Free-riding and cooperation in environmental games

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 119-158

  Espinola Arredondo, Ana ^a  

^a WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58449097862     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.01399.x     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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