Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 259-271

  Chen, Shimin ^a   Sun, Zheng ^b   Tang, Song ^b   Wu, Donghui ^c  

^a CHINA EUROPE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS SCHOOL   (China)

^b SHANGHAI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS   (China)

^c HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

China; G31; G34; Government intervention; Investment efficiency; L33; P31; Political connections

Indexed keywords

EID: 78751703213     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.08.004     Document Type: Article

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