Can a powerful CEO avoid involuntary replacement?-An empirical study from China

Asia Pacific Journal of Management

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 775-805

  Pi, Lili ^a,b,c   Lowe, Julian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BALLARAT   (Australia)

^b Department of Quantitative Economics   (China)

^c GUANGDONG UNIVERSITY OF BUSINESS STUDIES   (China)

Author keywords

CEO; Chinese firms; Forced turnover; Power

Indexed keywords

EID: 78751566053     PISSN: 02174561     EISSN: 15729958     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10490-009-9178-8     Document Type: Article

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