Exploring the dynamics between terrorism and anti-terror spending: Theory and UK-evidence

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 77, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 189-202

  Peren Arin, K ^a,b   Lorz, Oliver ^c   Reich, Otto F M ^a   Spagnolo, Nicola ^b,d  

^a MASSEY UNIVERSITY   (New Zealand)

^b AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^c RWTH AACHEN UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^d BRUNEL UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Defense spending; Markov switching; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 79551548473     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.10.007     Document Type: Article

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