, it is very rare for courts to find a constitutional violation in the government's failure to act. See generally Currie, supra note 132. But the very premise of presidential responsibility is that the President is guided by principles even if courts will not force him to be.
247. Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L. J. 330, 367-99 (2006);
248. cf. Presidential Statement on Signing the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 50 (Jan. 10, 2002) (signing educational bill with unconstitutional provisions).
249. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
250. These examples are not exhaustive. Another is President Lincoln's belief that he had a "constitutional duty" to preserve the Union by fighting the Civil War. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 691, 706-07 (2004) 1 (book review) (emphasis omitted).
251. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 [hereinafter BCRA], Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
252. Presidential Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 518 (Mar. 27, 2002), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020327.html.
253. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U. S. 93, 137 (2003)
254. overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)
255. reaff'd in part by Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010).
256. There is no evidence that the President disagreed with the conventional wisdom that neither the First Amendment nor the Equal Protection Clause limits private action.
257. See generally Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U. S. 551, 567 (1972);
258. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 17 (1883);
259. Lillian Riemer BeVier & John C. Harrison, The State Action Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588082.
260. Presidential Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 517 (Mar. 27, 2002), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020327.html
261. see also id. at 518 ("This legislation... does represent progress... [and] improves the current system of financing for Federal campaigns....") .
262. of course, depending on which provisions of the Act the President thought unconstitutional, it is possible that his faith in the courts may eventually be vindicated.
263. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010);
264. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D. C. Cir. 2010);
265. Emily's List v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 581 F.3d 1, 4 (D. C. Cir. 2009).
266. But see Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 153 (2010)
267. summarily aff'd, 130 S. Ct. 3544.
268. But even what vindication has come has been slow. Contra BCRA § 403 (a) (4), 116 Stat. 81 at 113-14 (requiring courts "to expedite to the greatest possible extent" challenges to the BCRA).
269. Prakash, supra note 1, at 84-86.
270. See James Madison, Veto Message (Mar. 3, 1817), reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION of THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS of THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 58, at 569;
271. James Monroe, Veto Message (Mar. 4, 1822), reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION of THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS of THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 58, at 142;
272. Prakash, supra note 1, at 84-86. For more background
273. see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829, at 260-66 (2001) (discussing the internal improvements veto);
274. id. at 279-81 (discussing Cumberland Road).
275. That is, assuming that their constitutional objections were accurate. But see, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 183, at 278, 280-81 (questioning Monroe's objections to the Cumberland Road bill).
276. Prakash, supra note 1, at 84 (quoting Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Feb. 16, 1791), in 31 THE WRITINGS of GEORGE WASHINGTON 215 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939)).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 85-86.
279. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 4 n. 7 (1997)
280. (quoting Letter from George Washington to Catherine Macaulay Graham (Jan. 9, 1790), in 30 THE WRITINGS of GEORGE WASHINGTON 496 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939)).
281. Letter from George Washington to James Madison (May 5, 1789), in 2 THE PAPERS of GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 216-17 (W. Abbott ed., 1987).
282. CURRIE, supra note 189, at 78-80.
283. One exception is Andrew Jackson, who vetoed a bank bill he plainly thought unredeemable, but also expressed the President's obligation to veto in more absolutist terms. Jackson, supra note 58, at 567 (discussed in Prakash, supra note 1, at 86 n. 22);
284. see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
285. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister or Constitutional Monarch?, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 743 (1989).
286. Cf. Baude, supra note 14, at 1831-34.
287. Accord Barron et al., supra note 31; Cass & Strauss, supra note 24.
288. Thanks to Hanah Volokh for stubbornly insisting on this point.
289. See DAVID O. STEWART, IMPEACHED: THE TRIAL of ANDREW JOHNSON AND THE FIGHT FOR LINCOLN'S LEGACY 321 (2009);
290. Chafetz, supra note 169, at 401-02.
291. AMAR, supra note 13, at 184;
292. Ross A. Wilson, Note, A Third Way: The Presidential Non-Signing Statement 34-35 (Apr. 21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593862.
293. Frederick Schauer, Ambivalence About the Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 16 (2007).
294. See John Harrison, Pardon as Prerogative, 13 FED. SENT'G REP. 147, 147 (2001).
295. See Waxman, supra note 144, at 1077-78, 1083.
296. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1494 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
297. accord Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N. Y. U. L. REV. 353 (1981).