Contracting contractors

Journal of Business Research

Volumn 64, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 338-343

  Singer, Marcos ^a   Donoso, Patricio ^b  

^a PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE CHILE   (Chile)

^b Escuela de Administración   (Chile)

Author keywords

Agency relationship; Contractors; Incentives

Indexed keywords

EID: 78751585378     PISSN: 01482963     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.11.022     Document Type: Article

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