Public choice

A Handbook of Cultural Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 379-388

  Mazza, Isidoro ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CATANIA   (Italy)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 79251595883     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781781008003.00055     Document Type: Chapter

References (31)

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